THE MODERN

SCHOOLMAN

MAY 1957

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SEMIOTIC AND A THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

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A student of current philosophies of science must sooner or later become aware of a curious state of affairs. If he is accustomed to the discipline and unity of a particular science, he may reasonably expect that a philosophy of science will in turn confer a larger unity on the elements of the scientific enterprise, not merely the various data of the sciences but also the conclusions and the activities of the scientists themselves. This is not, however, what he will find. What he is more apt to encounter in the various symposia and encyclopedias of unified science is an inveterate division of subject matters. Some may be written entirely in one language and some entirely in the other; some may be a mixture of both; but neither seems to have much to do with the other. The two approaches are (1) the nomothetic method with which he is familiar, arising from the "inexpugnable belief," as Whitehead put it, "that every detailed occurrence can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner exemplifying general principles";[1] and (2) the quite different program which Russell, after completing the *Principia Mathematica,* staked out for philosophy as its sole concern—the logical analysis of empirical propositions established by perception and science.[2]

To take the most ambitious and interesting example of a "metascience," semiotic, the science of signs—interesting because, unlike pure symbolic logic, it tries to unite logical analysis with the explanatory enterprise of science, and because, whatever its shortcomings, it has at least hit upon the fruitful notion of man as the sign-using animal—here too one encounters the same division of subject matters

with no visible means of getting from one to the other, despite the many assurances that semiotic confers unity. If one expected a larger epistemological unity in which the relation of logical analysis to the scientific explanation of natural events is to be made clear, he will be disappointed. He will get logical analysis and he will get scientific theorizing, but he will not learn what one has to do with the other.[3] There are studies on the biology of sign-function, and here one recognizes a basic continuity with the manifold of natural phenomena. When one speaks of animal *A* responding to buzzer *B* by salivation in expectation of food *F*, one is speaking a language familiar to psychologist, physiologist, and physicist alike, the language of spatio-temporal events which lend themselves to causal hypothesis. Stimulus-and-response events occur among natural existents and are mediated by physical structures and a causal nexus which is recognized as valid for organic and inorganic matter.[4] Thus, whatever the limitations of

[1]Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan, 1950), p. 18.

[2]Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, pp. 4 ff.

[3]"Languages are developed and used by living beings operating in a world of objects, and show the influence of both the users and the objects. If, as symbolic logic maintains, there are linguistic forms whose validity is not dependent upon non-linguistic objects, then their validity must be dependent upon the rules of the language in question" (C. W. Morris, *Int. Encyc. of Unified Science* [Univ. of Chicago Press, 1955], p. 66). Characteristically, semioticists do not find it remarkable that sign-using animals should have developed symbolic logic "whose validity is not dependent on non-linguistic objects." It is therefore not worth investigating how this could have come about but only necessary to note that it has and to define this unusual activity as the "syntactical dimension" of semiotic.

[4]Nor should one be confused by the encyclopedists' disavowals of determinism in favor of the probability approach, which is supposed to resolve the nomothetic-ideographic dichotomy of object-science and history (cf. Egon Brunswik, "The Conceptual Framework of Psychology," *Int. Encyc. of Unified Science*, p. 696). For, as becomes abundantly clear, the laws of probability are relied upon quite as heavily as strict causality (cf. Friend and Feibleman, *What Science Really Means* [London: Allen & Unwin, 1957], p. 180). As Nagel insists, although laws connecting micro-states may be statistical in character, that does not mean that laws connecting macro-states are not strictly deterministic (Ernest Nagel, "The Causal Character of Modern Physical Theory," *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* [New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953], p. 437).

[5]For example, the methodological negation of mental entities and the inability to take account of Gestalt qualities. (See G. P. Klubertanz, S.J., "The Psychologists and the Nature of Man," *The Nature of Man*, [Proceedings of Amer. Catholic Phil. Assoc., 1951], p. 70).

[6]Charles Morris, *Signs, Language and Behavior* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946), p. 19.

[7]Charles Morris, *Int. Encyc. of Unified Science*, p. 86.

[8]Campbell Crockett, "The Short and Puzzling Life of Logical Positivism," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXXI (January, 1954), 91.

a biological science of signs in man and animals,[5] one readily recognizes its validity as far as it goes. But then one suddenly finds oneself in the charged atmosphere of the Polish semanticists with their scoldings at the human *abuse* of signs. At one moment one is studying sign behavior as a natural science in which "interpreters" behave according to lawful empirical regularities and in the next moment as a quasi-ethical science in which "interpreters" disobey semantical rules and in general behave stupidly and perversely. There will also be articles dealing exclusively with syntactical rules in logic and mathematics, with the arbitrary formation of calculi, with the principles of logical implication. Or one may read statements by the same semioticist that (1) the basic terms of semiotic are all formulable in terms applicable to behavior as it occurs in an environment,[6] and (2) semiotic can be presented as a deductive system with undefined terms and primitive sentences which allow the deduction of other sentences as theorems.[7]

The fact is that a man engaged in the business of building a logical calculus is doing a very different sort of thing from an animal (or man) responding to a sign, and it is a difference which is not conjured away by ignoring it or by leaping nimbly from *res extensa* to *res cogitans* as though there were no epistemological abyss in between. I cannot say it as well as Professor Crockett: "I do not know whether one should try to describe the universe or whether one should play games with marks arranged according to certain rules; but I do know that one should decide which of these vastly different kinds of activities one is engaged in and inform the reader accordingly."[8]

It is not my intention to make a case against either of the two major components of semiotic, symbolic logic and behavioristics—the shortcomings of each are well known by now. Rather it is my hope to show that a true "semiotic," far from being the *coup de grace* of metaphysics, may prove of immense value inasmuch as it validates and illumines a classical metaphysical relation—*and this at an empirical level.*

I think it will be possible to show (1) that the "unified science" of semiotic is a spurious unity conferred by a deliberate equivocation

of the word "sign" to designate two generically different meaning-situations (the sign-relation and the symbol-relation) and (2) that an open "semiotical" analysis of symbolization—that is, one undertaken without theoretical presuppositions—will encounter and shed light upon two metaphysical relations: the first, the cognitive relation of identity by which a concept, a "formal sign," comes to contain within itself *in alio esse* the thing signified; the second, the relation of inter-subjectivity, one of the favorite themes of modern existentialists. It may well turn out that the semioticist has good reason to ignore the symbol-relation in view of his dictum that sign analysis replaces metaphysics, since an impartial analysis of symbolization can only bring one face to face with the very thing which the semioticist has been at all pains to avoid—a metaphysical issue.

Let us not be too hasty in surrendering the symbol to the symbolic logician or, as is sometimes done, to the mythist.[9] It is possible that a purely empirical inquiry into the symbol-function, an inquiry free of the dogmatic limitations of positivism, may provide fresh access to a philosophy of being.

I. Syntax and Science

Semiotic, the science of signs, is an attempt to bring together into

[9]"This is the last word of symbolism; it is the last word because symbolism moves in the order of univocal concepts, concepts which are merely given an 'analogical' reference by the mind; and through univocal concepts one can never acquire any proper and formal knowledge of reality as such, because reality as such is analogical. Follow the *via symbolica* as far as you like; follow it as far as it goes; it will never lead beyond agnosticism, either in metaphysics or theology" (James F. Anderson, *The Bond of Being* [St. Louis: Herder, 1954], p. 226).

[10]Roy Wood Sellars, "Materialism and Human Knowing," *Philosophy for the Future* (New York: Macmillan, 1949), p. 94.

[11]C. W. Morris, *Int. Encyc. of Unified Science,* pp. 84-85. "It will be convenient to have special terms to designate certain of the relations of signs to signs, to objects, and to interpreters. *'Implicates'* will be restricted to Dsyn, *'designates'* and *'denotes'* to Dsem and *'expresses'* to Dp. The word 'table' implicates (but does not designate) 'furniture with a horizontal top on which things may be placed,' designates a certain kind of object, denotes the objects to which it is applicable, and expresses its interpreter."

Note the ambiguity of the term "expresses its interpreter." "Implicates," "designates," and "denotes" are purely semantical-syntactical terms with no biological analogue. But what are we to take "expresses" to mean? Is it to be taken in the biological sense of a sign "announcing" its significatum to its interpreter or in the symbolic sense of "expressing a meaning"?

[12]*Ibid.,* p. 121.

[13]Such as, for example, *Philosophy for the Future,* "The Quest of Modern Materialism" (New York: Macmillan, 1949).

[14]Cf. Maurice Cornforth, "Logical Empiricism," *Philosophy for the Future,* p. 518.

the formal unity of a single science three separate disciplines: (1) the semantical rules by which symbols are applied to their designata, (2) the logical analysis of the relations of symbols as they appear in sentences, and (3) the natural science of behavioristics (to use Neurath's terminology), in which organisms are studied in their relation to the environment as it is mediated by signs. It was soon discovered, as Sellars points out, that the limitation of scientific empiricism to logical syntax is suicidal; and so the semantical and biological study of signs was added under the guidance of C. W. Morris.[10] According to Morris, these three disciplines may be regarded as three "dimensions" of the same science, the semantical dimension of semiotic, the syntactical dimension, and the pragmatic dimension.[11] This division is held to be analogous to the division of biology into anatomy, ecology, and physiology;[12] a symbolic logician, a semanticist, and a behaviorist are said to be emphasizing different aspects of the same science. Physiology requires anatomy and ecology requires both; all three conform admirably to the biologist's conception of organism as a system reacting to its environment according to its needs of maintaining its internal milieu and reproducing itself. Physiology is complemented by anatomy; one flows into the other without a hitch. But how does syntactical analysis flow into behavioristics? One may make a syntactical analysis of the sentences written down by a behaviorist, or one may study the sign responses of a symbolic logician; but in what larger scheme may the two be brought into some kind of order? We find symposia written from either point of view, from the physicalist's, who starts with matter and its interactions and tries to derive mind therefrom,[13] or from the symbolic logician's, who conceives the task to be the syntactical investigation of the language of science. Far from the one flowing naturally into the other, the fact is that one has very little use for the other. It takes the encyclopedist to bring them together.

It is well known that logical empiricism is without a theory of knowledge since it restricts itself to an abstract theory of the logic of language.[14] It is equally well known—and perhaps one is a consequence of the other—that the history of logical empiricism is the

history of wide fluctuations on the mind-body axis.[15] Examples of the extremes are the solipsism of Mach, Wittgenstein, and the early Carnap of *Der logische Aufbau* and the physicalism of the American behaviorists and the later Carnap. But even in the more modern attempts at unity, one is aware of the tendency to construe the field exclusively from the logical or the physicalist point of view—and indeed, how can it be otherwise when the problem of knowing is ruled out of court? A semioticist can easily take the position that the only genuine problem, as Carnap claimed, is one of logical analysis; that is, the question of the formal relations among the concepts that describe the data of first-person experience, the concepts of physics, and those of behaviorist psychology.[16] Or one can begin at the other end with the causal relations between signs and interpreters and derive mind and consciousness with never a thought for syntactical analysis.[17] Anatomy is indispensable to physiology, but syntax can get along very well without neurology. Neither symbolic logicians nor behaviorists are constrained to make contact with each other, and it is perhaps proper that they do not. But it is the semioticists who have brought them willy-nilly together to form the new organon. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to expect that this metascience will provide a larger order. Perhaps, then, it is the semanticists who fill the gap.

[15]Herbert Feigl, "The Mind-Body Problem in the Development of Logical Empiricism," *The Philosophy of Science* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 614 ff.

[16]*Ibid.*, p. 615.

[17]See, for example, Mead's *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952).

[18]Rudolf Carnap, *Introduction to Semantics* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1948), p. 9.

[19]Morris, *Int. Encyc. of Unified Science*, p. 101.

[20]Alfred Korzybski, *Science and Sanity* (Lakeville, Conn.: International Non-Aristotelian Library Pub. Co., 1952).

[21]*Ibid.*, p. 386.

[22]Alfred Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth," *Phil. and Phen. Research*, IV (1944), 375 ff.

[23]For example, in answer to the charge that his "Snow is white" sentence seems to imply a naive realism when it lays down the condition "if and only if snow is white," he writes: ". . . the semantic definition of truth implies nothing regarding the conditions under which a sentence like (1) *snow is white* can be asserted. It implies only that, whenever we assert or reject this sentence, we must be ready to assert or reject the correlated sentence (2): the sentence 'snow is white' is true.

"Thus we may accept the semantic conception of truth without giving up any epistemological attitude we may have had; we may remain naive realists, critical realists, or idealists—whatever we were before. The semantic conception of truth is completely neutral toward all these issues" (*ibid.*, p. 361).

[24]Rudolph Carnap, *The Unity of Science* (quoted by Cornforth in *Philosophy for the Future*, p. 510).

For semantics professes to deal with both the words of the logicians and the natural objects of the scientist.

We are destined to disappointment. Semantics, it turns out, abstracts from the user of language and analyzes only the expressions and their designata.[18] Like syntax it operates from the logical pole in that it is chiefly concerned with formation of "rules" for the application of symbols to things.[19] Korzybski, we discover, is not interested in how it is that words get applied to things, in the extraordinary act of naming, but only in our perverse tendency to use words incorrectly,[20] and in making a "structural differential" so that one may use words with the full knowledge of the level of abstraction to which they apply.[21] Or if we turn to Tarski's classic paper on the semantic conception of truth with high hopes that at last we have come to the heart of the matter, we will find as the thesis of the article the following criterion of "material adequacy": *X is true if, and only if, p is true,* which when interpreted yields: *"Snow is white" is true if, and only if, snow is white.*[22] I do not wish to deny the usefulness of Tarski's criterion within the limits he has set; I only wish to point out that Tarski by his own emphatic asseveration is not concerned with the problem of knowing.[23]

If, in order to bring the twain together by the semiotic method, we strain forward to the farthest limits of behaviorism and backwards to the earliest take-off point of semantics, we will find that the gap between them is narrow but exceeding deep. Logical syntax begins *with* the "protocol statement," the simplest naming sentence; semantics is exclusively concerned with its rules of designation. In regard to the logical syntax of the language of science, Carnap wrote: "Science is a system of statements based on direct experience and controlled by experimental verification. . . . Verification is based on *protocol statements.*" Protocol statements are "statements needing no justification and serving as the foundations for all the remaining statements of science."[24]

Behavioristics, even taken at its own estimation, brings us to a point considerably short of the relation of denotation and the protocol sentence. It deals with the sign behavior of animals and man according

to the method of natural science—that of discerning empirical regularities and later attributing them to a causal function, $a=f(b)$. An organism's response to a stimulus is resolvable into a sequential series of commotions mediated by structures, beginning with an air vibration and ending with an efferent nerve discharge into a glandular end-organ.[25]

An object-science of behavior can only make sense of language by trying to derive it from some refinement of sign-response. As Susanne Langer has pointed out, when the naming act is construed in these terms, when the situation in which you give something a name and it is the same for you as it is for me, when this peculiar relation of denotation is construed in terms of stimulus-response, one has the feeling that it leaves out the most important thing of all.[26] What is left out, what an object-science cannot get hold of by an intrinsic limitation of method is nothing less than the relation of denotation—*a name above all denotes something.*[27] If you say "James" to a dog whose master bears that name, the dog will interpret the sound as a sign and *look* for James. Say it to a person who knows someone called thus, and he will ask, "What about James?" That simple question is forever beyond the dog; signification is the only meaning a name can have for him.[28]

The upshot is, even if we go no farther than Mrs. Langer, who is otherwise in sympathy with the positivism of the semioticists, that in

[25]Nor does the Gestaltist, for that matter, take us an inch closer to the mysterious act of naming. By his concept of field forces and perceptual wholes, he can make sense of molar phenomena which escape the behaviorist. He can arrive at certain traits of configuration which apply alike to chickens and humans (see for example the Jastrow illusion in Koffka's *Gestalt Psychology*, p. 32). But neither the behaviorist nor the Gestaltist has anything to say, indeed does not wish to have anything to say, about the naming act. The very methodology of an object-science precludes its consideration of an object-sentence as such, perhaps for no other reason than that the object-science takes place within the very intersubjective nexus which attends language. (Cf. Marcel: "Without doubt the intersubjective nexus cannot in any way be asserted; it can only be acknowledged. . . . I should readily agree that it is the mysterious root of language" [*The Mystery of Being*, II, 10]).

[26]Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (Mentor Books, 1953), p. 51.

[27]*Ibid.*

[28]*Ibid.*, p. 50.

[29]Continuity "is the absence of ultimate parts in that which is divisible." It is "nothing but perfect generality of a law of relationship" (Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, VI, 172-73).

[30]Charles S. Peirce, "Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs," *Philosophical Writings* (Dover, 1955), p. 99.

[31]Morris, *Int. Encyc. of Unified Science*, p. 82.

semiotic symbol-analysis and the science of sign-behavior are brought willy-nilly together into a unity which has no other justification than that both have something to do with "sign." No larger sanction can be forthcoming because of the dictum that sign analysis replaces metaphysics. To say to a semioticist that he is confusing the logical with the real is unacceptable to him because of the "metaphysical" presuppositions involved. One might nevertheless expect that, within the limits of the semiotical method, some attempt might be made to achieve the continuity so highly prized by semioticists since the time of Peirce.[29] Failing this, one cannot help wondering whether to do so, to explore the gap between pragmatics and symbol analysis, will not run squarely into an "extra-semiotical" relation—not as a "metaphysical presupposition" or a "naive realism" but as an issue which is precisely arrived at by the semiotical method itself.

II. Sign and Symbol

Semiotic uses as its basic frame of reference the meaning triad of Charles Peirce.[30]



Its three components are sign, interpretant, and object. The "interpretant" in man is equivalent to "thought" or "idea" or, in modern semiotical usage, to "takings-account-of".[31] The interpretant therefore implies an organism in which the interpretant occurs, the interpreter. The virtue of the triadic conception of the meaning-relation is that it is conformable with the biological notion of stimulus-response, in

which the sign is equivalent to a stimulus, the conditioned response to the interpretant, and the designatum to the object of the response.

The triad can be looked at in either its biological (pragmatical) or its logical dimension. That is to say, it can be conceived either as a causal relation obtaining between natural existents and mediated by neural structures, sound waves, and so on; or it can be viewed syntactically-semantically. Thus, in the biological dimension, the buzzer (sign) has no direct relation to the object (food); whereas in the semantical dimension the word (sign) has the direct relation of designation with the object, precisely insofar as it is specified by a semantical rule to designate the object. Syntactics has to do with the logical relation which one sign bears to another.

The semioticists, however, when they speak of the meaning-relation as it is taken to occur among natural existents whether human or subhuman, regardless of whether they are speaking of the pragmatical or semantical dimension, always assume that it is a causal sequential event.[32] They are careful to use *response* instead of *conception* or *thought* or *idea*.[33] Even in Ogden and Richards' variation of Peirce's triad, in which the terms "symbol" and "thought" (or "reference") and "referent" are used, it is stated that "between a thought and a symbol causal relations hold."[34]

We may therefore express the basic semiotic relation in terms of the simple biological triad (represented in the diagram, page 235).

Between the sign and organism, organism and object, "real"[35] causal relations hold. The line between sign and object is dotted because no real relation holds but only an imputed relation, the semantical

[32]I use the word "causal" unprejudicially, to mean whatever the reader would take it to mean in the context. It does not matter for the argument whether one interprets this cause as efficient causality or as a probability function.

[33]". . . terms gain relations among themselves according to the relations of the *responses* of which the sign vehicles are a part, and these modes of usage are the pragmatical background of the formation and transformation rules" (Morris, *Int. Encyc. of Unified Science*, p. 95).

[34]C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (Harcourt, 1953), p. 10.

[35]*Ibid.*, p. 12.

[36]See *ibid.*; also Stuart Chase, *The Tyranny of Words;* Alfred Korzybski, *Science and Sanity.*

[37]It is irrelevant that in the case of thunder announcing rain, the thunder happens to have a real connection with the rain-process. The same relation of signification could be made to take place in a deaf organism by using a blue light to announce rain. Thus, to use St. Augustine's nomenclature, whether the sign is natural or conventional, the mode of response is the same.

relation of designation. A major doctrine of the semanticists is that most of the difficulties which thought encounters come about through the imputation of a real relation where only a semantical one exists.[86]



One knows at once what Ogden and Richards mean by *real* even though latter-day semioticists would avoid the term. Signification occurs as a material happening among natural existents, from the sound of the buzzer to an electro-colloidal change in the dog's brain to glandular secretion. There is, however, no such "real" relation between sign and object.[87]

Two considerations arise in connection with the semiotical theory of meaning. The first is simply this: If the semioticists insist on giving a biological account of the meaning-relation as it is taken to occur among natural existents (human organisms, words, things), what account are they prepared to give in these terms of the imputed and logical relations which occur in semantics and syntax? If the semantical relation between sign and designatum is not "real," then what is its status? Is its status settled by the nominal device of calling it an "imputed" relation? Is it simply "wrong" as one might gather from the semanticists? The answer is not forthcoming. One simply speaks in one breath of concepts as "responses" and in the next of the logical relations between concepts. This treatment is, as we have seen, ambiguous. Either it can mean that the semantical-syntactical relation stands in so obvious a continuity with sign behavior that nothing more need be said about it; or it may mean that of course it is "mental" and has nothing to do with sign behavior and that it goes without saying that the Cartesian dualism of *res extensa* and *res cogitans* prevails. In any case, it is unsatisfactory to be required to shift attention with-

out further ado from the great corpus of natural science to an "unreal but imputed" relation. It would not seem unreasonable to ask what one is to make of this queer relation in terms of a "unified science."

The second consideration, and one which on investigation leads to such unexpected consequences, has been raised, not by a hostile critic of semiosis, but by an erstwhile symbolic logician. There is something wrong, writes Susanne Langer, about regarding the word-symbol as a sign and a conception as a response.[38] Since the notion of meaning as signification in the narrow sense, as a response, "misses the most important feature of the material,"[39] *what is this feature and what are its epistemological consequences?*[40]

What is this most important feature which is left out by a causal rendering of meaning? It is, of course, the relation of denotation as opposed to signification. To give something a name, at first sight the most commonplace of events, is in reality a most mysterious act, one which is quite unprecedented in animal behavior and imponderable in its consequences. The semioticists are obliged by method to render symbol as a kind of sign. Morris defines a symbol as a sign produced by its interpreter which acts as a substitute for some other sign with which it is synonymous.[41] Thus, in a dog, hunger cramps can take the place of the buzzer in the control of the dog's behavior: "Hunger cramps might themselves come to be a sign (that is, a symbol) of food

[38]*Philosophy in a New Key*, p. 51.

[39]*Ibid.*

[40]If we had hoped that Mrs. Langer would follow up the epistemological consequences of this most important insight into the non-causal character of symbolic meaning, we shall be disappointed. She drops it quickly, restates her allegiance to positivism and goes on to the aesthetic symbol as the form of feeling. (See *Feeling and Form.*)

[41]*Sign, Language, and Behavior*, p. 25.

[42]*Ibid.*

[43]*Ibid.*, p. 28.

[44]For example, she had understood the word "water" (spelled into her hand) but only as a sign to which she must respond by fetching the mug, drinking the water, and so on. The significance of her discovery that this *is* water may be judged from the fact that having discovered what water *was*, she then wanted to know what everything else *was* (*The Story of My Life*, p. 25). (Cf. also the experiences of Marie Huertin, Lywine Lachance, and the well-authenticated account of Victor, the wild boy of Aveyron, who discovered the symbol *despite* every attempt of his positivist teacher to present it as a sign of a want [Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, p. 97]).

[45]Ernest Schachtel, "The Development of Focal Attention and the Emergence of Reality," *Psychiatry*, November, 1954; p. 309. "These considerations cast some doubt on the adequacy of Freud's theory of the origin and nature of thought . . . According to Freud thought has only one ancestor, the attempt at hallucinatory need-satisfaction . . . I believe that thought has two ancestors instead of one—namely, motivating needs, *and* a distinctively human capacity, the relatively autonomous capacity for object interest" (*ibid.*, p. 318).

at the customary place."[42] Although we may sympathize with Morris's purpose, not to disqualify "mind," but simply to advance semiotic as a science,[43] the fact remains that this is an extraordinary use of the word "symbol"—certainly it has nothing to do with denotation. It is the relation of denotation, as Mrs. Langer points out, which has been completely overlooked. The question is this: Can denotation be derived by a refinement of behavioral reaction, or is it something altogether different? Can any elaboration of response issue in naming? Why is it, we begin to wonder, the semioticists refuse to deal with symbolization, excepting only as it is governed by semantical rules?

That symbolization is radically and generically different from signification is confirmable in various ways. There is the sudden discovery of the symbol in the history of deaf-mutes, such as the well-known incident in which Helen Keller, who had "understood" words but only as signs, awoke to the extraordinary circumstance that the word "water" meant, denoted, the substance water.[44] There are the genetic studies of normal children, as for example the observation of Schachtel who speaks of the "autonomous object interest" of young children as being altogether different from the earlier need-gratification interest.[45] Symbolization can be approached genetically, as the proper subject of an empirical psychology; or it can be set forth phenomenologically, as a meaning-structure with certain irreducible terms and relations.

Let us first take notice of the gross elements of the symbol meaning-situation and later of the inter-relations which exist between them.

III. The Second Organism and the Relation of Intersubjectivity

What happens, then, when a sign becomes a symbol; when a sound, a vocable, which had served as a stimulus in the causal nexus of organism-in-an-environment, is suddenly discovered to *mean* something in the sense of denoting it?

It will be recalled that the relation of signification is a triadic one of sign-organism-object (see the diagram above). This schema holds true for any significatory meaning-situation. It is true of a dog responding to a buzzer by salivation; it is true of a polar bear responding to the sound of splitting ice; it is true of a man responding to a

telephone bell;[46] it is true of little Helen Keller responding to the word "water" by fetching water. The essential requirement of signification is that there be an organism in an environment capable of learning by effecting an electrical-colloidal change in the central nervous system and as a consequence responding to a stimulus in a biologically adaptive fashion.[47]

It is important to realize that whereas signification often occurs between two or more organisms, it is not essential that it should, and that generically the sort of response is the same whether one or more organisms are involved. The action of a dog in responding intelligently to the bark or feint of another dog—Mead's "conversation of gesture"[48]—is generically the same sort of meaning-relation as that in which a solitary polar bear responds to the sound of splitting ice. It is the *environment* to which the organism responds in a biologically adaptive fashion, and the mode of response is the same whether the environment consist of other organisms or of inorganic nature.

Only a moment's reflection is needed to realize that the minimal requirement of symbolization is quite different. By the very nature

[46]It is also true of a human responding to the shout "Fire!" in a crowded theatre (Mead's example in *Mind, Self and Society*). Here, characteristically, the semioticist confuses symbol and sign by citing human significatory responses as illustrative of human meaning in general. One may indeed *respond* to a word and in this respect our understanding is similar to Helen's understanding of signs prior to her discovery of the symbol and, in fact, generically the same as a dog's response to a spoken command. But it is an altogether different situation when a father tells his child that this *is* fire, and the child awakes to the fact that by this odd little sound of *fire* his father means this leaping flame.

[47]It does not matter for the present purpose that some intelligent responses are acquired by conditioning and that others are congenital dispositions of the organism. The learned response of the dog to the buzzer and the innate response of the chick to the sight of grain are both explicable in physico-causal terms as an event in an electrico-colloidal system. (See the "IRM," the Innate Response Mechanism in John Bowlby's "Critical Phases in the Development of Social Responses in Man," *New Biology*, 14 [Penguin Books, 1953]).

[48]*Mind, Self and Society*, p. 43.

[49]If there is a natural wisdom in etymologies, perhaps this is a case of it—for *conceive*, one suddenly realizes, means "to take *with*."

[50]George Mead, the great social behaviorist, clearly perceived that language and mind are essentially social phenomena. We owe a great deal to his prescience that the interpersonal milieu is of cardinal importance in the genesis of mind, even though he felt compelled to render this relation exclusively in behavioristic terms for fear of "metaphysical" consequences (it is clear that by "metaphysical" he meant anything airy and elusive). It is typical of his integrity, however, that even with his commitment to behaviorism, he did not shrink from mental phenomena and consciousness, and in fact attempted to derive consciousness from social interaction.

Having realized that language is an interpersonal phenomenon, however, he set himself the impossible task of deriving the symbol from a stimulus-response sequence. For since it was an article of faith with

of symbolic meaning, there must be *two* "organisms" in the meaning-relation, one who gives the name and one for whom the name becomes meaningful. The very essence of symbolization is an entering into a *mutuality* toward that which is symbolized. The very condition of my conceiving the object before me under the auspices of a symbol is that you name it for me or I name it for you. The act of symbolization requires another besides the hearer; it requires a namer. Without the presence of another, symbolization cannot conceivably occur because there is no one from whom the word can be received as meaningful. Robinson Crusoe writing in his diary after twenty years on the island is nevertheless performing a through-and-through social act. *The irreducible condition of every act of symbolization is the rendering intelligible; that is to say, the formulation of experience for a real or an implied someone else.*

The presence of the two organisms is not merely a genetic requirement, a *sine qua non* of symbolization; it is rather its enduring condition, its indispensable climate. Every act of symbolization, a naming, forming an hypothesis, creating a line of poetry, perhaps even thinking, implies *another* as a co-conceiver,[49] a co-celebrant of the thing which is symbolized. Symbolization is an exercise in intersubjectivity.

A new and indefeasible relation has come into being between the two organisms in virtue of which they are related not merely as one organism responding to another, but as namer and hearer, an I and a Thou. Mead's two dogs quarrelling over a bone exist in a conversation of gesture, a sequential order of gesture and counter-gesture. But a namer and a hearer of the name exist in a mutuality of understanding towards that which is symbolized. Here the terminology of object-science falls short. One must use such words as mutuality or intersubjectivity, however unsatisfactory they may be. But whatever we choose to call it, the fact remains that there has occurred a sudden co-intending of the object under the auspices of the symbol, a relation which of its very nature cannot be construed in causal language.[50]

Is it possible, then, that an unprejudiced semiotic may throw some light on the interpersonal relation, the I-Thou of Buber, the intersubjectivity of Marcel? As things stand now, the empirical mind can make very little of this entity "intersubjectivity," and the behaviorist

nothing at all. Like other existential themes, it seems very much in the air. Yet an empirical approach to the genesis of symbolization is bound to reveal it as a very real, if mysterious, relation. Perhaps the contribution of a new semiotic will be that intersubjectivity is by no means a reducible, or an imaginary, phenomenon but is a very real and pervasive bond and one mediated by a sensible symbol and a sensible object which is symbolized.[51]

We may therefore revise the sign triad as the symbol tetrad:



him that the explanatory science of behavioristics is the only hope of approaching mind, he could not do otherwise than render symbolization as a response. As a consequence, he is obliged to define a symbol as the kind of sign which "calls out" the same response from the speaker as from the hearer. This definition drives him into the absurdity of saying that a word can only mean the same thing for you and me if it provokes the same response from you and me. Thus, if I ask you to get up and fetch the visitor a chair, it must follow that I also arouse in myself the same tendency to get up and fetch the chair (*Mind, Self, and Society*, p. 67). Clearly, as Mrs. Langer noticed, something is wrong here.

Is it possible, we wonder, that Mead was right in his emphasis of the social bond, but mistaken in construing it behavioristically?

[51]Hocking writes of intersubjectivity as a direct unmediated bond from which mind and language arise: ". . . without the direct experiential knowledge of 'We are,'

The "organisms" no longer exist exclusively in a causal nexus but are united by a new and noncausal bond, the relation of intersubjectivity.

But a new relation has also arisen between the object and its symbol. What is the nature of the "imputed relation of identity"?

IV. The Intentional Relation of Identity

Mead said that a vocal gesture (sign) becomes a symbol when the individual responds to his own stimulus in the same way as other people respond.[52] Yet one cannot fail to realize that something is amiss in construing as a response Helen Keller's revelation that this *is* water. And certainly it misses the peculiar representative function of language to declare that, when I ask you to do something, I also arouse in myself the same tendency to do it.[53]

What, then, is changed in the semiotic relation by Helen Keller's inkling that this *is* water? Physically, the elements are the same as before. There is Helen; there is Miss Sullivan; there is the water flowing over one hand, and there is the word spelled out in the other. Yet something of very great moment has occurred. Not only does she have the sense of a revelation, so that all at once the whole world is open to her, not only does she experience a very great happiness, a joy which is quite different from her previous need-satisfactions (see Schachtel's "autonomous object interest" above), but immediately after discovering what the water *is*, she must then know what everything else *is*.

The critical question may now be raised. In discovering the peculiar denotative function of the symbol, has Helen only succeeded in opening Pandora's box of all our semantical ills of "identification," or has she hit upon the indispensable condition of our knowing anything at all, perhaps even of consciousness itself?[54] Is her joy an "hallucinatory need-satisfaction," an atavism of primitive word-magic; or is it a purely cognitive joy oriented toward being and its validation through the symbol?

It comes down to the mysterious naming act, this *is water* (the word spelled out in her hand). Here, of course, is where the trouble starts.

For clearly, as the semanticists never tire of telling us, the word is *not* water. You cannot eat the word "oyster," Chase assures us; but then not even the most superstitious totemistic tribesman would try to.[55] Yet the semanticists themselves are the best witnesses of the emergence of an extraordinary relation—which they deplore as the major calamity of the human race—the relation of an imputed identity between word and thing. Undoubtedly the semanticists have performed a service in calling attention to the human penchant for word-magic, for reifying meanings by simply applying words to them. Gabriel Marcel frequently speaks of the same tendency of "simulacrum" formation by which meanings become hardened and impenetrable to thought. Yet one wonders if it might not be more useful to investigate this imputed identity for what part it might play in human knowing, rather than simply deplore it—which is after all an odd pursuit for a "scientific empiricist."

To awake to the remarkable circumstance that something has a name is neither a response nor an imputed real identity. No one believes that the name is really the thing, nor does the sentence "This is water" mean this. Then what is the relation? It might clarify mat-

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the very ideas of 'sign,' 'language,' 'other mind,' itself could not arise" (William E. Hocking, "Marcel and the Ground Issues of Metaphysics," *Phil. and Phen. Research*, XIV [June, 1954], 453).

Yet one might wonder whether it is not the other way around—whether the relation "We are" does not arise through a mutual intending of the object through its symbol, the word which you give me and I can say too. It would perhaps be more characteristic of angelic intelligences to experience such an immediate intuitive knowledge rather than a knowledge mediated by sensible signs and objects. (See Walker Percy, "Symbol as Hermeneutic in Existentialism," *ibid.*, XVI [June, 1956], 526).

[52]*Mind, Self, and Society*, p. 67.

[53]*Ibid.*

[54]Cf. her comment on pre-symbolic thought: ". . . if a wordless sensation may be called a thought" (*The Story of My Life*, p. 25).

[55]In regard to primitive identification, Oliver Leroy writes: "The logic of a Huichol (who mystically identifies stag with wheat) would be deficient only on the day when he would prepare a wheat porridge while he thought he was making a stag stew" (*La raison primitive*, p. 70). Yet in some sense, the symbol is identified with the thing, a sense, moreover, which is open to superstitious abuse.

[56]Cf. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, p. 49.

[57]*Quid est illud in signato conjunctum signo, et praesens in signo praeter ipsum signum et entitatem ejus? Respondetur esse ipsummet signatum in alio esse.* "What may be that element of the signified which is joined to the sign and present in it as distinct from the sign itself? I answer: No other element than the very signified itself in another mode of existence" (John of St. Thomas, *Logic*, II. P., q. 21, a. 6; trans. Jacques Maritain).

[58]Jacques Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," *Ransoming the Time* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), p. 222.

ters to eliminate the mysterious copula, leaving the sentence, "This: water." Or even more simply, eliminate the word "this," leaving a pointing at and a naming (in semiotic language, an indexical sign plus a symbol). In its essence the making and the receiving of the naming act consists in a coupling, an apposing of two real entities, the uttered name and the object. It is this *pairing* which is unique and unprecedented in the causal nexus of significatory meaning. But what is the nature of this pairing? The two terms, it is clear, are related in some sense of identification, yet not a real identity. To express it in modern semiotical language, the water is conceived through the vehicle of the symbol.[56] In Scholastic language, the symbol has the peculiar property of containing within itself *in alio esse,* in another mode of existence, that which is symbolized.[57] Helen knows the water *through* and by means of the symbol.

The word is that by which the thing is conceived or known. It is, in Scholastic language, an intention. The Scholastics speak of concepts as "formal signs," intentions whose peculiar property it is, not to appear as an object, but to disappear before the object.[58] But here we are not dealing with concepts or mental entities. We are dealing with natural existents, the object and the vocable, the sound which actually trembles in the air. It is this latter which is in some sense intentionally identified with the thing. Or rather the thing is intended by the symbol. Perhaps much of the confusion which has arisen over the "identification" of the symbol with its designatum could have been avoided by an appreciation of the phenomenological (and Scholastic) notion of intentionality and by distinguishing real identity from the intentional relation of identity.

An interesting question arises in connection with the intentional function of the symbol. Is it possible that the symbol is a primitive precursor of the concept or "formal sign" of the Scholastics? The latter contains its object in an intentional mode of existence, *in alio esse. But so in an extraordinary fashion does the sensuous symbol.* In cases of false onomatopoeia, the symbol is transformed intentionally to imitate the thing symbolized (for example, *crash, glass, limber, furry, slice,* and so on). The word *glass* bears no resemblance to the thing glass. Yet it actually seems to transmit a quality of brittleness, glossi-

ness, and so on. The fact is that a symbolic transformation has occurred whereby the drab little vocable has been articulated by its meaning.[59]

The semanticists supply a valuable clue by their protestations. Confronted by a pencil, Korzybski says, it is absolutely false to say that this is a pencil; to say that it is can only lead to delusional states. Say whatever you like *about* the pencil, but do not say that it is a pencil. "Whatever you say the object is, well, it is not."[60] The pencil is itself unspeakable. True; but insofar as it remains unspeakable—that is, unvalidated by you and me through a symbol—it is also inconceivable. Clearly the semanticists are confusing an epistemological condition with a true identity.

How does it happen, Cassirer asked, that a finite and particular sensory content can be made into the vehicle of a general spiritual "meaning"?[61] And we know his answer. It is the Kantian variant that it is not reality which is known but the symbolic forms through which reality is conceived. Yet the empirical approach belies this. An empirical semiotic deals with natural existents and takes for granted a lawful reality about which something can be truly known. Even a strict behaviorist operates publicly in a community of other knowers and data to be known; he performs experiments on real data and publishes papers which he expects other scientists to understand. What account, after all, can Cassirer or any other idealist give of in-

[59]"The natural sound element has been taken up into and practically disappears from our consciousness in its significant symbolic connotation. In other words the natural sounds have been completely transmuted into conventional sound symbols" (R. A. Wilson, *The Miraculous Birth of Language* [New York: Philosophical Lib., 1948], p. 220).

One can establish this transformation to his own satisfaction by a simple experiment. Repeat the word "glass" many times; all at once it will lose its symbolic guise, its "glassiness," and become the poor drab vocable that it really is. Yet it is from its original poverty that its high symbolic potentiality derives. It is for this reason, as Mrs. Langer says, that a vocable is very good symbolic material, and a peach very poor.

[60]*Science and Sanity*, p. 35.

[61]Ernst Cassirer, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, Vol. I: *Language* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1953), p. 93.

[62]Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, "The Philosopher and the Myth," The Modern Schoolman, XXXII (November, 1954), 40.

[63]Marcel observes that when I ask what is this strange flower, I am more satisfied to be given a nondescriptive name than a scientific classification. "But now we find the real paradox—the first unscientific answer (it is a lupin, it is an orchid) which consisted in giving the *name* of the flower, although it had practically no rational basis, yet satisfied the demand in me which the interpretation by reduction tends . . . to frustrate" (*The Mystery of Being*, II, 13).

tersubjectivity? If it was, according to Kant, a "scandal of philosophy" in his day that no satisfactory solution could be found to the problem of intersubjectivity, is it any less a scandal now? But a broad semiotical approach can only bring one into the territory of epistemological realism. Since we do not know being directly, Wilhelmsen writes, we must sidle up to it; and at the symbol-object level, we can only do this by laying something of comparable ontological status alongside.

> Existence is attained immediately in the judgment; but judgments necessarily entail the use of phantasms, and, except in direct judgments of existing material things, the phantasms employed are symbolic. The philosopher must go through phantasm to reach being.[62]

Perhaps it would be truer, genetically speaking, to say that the primitive act of symbolization, occurring as it does prior to conception and phantasm, consists in the application, not of the phantasm, but of the sensuous symbol to the existing thing. A being is affirmed as being what it is through its denotation by symbol.[63] Is it not possible that what I primarily want in asking *what* something is, is not an explanation but a validation and affirmation of the thing itself as it is—a validation which can only be accomplished by laying something else alongside: the symbol?

We might therefore reverse Korzybski's dictum: It is *only* if you say what the object *is* that you can know anything about it at all.

The symbol meaning-relation may be defined as not merely an intentional but as a co-intentional relation of identity. The thing is intended through its symbol which you say and I can repeat, and it is only through this quasi-identification that it can be conceived at all. Thus it is, I believe, that an empirical and semiotical approach to meaning illumines and confirms in an unexpected manner the realist doctrine of the union of the knower and the thing known. The metaphysical implications of semiotic are clear enough. Knowing is not a causal sequence but an immaterial union. It is a union, however, which is mediated through material entities, the symbol and its object. Nor is it a private phenomenon—rather is it an exercise in intersubjectivity in which the Thou serves as an indispensable col-

league. Both the relation of intersubjectivity and the intentional relation of identity are real yet immaterial bonds.

To render human cognition physico-causally can only end in the hopeless ambiguity of current semioticists who must speak in two tongues with no lexicon to translate, the language of the scientist who deals with signs as natural existents and the language of the formal logician who deals with the syntactical relations between signs.

The intentional relation of identity is not only the basic relation of logical forms, as Professor Veatch has pointed out;[64] it is also the basic relation of symbolization. No wonder, then, that the symbolic logician has no use for it—for once the intentional character of knowing is recognized, "so far from being independent of metaphysics or first philosophy, [it] necessarily presupposes it."[65]

[64]Henry Babcock Veatch, *Intentional Logic* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1952).

[65]*Ibid.*, p. 18.

What Is the Starting Point of Metaphysics?

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I. Introduction: *Ens Commune* and Immateriality

The traditional definition of metaphysics, coming from Aristotle, is that it is the science of being *qua* being.[1] Since it is proposed as a wisdom embracing *all* being in its material object, its formal object—that which precisely makes all beings an object of metaphysical enquiry with respect to the causes and principles of their very being—cannot be limited and restricted to a determinate category of being. That which causes something *to be in a way not common to all beings* cannot, therefore, be a metaphysical cause or principle of being as such.

The very word "*meta*physics," therefore, implies a consideration of causes and principles in some way transcending the physical order of explanation. The metaphysician is seeking a more ultimate explanation of real things than can be provided by natural sciences dealing only with material entities in terms of their mobile and sensible being, as subject to becoming and change. Physical things, as material, are indeed subject to becoming and change; but is this materiality, which is the root of their mobility, the intrinsic principle which also constitutes them as actually existing beings? For a materialism, the answer would be affirmative; then the question must be raised as to whether materialism is a *meta*-physical position, or, indeed, if materialism be true, whether metaphysics is possible at all.

Aristotle, in a famous passage from Book VI of the *Metaphysics*, tells us that

> if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being *qua* being—both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being.[2]

This classic text seems to make the very existence of a science of metaphysics which is really distinct from physics dependent upon first proving

the existence of spiritual and immaterial entities. Whether metaphysics is so dependent and whether it is even possible to demonstrate spiritual realities prior to the existence of metaphysics—these are questions we will consider later. But what are the basic assumptions behind this text? Physics deals with movable beings existing separately (as substances exist), while mathematics deals with objects abstracted from matter and motion, although incapable of existing apart from matter and motion. Beings as considered in the physical sciences are neither intelligible apart from matter and motion, nor can they exist save in a material, changeable way. Mathematical entities are intelligible and definable in formal abstraction from motion and matter, but they are not themselves substances and hence lack separate existence. Metaphysics, consequently, is only distinguished from other theoretical sciences if it is dealing with things which both exist and are intelligible in separation from matter and change.

But precisely why, it may be objected, must an ultimate explanation of the very being of *everything which is* be found only on the level of immaterial or spiritual being? Is metaphysics at its outset committed by its very nature to varieties of idealism? Is the possibility of metaphysics not only dependent upon establishing somehow, some way, the existence of immaterial beings, but even upon an idealistic denial of the reality of matter or at least upon an insistence that matter in physical beings is metaphysically unintelligible and irrelevant? Certainly neither Aristotle nor St. Thomas could be called an idealist. Neither of them doubted the real, substantial existence of physical things. And in common with most thinkers, ancient and modern, who have ever talked about metaphysics, they assumed that such a science, if it existed, must have for its material object everything which is, without exception. A science which deals only with some special kind or class of being to the exclusion of all others is not metaphysics, whatever else it might be. If the formality under which *all* beings are to be considered is such that some really existing beings fall outside the scope of that formality, then the formal object so used is improperly metaphysical. As Lewis Hahn has remarked, the starting point should not be such as to beg the question against the options provided by major metaphysical positions. To define at the outset metaphysical being in such a way as to exclude the real existence or possibility of either material *or* immaterial beings would seem to be such a begging of the question.

Nevertheless, there are powerful exigencies which seem to call for some

[1]This paper was given at the colloquium on Thomism and contemporary philosophy at Saint Louis University, June 12-15, 1956.

[2]*Metaphysics* vi. 1026a10-33.
[3]*In Metaphys.*, proem.
[4]*Ibid.*

kind of "dematerialization" of being as studied by the metaphysician. First, there is the character of metaphysics as a science in the strictest sense of the word—if, indeed, it is to merit its antique reputation of being the highest natural wisdom. For both Aristotle and St. Thomas, science deals with things which cannot be other than they are. The radical contingency of material being, which is by its very nature subject to generation and corruption, would seem to render it unfit for scientific enquiry. The hold upon reality which a material thing has is tenuous and impermanent. It is by essence capable of becoming other than it is. The very individuality of a physical substance is dark and obscure, rooted in matter, and inexpressible and unintelligible in terms of essential definition. Matter, at least in the terrestrial sphere, was thought by Aristotle to be the ultimate source of chance and luck, events which escape the ordering finality of any finite agents. Accidental being could not be the subject of any scientific enquiry, much less of one which sought to know being *qua* being. The causality of accidental being is indefinite and indeterminate, and as such it is removed from the sphere of scientific knowledge. It cannot be rendered intelligible in terms of any line of *per se,* essentially subordinated causes.

Further, the character of metaphysics as "first philosophy," as the highest natural wisdom, demands that its objects have supreme intelligibility. If it is to be by right mistress of the other sciences it must be in the highest degree intellectual, and such a science must treat, St. Thomas tells us,[3] of the most intelligible things. But what are these most intelligible things? To begin with, they must be first in the order of causality. Indeed, metaphysics, as *wisdom,* is precisely the knowledge of the highest causes. Secondly, a science which is maximally intellectual must treat of principles which are supremely universal. Principles of this kind are not dealt with in any one of the special sciences. Thirdly, these supremely intelligible objects are such only if they exist in complete separation from matter.

> Now, those things are in the highest degree separated from matter which abstract not only from signate matter, as do natural forms taken universally, of which natural science treats, but which abstract altogether from sensible matter—and not only according to reason, as mathematical objects do, but also in respect to actual existence, as with God and the intelligences. Evidently, therefore, the science that considers these things is supremely intellectual and the chief or mistress of the others.[4]

Taking these three canons of maximal intelligibility for the objects of metaphysics, it is easy to see that beings considered precisely *as material* fail to measure up on all three counts. Let us consider the first canon.

Material beings as material can hardly be first and highest causes of the being of all things. Their materiality is a sign of radical contingence, of essential instability, of causal dependence upon others for their very being. Whether or not a metaphysical science dealing with first, uncaused causes —with the order of what Kant called the Unconditioned—is possible may be an open question. But if there *is* any metaphysical wisdom, it must be concerned with first causes of this order; and it is clear that material beings are hindered by their materiality from playing such a role. Their being by its very nature is transient, conditional, and derivative.

With respect to the second canon, of maximal universality, the manifest deficiencies and limitations of beings considered as material preclude them from qualifying as the objects of metaphysical enquiry. The particular natural sciences do indeed consider physical beings in their materiality, though not, however, in their individual but in their common material being. But this is not to study them precisely *as beings*. Until we come to the level of metaphysics, *existence* in the special natural and mathematical sciences is, as Gerard Smith points out, "an undisclosed factor which we assume without examination."[5] No one of the special physical sciences is concerned with the explanation of the very existence of its entities but only with the explanation or description of their existence in qualified, limited modes of being. Gerard Smith makes this point very effectively when he shows that no account given of a physical being by mathematics and the natural sciences can be precisely a description of that thing in terms of its very being:

> To explain, let x be a being. Let a being be anything which exists or can exist. Let x now be described accurately, if not fully, in measurable and sensible terms as follows: x is one (arithmetical account), spoonful (geometrical account) of gritty, acrid salt (physical account). It is not easy at first to see in what terms, other than more of the same, an account of x as a being could possibly be given. Observe, however, that to say x is a b c d e, and to say further that a b c d e is *the only possible description of x as of something which exists or can exist*, this is to say not only that x is a b c d e—a true statement; that is also to say that a thing which exists or can exist *must be a b c d e*—a false statement.[6]

If *x*, for example, is one hairy ape, this is still not a description of *x* in terms of its common metaphysical being, as something which exists or can

[5] *Natural Theology* (New York: Macmillan, 1952), p. 10.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[7] *In Boetii de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 1.

exist. If it were, *y*, who is not a hairy ape, would not be a being; and even *x*, if it should lose any of its predicates, would cease to be. Consequently metaphysical explanation is not the function of any of the special sciences of nature nor of all of them taken together. Their principles of description and explanation do not have the requisite universality.

The reasons for the third canon, that of maximal immateriality, should now be manifest. Indeed, for *any* speculative science, according to St. Thomas, a certain measure of freedom from matter in its objects is necessary. As St. Thomas writes:

> On the part of the intellect it is required that the object be immaterial, because the intellect itself is also immaterial; as regards the habitus of science, the object must be necessary, because science is of necessary things, as is proved in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*. Every necessary thing, as such, is immobile, since whatever is moved, so far as it is moved, can be and not be, either in an absolute or in a qualified sense, as is said in the ninth book of the *Metaphysics*. Consequently, separation from matter and motion, or from relationship to them, is essential to that speculable entity which is the object of speculative science.[7]

Hence even in the physical sciences there must be a certain dematerialization of its object, effected by abstraction from individual sensible matter, although common sensible matter must be retained. The *sheerly* contingent, with no tincture of necessity of any sort, is not only *as such* radically unintelligible but even, as St. Thomas's Third Way of proving God's existence makes clear, nonexistent, unless it is shot through and permeated with elements of formal and existential necessity which the intellect can disengage. A universe in which there is *only* the contingency arising out of the indeterminacy of matter is not even a possible universe. The superior ease, power, and facility of mathematical reasoning, as compared with the natural sciences, is rendered possible by a further purification of its objects from matter. Because of the privileged intelligibility of quantity, it can be considered by the intellect in formal abstraction apart from concretion in a material, mobile subject, although it cannot exist in this way. But the being which is the object of metaphysics must be maximally immaterial, as well as maximally universal, and first in the order of causality. Its immateriality involves a freedom from matter both in intelligibility and in existence.

II. The Reconciliation of Maximal Immateriality and Maximal Universality

A. The Dilemma

There is, however, in all that we have been saying about the object of metaphysics a residual ambiguity, precipitated by this very dematerialization of being which we have seen as necessary to make it a fit subject for the metaphysician. The ambiguity is reflected in the difficulty in reconciling the demand of maximal universality with the canons of maximal immateriality and primacy in causality.

In terms of maximal universality, the subject of metaphysics would seem to be *ens commune,* common being as distinguished from proper being. We have already seen that metaphysics proposes to deal with everything which is, rather than with some restricted class or category of reality. But if the subject of metaphysics is to be immaterial, immobile substances, as the other two canons would seem to prescribe, then metaphysics appears to be limited to the consideration of one class of beings to the exclusion of all others. How can we, by treating of principles *proper* to the being of immaterial substances, attain a knowledge of *ens commune*—of the being common to all things, both spiritual and physical? And, indeed, is it even possible for the human mind to achieve a *proper* knowledge of spiritual beings *qua* spiritual as distinguished from a much more modest knowledge of them by analogy with material beings?

What kind of immateriality in the object of metaphysics is really compatible with its maximal universality, so that it is the being common to all things? The text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is haunted by this problem. There are two series of Aristotelian texts concerning the object of metaphysics. On the one hand, Aristotle will speak of the Primary Philosophy as the science of the highest causes and as the science of the separate substances. This "theological" view of First Philosophy, as dealing with divine and immobile being, is regarded in some quarters as Platonic in origin. Being *qua* being in this context is the *ens perfectissimum.* On the other hand, there are those Aristotelian texts describing metaphysics as the science dealing *universally* with being *qua* being and not with particular being. This has often been regarded as an "ontological" view of metaphysics. Many scholars, such as Jaeger, have found these two views radically incompatible. It might even be argued that not only are the theological and ontological views incompatible but that we are confronted in them

[8]*The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951).

with a choice of equally unpalatable alternatives. The theological view seems to make metaphysics utterly beyond the reach of man's earth-bound natural reason. Indeed, we do not even know, to begin with, whether immaterial substances exist or are possible. Even if such knowledge of their existence should somehow prove to be available, it does not seem to be within the competence of human reason, in its sense bondage, to know them in their essential being. On the other hand, if *ens commune* is most universal because most abstract, it seems to be the emptiest and most barren of all concepts, a veritable "night in which all cows are black." Metaphysics founded upon the analysis of such a concept appears doomed to be the most sterile of all enterprises. It would become, as the contemporary positivists and analysts have been maintaining, "sound and fury signifying nothing," a game played with pseudoconcepts devoid of any meaning or intelligibility founded upon and derived from experience and hence verifiable in it. Such is the dilemma which must be honestly confronted and overcome if any valid metaphysical knowledge is to exist at all.

B. Proposed Solutions

1. The Primacy of Form: Owens's Aristotle

To this particular *aporia* there does not exist, I think, any finally satisfactory solution by Aristotle. Indeed, since antiquity there has been controversy about what Aristotle's definitive and ultimate position was concerning this matter. The early Greek commentators, who saw Aristotle through Neoplatonic spectacles, considered him as having opted for the theological view of metaphysics as a science of separated substances. Father Joseph Owens, C.SS.R., in his recent magistral study of the doctrine of being in Aristotle,[8] takes the same stand. It is not the business of this paper to enter into controversy about this question in the history of philosophy. For our purposes it is sufficient to prescind from the historical question, which is extremely difficult and vexed, and consider merely the doctrine which Owens thinks he finds in Aristotle on its philosophical merits as an attempted solution to the dilemma which has been proposed. As a presentation of Aristotle's own final positions it is perhaps oversimplified and exaggerated. But it constitutes an ideal case study for our present purposes.

According to Owens's version of Aristotle, the being of the separated substances—of the fifty-five or forty-seven unmoved movers of Book Lambda—is the being *qua* being of all things. Sensible substances exist not by virtue of their matter (which is a principle of potentiality rather than of actual being) nor even, according to Father Owens's exegesis, in virtue of their own proper form. Instead, they are denominated *beings* by the

metaphysician solely in terms of a relationship or reference to the being which is *proper* to separated substances. This relationship in virtue of which sensible things are denominated beings by extrinsic denomination is constituted in terms of finality, not efficient causality. The Schoolmen called this kind of predication analogy of extrinsic attribution; Aristotle called it *pros hen* equivocity. As Owens puts it:

> When they [sensible substances] are called Being, it is not their own nature, but the nature of the separate Entities which is primarily designated, just as the health of the body is expressed when a medicine is called healthy. Separate form is *Being* and is universal to all beings. It is the *cause* of Being, it is the Entity to all, by way of final causality. Because it is the highest type of reality it is the most universal. . . . As a science of *pros hen* equivocals, the Primary Wisdom contemplates form without matter—which is the nature of the separate Entities—in itself and as it is expressed in every other instance of Being. But this nature which it studies in every case is the same—separate Entity, which is Being *qua* Being in its highest instance. Wisdom is therefore correctly designated 'the science of separate Entity' without any further addition.[9]

Such a position achieves a reconciliation of the demands of maximal immateriality and universality only at a terrible cost. If the common being of all things is to be identified with the proper being of any of them, then all save the primary analogate will lose their own proper *being*. In their own right they will possess no metaphysical value or status. They may have proper natures of their own; but insofar as these natures are contaminated by matter and hence are principles of change and corruptibility, they are *in themselves* simply nonbeing. I do not believe Aristotle himself intended such a conclusion—it would certainly be only a variety of Platonism —but it is arguable that any attempt to establish metaphysics on the primacy of form will tend in this direction.

There are also other difficulties. It is remarkable that we find nowhere in the extant writings of Aristotle any treatise upon metaphysics which actually attempts to develop a science which in treating spiritual substance treats all beings universally. As Owens points out,[10] not even Book Lambda attempts to show how separate substance is expressed in every predication of being, although it contains the basis of such treatment in the doctrine of the final causality of the unmoved movers. We are forced, therefore, to say that Aristotle never wrote a metaphysics, at least in the sense of a science which has for its subject divine being. And, indeed, in terms of Aristotle's

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 295-96.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 287.
[11] *Metaphysics* ii. 1. 993b9-11.
[12] *In de Trin.* q. 5, a. 4.
[13] *Ibid.*

own epistemology and psychology there are compelling reasons making any such enterprise impossible. Aristotle himself once wrote,[11] perhaps with Plato's allegory of the cave in the background of his mind, that divine things, though supremely intelligible in themselves, are in relation to our human intellect as the light of the sun to the eyes of the owl. We cannot, therefore, attain to them by the light of natural reason except as we are led to them through their effects; and this is only a remote, indirect knowledge of them by analogy with material, sensible things. There is for the human mind in this life no direct intellectual intuition of subsistent forms.

2. *Ens Commune* and the Primacy of Existence: St. Thomas Aquinas

The kind of *separation* from matter and motion which constitutes the being *qua* being which is the object of metaphysics is not that of disengaging subsistent forms from matter. The primary task in founding a science of metaphysics is not, therefore, to first establish the existence of wholly immaterial substances and then, by somehow knowing the *proper* natures of these beings, to know the "common," metaphysical being of all things. This is to lead the human mind into a blind alley in which no forward movement is possible. The *aporia* growing out of the apparent conflict between the canons of maximal immateriality and universality cannot be resolved in this way.

As a consequence, St. Thomas Aquinas carefully distinguishes between divine being and *ens commune,* and denies that the positively immaterial being of God and of spiritual substances can be the subject of metaphysical enquiry. It is rather the being *common* to all and proper to none which is the real object of metaphysics. Such a science will indeed lead toward, and be consummated in, the knowledge of the existence of God and other spiritual beings and of their attributes through negation and analogy with material things; but such knowledge is the *goal,* not the *starting point,* of metaphysics. In metaphysics divine things are not considered in their own proper natures according as they subsist in themselves, which is the subject of sacred theology dependent upon revelation, but only insofar as they are principles of all things. Hence St. Thomas says that spiritual beings "are studied in that doctrine wherein the principles *common* to all beings are established and whose subject is being *qua* being."[12] All beings, "as regards their common participation in being, have certain principles that are the principles of all beings."[13] Such principles, common to all beings, are called common in two ways. There are principles analogically common to all beings *by predication.* Divine things are not principles of *ens commune* in this way, although the Owensian version of Aristotle attempted to make them so. Divine things are common principles of all be-

ings not by way of predication but by way of *causality,* which is the only way in which things numerically the same—individuals—can be common principles.

The *aporia* of universality and immateriality has, therefore, its origin in a double ambiguity. Both "universality" and "immateriality" are ambiguous, and in order to untie the *aporia* we must distinguish two different meanings for each term. As we have seen, universality may be either in the mode of predication or of causality. "Being separated from matter and motion" also has two distinct modes, and we will fail to understand the immateriality of the object of metaphysics unless these two meanings are precisely distinguished. The two modes of immateriality serve for St. Thomas in distinguishing metaphysics and sacred theology. Both sciences, he tells us,

> are concerned with things existing apart from matter and motion, but in diverse ways, according as a thing can exist in separation from matter and motion in either of two ways: in *one* way if by reason of its very nature it can in no wise exist in union with matter and motion, and thus are God and the angels said to be "separated" from matter and motion; in *another way* if the thing is not by its very nature existent in matter and motion but can exist apart therefrom, though it may sometimes be found in matter and motion; and thus being and substance, potency and act, are "separated" from matter and motion, because they do not depend upon matter and motion for their existence . . .[14]

The second mode of immateriality characterizes the common being of all things which is the object of metaphysics; the first mode is the being of divine things, not as manifested through their effects, but as manifested by God Himself in revelation. It is this latter which is the subject of sacred theology.

The metaphysical notion of being, therefore, is analogously common to all beings, in all of whom existence is found properly proportioned to, and as the actuality of, their natures, whether they be material *or* (if indeed spiritual entities exist) immaterial. It is a notion which is not reached by abstraction of any quiddity or nature, and which is not knowable, therefore, by any simple apprehension of essence. Indeed, there *is* no quiddity or essence which is common to all beings—no *formal* perfection which is the being *qua* being of everything which is.

But how, then, has such a notion been reached, if not by some kind of abstraction or prescinding from all of the proper differences, formal

[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *ST,* I, q. 3, a. 4.
[16] *Ibid.*

and material, found in beings? Surely, if we prescind from every specifying or individuating difference in beings we will end up with a pseudonotion of common being which will be utterly empty of content and meaning. We are confronted with the other horn of the dilemma mentioned earlier, in which the notion of being is indistinguishable from nothingness, and the metaphysics which pretends to analyze such a barren concept is an illusion. If we try to isolate or separate common being from proper beings, do we really grasp an intelligibility founded in experience which can be in us the seed of the highest natural wisdom?

Certainly there are texts in St. Thomas in which it is hard to see the vital difference between the separation from matter which gives the special immateriality and universality of *ens commune* and the abstraction from matter and specific differences which yields a generic concept. It is true that a generic universal can only signify, in an indeterminate way, *material* things. Starting with material beings, a process of total abstraction can never transcend the material or attain at the uttermost limits of generalization any notion strictly predicable of a spiritual being. For this reason the being which is divisible into the ten categories or predicaments, even though it is transgeneric, is still insufficient to qualify for metaphysical being. Nor can formal abstraction, characteristic of mathematics, ever reach a plane of spiritual *existence*. Mathematical formalities can be conceived and defined in abstraction from matter but not conceived as *existing* in this way. But what process other than abstraction can really attain the high plateau of metaphysical being?

In order to sharpen the problem, let us examine a crucial text of St. Thomas from the first part of the *Summa Theologiæ*.[15] In it St. Thomas is distinguishing between *ens commune* and the being proper to God alone. Neither divine being nor the being-in-general which is predicated of everything can have any additions made to them. They cannot be further specified or differentiated (and hence limited or restricted) without ceasing to be either divine being or being-in-general. St. Thomas points out that a thing that has nothing added to it can be understood in two ways. Its essence may *preclude* any addition. This is the case of divine being, which is the infinite actuality of existence itself, precluding any kind of limitation or contraction to any finite mode of existing. On the other hand, St. Thomas writes,

> we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it inasmuch as its essence does not *require* that anything should be added to it (thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason, but neither is it of the essence of animal to lack reason).[16]

Ens commune, being-in-general, then neither explicitly *includes* in its connotation the proper being of anything—that which differentiates it from all others—nor does it *exclude* it. The difficulty, however, is that this is also true of any generic universal in relation to its inferiors, and St. Thomas's own example only aggravates the problem. Certainly the notion of metaphysical being cannot so prescind from its differences as to exclude them. There is, in any event, nothing univocally and generically common to all beings, and the differences between beings are themselves *beings.* But these specifically and materially different modes of being cannot be actually included in *ens commune* in an explicit way without transforming common being into proper being.

The Schoolmen in the Thomistic tradition have dealt with this problem by talking about an "abstraction of confusion"—surely an unfortunate phrase in the use of the terms "abstraction" and "confusion." Somehow implicitly and actually but not explicitly the metaphysical notion of being must contain the proper modes of existing of all things without being restricted to any of them. But how can the human intellect form such a notion?

For St. Thomas, as we have already remarked, this simply cannot be explained by any process of abstraction which terminates in the simple intellectual grasp of some quiddity or essence, which will always be a nature proper to some being but not common to all. It cannot be the abstraction or separation of any *form.* Rather, what is separated and known as analogically common to all beings is precisely the act of existence itself. The intellect knows existence not in quidditative apprehension but in the judgment, presupposing a united operation of intelligence and sense powers. The existence which is known in this way is of course the existence of sensible, material beings. The judgment which definitively constitutes the metaphysical notion of being has come, in the Thomistic tradition, to be called the "negative judgment of separation"—that *to be* is not the same as *to be material.* Precisely what is the meaning of this judgment which founds the object of metaphysics, and what makes it possible?

The separation which is effected in the negative judgment is founded upon the discovery, in our experience of the existence of sensible beings, that *existence* is an act which is not *in and of itself* limited or restricted to finite modes of existing. Existence is the actuality even of forms. To contract this act of existing to a particular mode—to limit it so that it becomes the existence *proper* to a particular nature or kind of being—is to *add* to it, to formally or materially determine it so that it ceases to be *ens commune.* The metaphysical notion of being is not, therefore, the result of the abstraction of form from matter; but rather it is achieved by the separation of existence, as the act of acts, the perfection of perfections, from all material

and formal limitations and restrictions. This is the being analogically common to all things. In each of them it will be proportioned to the nature which receives it and is actuated by it. In one of them—God—existence may even be the *proper* nature. Whether there is such a being whose essential nature is to exist is a question not prejudged or known in advance prior to the constitution of the object of metaphysics. Nor is it a question which can be answered simply by an analysis of the content of *ens commune*. Suffice it to say that the existence of such a being is not *precluded* in such a notion, any more than the proper existence of material beings is precluded. Instead of being the emptiest and most abstract of all notions, it is the richest, for everything which *is*—either material or immaterial—is implicitly included in its content, and nothing real is excluded from its extension.

The source and the fullness of metaphysical intelligibility, therefore, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, is in existence rather than in form.

III. How Not to Establish the Object of Metaphysics

The main lines of St. Thomas's doctrine on the nature of the object of metaphysics and the meaning of the negative judgment of separation which is its foundation have now been described. But a fuller explanation of how this judgment—that *to be* is not the same as *to be material*—is grounded in experience and knowledge is needed. Let us first examine briefly certain approaches which I think are fruitless and excluded by the principles of St. Thomas's philosophy, although perhaps most professed Thomists since the thirteenth century have tried to employ them.

A. The Approach to Metaphysics from the Philosophy of Nature

The most common attempt to validate the negative judgment of separation has been to seek arguments within physics, or the philosophy of nature. The underlying assumption of all such theories is that while the philosophy of nature is immediately grounded in the data of experience, metaphysics is not and can only be indirectly related to experience through the intermediary of physical knowledge. Experience has, according to this view, only physical intelligibility. The philosophy of nature is therefore a bridge leading to the starting point of metaphysics. Obviously such a theory, in supposing that a lower science can establish the formal object of a higher science, is expecting the philosophy of nature to transcend itself and the limitations of its own formality. This is, I think, to expect the impossible.

It has most often been supposed that the philosophy of nature shows that *to be* is not the same as *to be material* by demonstrating, in a properly

physical way, the existence of God or of some other immaterial, spiritual being. Appeal is often made to the arguments for the existence of a First Unmoved Mover in the eighth book of Aristotle's *Physics* and in St. Thomas's First Way. There is not time here to examine the validity and character of proposed physical demonstrations of the existence of spiritual beings. But I think that, as the Reverend George Klubertanz, S.J., has recently been pointing out, there is one rock upon which all physical arguments seeking to prove the existence of immaterial causes and principles must founder. As long as the philosophy of nature remains within its own formality of *mobile* being, the meaning of existence, of the *is* in any of its propositions, must necessarily and inseparably be limited to changeable, material existence. Without a *prior* negative judgment of separation one cannot even begin to undertake a demonstration of the existence of God or spiritual beings. Immanuel Kant was quite right in supposing that it is an illusion to seek to go from the Conditioned objects of experience to that which is absolutely Unconditioned, *if* the only way in which reason can move or know existence is in terms of the Forms of sensibility and the categories of understanding. Such Kantian Forms and categories constitute an apparatus designed only for the production of *physical* intelligibility. Physical categories of explanation, whether Kantian or otherwise, are quite futile for either the production or the discovery of *metaphysical* intelligibility. If experience should prove to have *only* physical intelligibility, then metaphysics is indeed an illusion and an idle dream.

There is a stronger argment which is often advanced by those who think the foundations of metaphysics can be established in physics. Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy of nature, through the analysis of substantial change, can indeed show that matter, in its primary and ultimate nature, is pure potentiality. As a potential and indeterminate principle, it cannot simultaneously be the intrinsic principle within a being which makes it *actually to exist.* This, I am convinced, is a valid insight, and without it substantial change is radically unintelligible and impossible. It surely constitutes a significant part of the evidence which enables us to see that *to be*—the act of existing—is not identical with *to be material,* even in a material being. But is it *sufficient* to ground this judgment?

I think it is not, because there still would remain the possibility of being, as *ens commune,* being identified with the *proper form* of some being, which would make radically impossible the real existence of *many diverse* beings. Even if formally diverse beings were asserted to exist, but to exist precisely in virtue of a form proper to each, this formal diversity would still remain metaphysically unintelligible. Nor would a satisfactory solution be possible by asserting that these formally diverse beings *existed* not in

virtue of their own proper form but only by virtue of some relation to being *qua* being identified with the proper form or essential nature of some other (Aristotle's *pros hen* equivocity, the Schoolmen's analogy of extrinsic attribution). This form proper to another could not be the *common being* of all. As we have seen, even divine being is not *ens commune*. If it were, leaving aside the obvious alternative of pantheism, then we would have to say that the many who are denominated beings by extrinsic denomination --only by reference to the being of another—would have no real being of their own.

Consequently, to fully ground the negative judgment of separation, without which metaphysics cannot even begin, primary and compelling evidence must be found in our experience of the existence of sensible things, and in our judgments founded upon that experience, for a real distinction of essence and existence. Existence must be shown to be the act of forms themselves. The very possibility of the real existence of many formally diverse or numerically distinct beings rests upon the separation of existence from both matter and form. The metaphysical notion of being involves a real distinction of act and potency for finite beings on the level of existence itself. The philosophy of nature is incapable of knowing act and potency save in terms of matter and form and substance and accident—which is to attain principles of act and potency not in terms of being *qua* being but solely in terms of being *qua* mobile.

B. Is Metaphysics Self-caused? Can Metaphysics Establish Its Own Object?

The radical inadequacy of physics to engender the starting point of metaphysical knowledge has led certain Thomists to suppose that metaphysics is somehow self-engendering, so that it produces its own object by formally metaphysical processes. This would be to suppose that a science already formally constituted causes itself to be formally constituted—in other words, pre-exists its own existence.

One variety of such a position follows the old line we have so frequently encountered, which seeks to constitute the immaterial object of metaphysics by demonstrating the existence of God or of some spiritual being, this time metaphysically rather than physically. An approach of this kind has failed to distinguish the two modes of immateriality which were described earlier. In any event, a vicious circle is inevitable, since any such arguments to the existence of spiritual being already presuppose, if the arguments are properly metaphysical, that the object of metaphysics has already been formally constituted by a valid negative judgment of separation. I think it is easy enough to show that St. Thomas's famous Five Ways take for granted a real distinction of essence and existence in the sensible, material beings

from which the proofs begin. Without the negative judgment of separation, such a real distinction could not even be formulated. To maintain, as a contemporary Thomist seems to be saying, that this distinction itself, at least insofar as it involves the recognition of existential potency in creatures, is the *consequence* of first proving God's existence as a being in whom existence is His proper nature, is to make it radically impossible ever to prove God's existence at all. There is no way of metaphysically demonstrating the existence of spiritual entities unless metaphysics is already formally constituted by its object.

Indeed, the properly metaphysical meaning of the principle of causality itself presupposes the separation of existence brought about in the negative judgment. One must first know that existence is not *in and of itself* the existence of any particular nature or proper mode of being before a real distinction of essence and existence in finite beings can be crystallized and explicitly known, and as a consequence a metaphysical principle of causality formulated. Existence as metaphysically separated in the negative judgment is not even, as such, the existence proper to God. If it were, the existence of creatures would be impossible. Nor does existence as metaphysically separated exclude the existence of a being whose proper nature is *to be*. But we can be led by way of causality to the knowledge of God's existence from the existence of sensible, material beings only if we know that where existence is received in specific natures which contract and limit it, such existence is related to essence as act to potency and is therefore contingent, participated, and caused.

IV. Metaphysics and Experience: Conclusion

Is there any legitimate escape from the vicious circle involved in attempting to prove that *to be* is not the same as *to be material* by processes which already presuppose what is to be proved? Those who attempt to find the starting point of metaphysics in physics are trying to base it upon evidence lacking the intelligibility proportioned to it and are illicitly assuming the negative judgment of separation in trying to prove it. The same illicit assumption is involved in trying to make metaphysics project itself into being by metaphysically proving its own starting point. This kind of bootlegging is against the laws of human knowing and should be stopped. If there is to be any valid starting point at all for the journey into metaphysical wisdom, it can only be in our integral experience, perceptual and intellectual, of the world of sensible, material beings and of such massive facts as their existence in modes of formal diversity and numerical distinction. Such experience is charged not only with physical intelligibility, but there

is real metaphysical necessity and intelligibility discernible in it. It is structured not only physically but metaphysically as well. There is no other possible source for metaphysical knowledge.

The general tendency of modern philosophy has been to deny that experience possesses this highest dimension of significance and meaning. Certainly if metaphysics is cut off from any direct empirical foundations, it becomes a sterile rationalism, an a-priori analysis of pseudoconcepts. The rationalistic systems of the late mediaeval Schoolmen and of the seventeenth century are examples. If there is to be any real rehabilitation of metaphysics, there must first of all be a re-examination of the data of experience, more searching, more profound, and above all more *empirical* than that which was made by the empiricists of modern philosophy. This is the kind of preliminary phenomenological investigation which the Reverend Robert Henle, S.J., has recently called for. It is here that we should all begin; and it is only here, if at all, that metaphysical wisdom can have its birth in the human mind.

At the Annual Meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, March 22 and 23, the following officers were elected for 1957-1958: President, William Ernest Hocking; Secretary, Sidney C. Rome; Treasurer, Richard L. Barber; Councillor, Paul Weiss.

Marquette University announces a "Philosophical Workshop in the teaching of philosophy," to be held June 10, 11, 12, and 13. The general theme is the philosophical knowledge of man; the discussions will be led by the Reverend Gerald B. Phelan, Doctor Donald A. Gallagher, the Reverend Joseph Owens, c.ss.r., and the Reverend Bernard J. Cooke, s.j.

Victorian Studies, a new quarterly journal devoted to the examination of Victorian culture, will be published at Indiana University under the editorship of Philip Appleman, William Madden, and Michael Wolff. The Editors hope to include articles related to the various academic fields, as well as book reviews, bibliographies, and discussions. The subscription price will be $5.00; the first issue is to appear in the fall of 1957. (Address: The Editors, *Victorian Studies,* Indiana University, Bloomington.)

Professor Roland Houde, Villanova University (Villanova, Pa.) is compiling a bibliography of bibliographies of philosophers. Anyone who knows of a rare or little-known bibliography is asked to send as detailed information as possible to Professor Houde.

A Note on Certain Textual Evidence in Fabro's *La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione*

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In a previous paper I referred to the rather recent interest in the problem of Thomism and Platonism, and pointed to the elaborate studies of Santeler,[1] Fabro,[2] Geiger,[3] and Little.[4] I repeat here, by way of introduction, some of the remarks made there:

> These studies, obviously the result of most painstaking research, present a number of broad generalizations concerning Saint Thomas' historical and doctrinal relationships to Platonism. Their conclusions are supported by an extensive array of textual evidence. The value of the generalizations, therefore, depends entirely upon the texts presented. The crucial and critical question, then, in estimating the correctness of these studies and their enduring contribution to Thomistic scholarship is this: Do the texts, when properly and accurately read, support the interpretations essential to the various theses of these authors?
>
> Now, anyone acquainted with modern Thomistic scholarship knows that it is no easy or simple matter to read a given text correctly. The intricacy of the sources and historical backgrounds, the difficulties of terminology, of methods, of chronology and so forth, make the accurate reading of a text, as well as its ultimate interpretation into a general scheme, an achievement requiring all the resources of scholarship. Laborious and slow as it is, we must yet apply this type of study to the accumulated texts of these authors before we can properly assess the value of their work.[5]

In the rest of the paper I summarized and presented the results of studies in St. Thomas's own methodology for the handling of *positiones*.

In this present paper it is my purpose to submit to close scrutiny certain texts advanced by Fabro in support of his own conclusions. I do not wish at the present time to evaluate or criticize the broad generalizations of Fabro's study. My present purpose is much more modest. I propose to clear the ground by examining only that textual evidence which he advances in pages 57 to 64.

In these pages Fabro argues that the development of St. Thomas's thought displays an increasing benevolence toward Plato and a gradual but successful effort finally to create a synthesis by incorporating the Platonic metaphysics of participation into his own system. In support of this con-

clusion Fabro quotes a series of texts which we may take to constitute his fundamental evidence, for at the close of the series he says:

> It therefore appears established that, especially with regard to the works of his mature period, St. Thomas always tended toward a closer assimilation, within Aristotelian thought, of the metaphysical content of the Platonic notion of participation.[6]

And early in these pages he speaks of a "more favorable attitude toward Platonism"[7] and a more explicitly "benevolent attitude"[8] in the later works.

Obviously a general discussion of Aristotelian thought and the metaphysical content of the Platonic notion of participation would require the prior establishment of an accurate historico-philosophical definition of Platonism and Aristotelianism. Fortunately, the present discussion does not demand so difficult and laborious an undertaking. For Fabro, by using only St. Thomas's explicit comments on Plato and Aristotle, has located the immediate problem within the thought of St. Thomas himself. What Platonism and Aristotelianism are and what they mean are here taken to be that which St. Thomas understood them to be and to mean.

It seems obvious, also, that there is no question here of a total point-by-point opposition between Aristotle and Plato such that if one were to construct a complete list of Aristotelian theses, a list, corresponding in thesis-by-thesis opposition, could be constructed for Platonism. Whether one takes a careful historical view or whether one looks at the divergence of Aristotle and Plato through the minds of subsequent philosophers and commentators, it is surely clear that on many points Aristotle and Plato are in at least some agreement. The real problem is to determine (and here I replace the problem within the thought of St. Thomas) where St. Thomas thought the opposi-

[1] *Der Platonismus in der Erkenntnislehre des heiligen Thomas von Aquin* (Innsbruck: Rauch, 1939).

[2] *La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino* (Milan: "Vita e Pensiero," 1939).

[3] *La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 1942).

[4] *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism* (Dublin: Golden Eagle Books, 1950).

[5] "Saint Thomas' Methodology in the Treatment of 'Positiones,'" *Gregorianum*, XXXVI (1955), 391-409.

[6] "*Pare adunque assodato* che soprattutto nelle opere della maturità S. Thommaso tendesse ad una assimilazione sempre più intima entro il pensiero aristotelico del contenuto metafisica della nozione platonica di partecipazione" (*La Nozione*, p. 64).

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

[9] "Il problema che il Gilson ha fra le mani riguarda l'ilemorfismo universale di Avicebron nell'influsso che ebbe sull' Augustinismo, da una parte, e nella sua derivazione da Platone, dall'altra; *ora pare che è più prudente trattare i problemi uno alla volta prima di avanzare affermazioni d'ordine generale*" [italics added] (*ibid.*, pp. 63-64).

[10] *In II Sent.*, d. 1, a. 1, *Exp. Text.*; Fabro, *ibid.*, p. 58.

[11] "Veramente a voler essere precisi, e qui tocchiamo il punto cruciale del nostro saggio, anche S.T. sembra sia arrivato per tappe ed un po' alla volta a questa interpretazione 'sintetica' del due sistemi, *ed agli inizi della sua activitá letteraria tutte le sue simpatie erano per il Filosofo*" [italics added] (*La Nozione*, p. 58).

tion lay and how important he estimated it. If the question is placed in this fashion, it is immediately clear that we cannot simply lump texts together under the two rubrics of "approval" and "disapproval" of Plato. To strike a balance between such undifferentiated lists and so arrive at a *generalized* attitude of St. Thomas in regard to Plato and Platonism would thus confuse the entire issue. Fabro himself adopts this view in criticizing Gilson. After quoting Gilson's generalized conclusions, he remarks:

> The problem with which Gilson is faced concerns the universal hylomorphism of Avicebron in its influence on Augustinianism, on the one hand, and in its derivation from Plato on the other. *Now it seems that it is perhaps more prudent to treat problems one at a time before advancing affirmations of a general type.*[9]

Since, then, this procedure seems imposed by the nature of the question as well as stipulated by Fabro himself, I shall deal with the texts as they present different individual problems. However, it must be remembered that the texts are woven together in Fabro's presentation in such a way as to produce a cumulative general effect.

The investigation of these texts may also be considered as a series of case studies in Thomistic textual exegesis and as a contribution toward a general methodology for the reading of St. Thomas.

Fabro presents the development of St. Thomas's views in essentially three stages. First he establishes a point of departure in the *Commentary on the Sentences* wherein he finds St. Thomas an unqualified partisan of Aristotle and Plato's determined opponent. He then presents a series of texts from later works which are intended to show St. Thomas's increasing benevolence toward Plato and his gradual incorporation of Platonic metaphysics into his own system. Finally, he finds the climax of these developments in the third chapter of the *De Substantiis Separatis.*

I. The First Stage: *In II Sent.*, d. 1, Expositio Textus

Fabro advances one text to establish the point of departure:

> Plato erravit, quia posuit formas exemplares per se subsistentes extra intellectum divinum, nec ipsas neque materiam a Deo esse habere.[10]

From this text he generalizes on the early attitude of St. Thomas:

> Truly, to be precise, and here we touch upon a crucial point of our essay, even St. Thomas seems to have arrived gradually and a little at a time at this "synthetic" interpretation of the two systems. *At the beginning of his literary activity he was wholly sympathetic toward the Philosopher.*[11]

But is one text alone sufficient to ground a generalization with regard to St. Thomas's attitude "at the beginning of his literary activity," and does this text represent the consistent attitude of St. Thomas at that period?

There are approximately forty texts in the *Commentary on the Sentences* which refer to Plato and/or the *Platonici*.[12]

Now, while these texts are similar in being all Platonic references, they differ widely in the doctrinal points discussed and in the use St. Thomas makes of them. Moreover, if we consider them in relation to the Platonic references found in later works of St. Thomas, we find that they fall naturally into continuity with various series of texts which often reappear in the same sort of doctrinal context in the various works and often maintain a continuity quite in isolation from the general discussions of Platonism.

Let us first examine some of these texts for what they may reveal of St. Thomas's *general* attitude toward Platonism.

One group of texts deals with Plato's definition of pleasure. The definition itself is rejected precisely on Aristotelian grounds,[13] but in several of the texts the definition is recognized as revealing some aspect of the nature of pleasure and is used as a confirmation of a point of doctrine.[14]

Again a sympathetic interpretation of Plato's *"intellectus paternus"* is offered.[15]

Two texts deal with Plato's theory of the "self-moved first mover." St.

[12]I say "approximately" because the determination of what constitutes a unit-text is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. See Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956), pp. 7-17.

[13]". . . definitio illa Platonis non est conveniens, ut patet per Philosophum in VII et X Ethic" (*In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 3, a. 4, qa. 4 ad 2, in contr.).

[14]". . . Delectatio autem non potest esse nisi in cognoscente: propter quod Plato dixit, quod delectatio est generatio sensibilis in naturam" (*In I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1). Cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 20, q. 1, a. 2 ad 3; *In III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 2 ad 3.

[15]"Vel forte intellectum paternum nominat intellectum divinum, secundum quod in se quodam modo concipit ideam mundi . . ." (*In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4 ad 1).

[16]"Ad secundum dicendum, quod Augustinus accipit large moveri, secundum quod ipsum intelligere est moveri quoddam et velle, quae proprie non sunt motus, sed comparatione. In hoc enim verificatur dictum Platonis qui dicit: 'Deus movet se' . . . " (*ibid.*, d. 8, q. 3, a. 1 ad 2). "Sed forte propter hoc Plato posuit quod primum movens seipsum movet, inquantum cognoscit se et amat se, ut in VIII Phys. dicit Commentator" (*ibid.*, d. 45, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3).

[17]"Cosi nelle Sentenze, il Magister, trattando della creazione, simpatizza per Platone contro Aristotele ed in ciò si comporta da buon teologo e da fedele interprete della tradizione patristica" (*La Nozione*, p. 58).

[18]*Liber Secundus Sententiarum*, 1.

[19]*Ibid.*

[20]". . . ma S. Tommaso, nel Commentario, rettifica subito secco. . . ." (*La Nozione*, p. 58).

[21]*In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1 *Exp. Text.*

[22]". . . e difende [sc. S. Tommaso] con calore l'ortodossia di Aristotele" (*La Nozione*, p. 58).

Thomas refers explicitly to Averroes's commentary on that section of the *Physics* in which Aristotle attacks this Platonic position. However, St. Thomas justifies Plato by giving a broader interpretation of the word *movere.*[16]

These are only illustrations but they are sufficient to show that St. Thomas's attitude "at the beginning of his literary activity" was far more nuanced than Fabro's use of a single text would indicate. His attitude already included a discriminating approach to Platonic doctrines and an independence in evaluating Aristotle's critique.

Fabro increases the apparent evidential value of this text by his exposition of its setting in the *Commentary.* He introduces it thus:

> Thus in the *Sentences,* the Master, treating of creation, sympathizes with Plato against Aristotle and in this way remains a good theologian and a faithful interpreter of the Patristic tradition.[17]

But actually, in the part of the *Sentences* in which the Master treats of creation and on which the *Expositio Textus* cited immediately depends, there is no indication of sympathy with Plato. On the contrary, Peter Lombard wrote:

> . . . Moyses . . . elidens errorem quorundam plura sine principio fuisse principia opinantium. Plato namque tria initia fuisse existimavit Deum scilicet, et exemplar et materiam et ipsa increata sine principio, et Deum quasi artificem, non creatorem.[18]

There is no effort whatever in Peter Lombard's text to mitigate Plato's error; in fact, he proceeds immediately to refute it from Sacred Scripture.[19]

Fabro now continues:

> . . . but Saint Thomas, in the *Commentary,* rectifies things quickly and dryly.[20]

Since Peter Lombard has not excused Plato, there is nothing for St. Thomas to "rectify"; and the addition of "subito secco" is quite gratuitous, for if we now compare the alleged rectification with the words of Peter Lombard, St. Thomas, if anything, is less sweeping than the Lombard:

> Plato erravit quia posuit formas exemplares per se subsistentes extra intellectum divinum, neque ipsas neque materiam a Deo esse habere.[21]

In other words, St. Thomas, as we might expect in a passage taken from the *Expositio Textus,* simply repeats the exposition he found in the *littera* of Peter Lombard. There is some variation in the statement but certainly no "rectification."

Fabro now adds:

> . . . and he [St. Thomas] enthusiastically defends the orthodoxy of Aristotle.[22]

No reference is given for this addition. Certainly there is no defense in the *Expositio Textus* itself. In the articles of the *Commentary* directly based on this part of the *Expositio*, Aristotle's opinion is twice discussed explicitly. In listing opinions on *secondary* causality, Aristotle's is cited with approval and he seems to be said to hold that matter is created by God.[23] This is a simple statement, but certainly without "calore." Aristotle's doctrine is listed among the errors in the article "Utrum Mundus Sit Aeternus" and all these doctrines including Aristotle's are said to be "falsae et hereticae."[24] This is certainly no complete defense, no direct defense, and no enthusiastic ("con calore") defense.

Thus the gratuitous annotations with which Fabro surrounds this simple text from an *Expositio Textus* gives it an interpretative coloring, completely unjustified by, and partially directly contrary to, the context.

In fine, when this first text is read in its proper immediate context as well as against the entire body of Platonic references in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, it simply does not support Fabro's generalization. St. Thomas, in commenting on the *Sentences*, displayed a judiciously discriminating attitude with regard to Plato's doctrines. He is not the unqualified partisan of Aristotle or the unqualified opponent of Plato.

II. The Second Stage

In order to treat the texts here presented without undue repetition, I shall divide them into interrelated groups. One text, however, stands somewhat alone and so must be considered separately. I shall begin with this text.

A *In IV Metaphys.*, lect. 4

Fabro presents the text thus:

> Finally one meets also this curious text in the Commentary on the Metaphysics (a. 1271-1272): "Sive dicamus quod universale sit unum in omnibus secundum *opinionem* nostram, sive quod sit aliquid separatum secundum opinionem Platonis, sicut *fortassis* non est verum . . ."[25]

The text is read as displaying a benevolent attitude toward Plato, for Fabro begins his next sentence, "Quest'atteggiamento benevolo"; presumably the date of the *Commentary* is explicitly mentioned to emphasize, in line with the general tenor of Fabro's argument, the maturity of the text. Fabro's

[23] *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4 ad 4.

[24] *Ibid.*, d. 5, *sol.*

[25] *La Nozione*, p. 59.

[26] The translation is taken from the text given in the Cathala edition of St. Thomas's *Commentary*, Book IV, Lectio 4.

[27] *In IV Metaphys.*, lect. 4 (ed. Cathala, 584).

[28] *In I De An.*, lect. 10 (ed. Pirotta, 150).

[29] *In III Phys.*, lect. 8 (ed. Leonine, vol. II, No. 5). Cf. also *In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 16 (ed. Cathala, 1646); *In V Phys.*, lect. 6 (ed. Leon., II, 8). Fabro adds, in a footnote (p. 59, n. 1), a reference to *In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 5 (ed. Cathala, 1368-70), apparently as a confirmation. This text, however, is simply another Aristotelian *forsan* text.

underlining of *opinionem* and *fortassis* places the weight of the text in these words.

In order to read this text aright, it must first be related to the Aristotelian *littera* on which, as a commentary, it depends. As soon as we do so, we find that the text is an *ad litteram* comment, simply a clarifying expansion of Aristotle and that the words which seem to make this a "curioso testo" for Fabro are, as a matter of fact, *in the text of Aristotle:* "Et propter hoc si ens et unum non est universale idem in omnibus aut separabile, *ut forsan non est.*"[26] This is simply repeated by St. Thomas as "sicut fortassis non est verum." If this phrase displays a "benevolent attitude," it is Aristotle's benevolence which the text reveals. A curious situation indeed, since there is no doubt, either in St. Thomas's mind or in anyone else's, of Aristotle's opposition to the separation of the universals. Now, the apparently surprising character of this remark did not escape St. Thomas himself, for, after laying out the amplified meaning of the *littera,* he explains:

> Utitur tamen adverbio dubitandi, quasi nunc supponens quae inferius probabuntur.[27]

Thus the expression of doubt is seen by St. Thomas not as reflecting any real doubt in the mind of Aristotle but as a methodological procedure. Nor is this simply an *ad hoc* justification of the "curious" *fortassis.* On the contrary, it is a general principle of interpretation which St. Thomas frequently uses and which involves an explicit recognition of Aristotle's method. Thus, to quote but two parallel examples:

> Et quia ipse determinabit inferius quod intelligere est quaedam operatio animae, in qua non communicat cum corpore, et non est conjuncti; ideo dicit, quod intelligere forsitan est aliquid alterum ab operationibus conjuncti. *Et dicit "forsitan," quia non loquitur definiendo, sed supponendo.*[28]
>
> Deinde cum dicit: Physice autem magis etc., inducit rationes naturales ad ostendendum quod non sit corpus infinitum in actu. Circa quas considerandum est quod, quia Aristoteles nondum probaverat corpus caeleste esse alterius essentiae a quatuor elementis, opinio autem communis suo tempore fuerat quod esset de natura quatuor elementorum, procedit in his rationibus ac si non esset aliud corpus sensibile extra quatuor elementa, secundum suam consuetudinem: *quia semper antequam probet id quod est suae opinionis, procedit ex suppositione opinionis aliorum communis.* Unde postquam probavit in primo libro de Caelo et Mundo, caelum esse alterius naturae ab elementis, ad veritatis certitudinem iterat considerationem de infinito, ostendens universaliter quod nullum corpus sensibile est infinitum. . .[29]

Thus St. Thomas explicitly recognizes that Aristotle's method is to move toward a solution through a problematical study of various opinions. St. Thomas reads Aristotle's text in the light of this general methodology. Hence when the Thomistic comment is properly read within its full context, it loses its "curious" character and becomes only an instance of a common type of Aristotelian text and Thomistic comment, completely neutral and immaterial for the question of an increasing benevolence—or of any benevolence at all—on the part of St. Thomas.

If the text has any implications concerning St. Thomas's own view, it is that Aristotle had, later in the *Metaphysics*, definitively refuted the separation of the Ideas as held by Plato. This could be confirmed by a long series of texts, for on this point, at least, St. Thomas maintained a consistent opposition to Plato and consistently appealed to Aristotle's refutation.[80]

It is clear, then, that the appearance of evidential relevance for Fabro's thesis was created by citing the text in a truncated form. Had the next four lines been included in the quotation, St. Thomas's own explanation would have made the true import of the text evident even to the casual reader.

[80]See Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism*, pp. 351-73.

[81]Fabro refers to these texts either in the body or in the footnotes on pp. 60-61.

[82]Bourke, *Thomistic Bibliography* (St. Louis: The Modern Schoolman, 1945), p. 17; *In Aristotelis Libros De Caelo et Mundo*, ed. Spiazzi (Marietti, 1952), p. xv.

[83]St. Thomas, *In De C. et M.*, I, lect. 4 (ed. Spiazzi, 38)—Simplicius, *Com. Graeci*, VII, 12.16-29; 85.7-9; 86.8-11; I, lect. 6 (60-61)—Simplicius, *ibid.*, VII, 140.9-19; I, lect. 23 (231-33)—Simplicius, *ibid.*, VII, 306.18-307.11; I, lect. 29 (283)—Simplicius, *ibid.*, VII, 301.1-22; II, lect. 1 (297-98) depends substantially on Simplicius, *ibid.*, VII, 376.28-378.22. The attribution to Plato of the doctrine of dependence on a first cause goes beyond the immediate source in Simplicius, II, lect. 10 (384)—Simplicius, *ibid.*, VII, 435.32-436.1 (cf. *ibid.*, 88.5-25; 91.7-20); II, lect. 12 (408)—Simplicius, *ibid.*, VII, 454.23-456.6; II, lect. 21 (490)—Simplicius, *ibid.*, VII, 517.3-519.11.

[84]Paragraph 38, the igneous character of the heavenly body; 231-33, priority (temporal or not?) of unordered to ordered motion; 297-98, meaning of Plato's statement that the motion of the heavens is "contra naturam"; 384, contraries in the heavenly bodies; 408, the twofold motion of the stars; 490, revolution of the earth; 584, priority (temporal or not?) of unordered to ordered motion. 228 gives no doctrinal determination. It simply states the conciliatory exegetical principle laid down by Simplicius and contrasts it with the procedure of Alexander.

[85]See Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism*, "Analytic Index to the Texts," pp. 255-88, under appropriate headings.

[86]In paragraphs 231-33 and 584 the ordered motion of the heavens is said to be, according to Plato, from God *(a Deo)* and from the first principle *(a primo principio)*; in *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, *sol.*, we read: "Alii dixerunt quod res ab aeterno movebantur motu inordinato, et postea reductae sunt ad ordinem, vel casu . . . vel *a creatore*, et *hoc ponit Plato*." Here St. Thomas makes no effort to interpret away the temporal priority as, following Simplicius, he does in paragraphs 231-33 and 584; but dependence on God is introduced in all three texts.

B *In I De Caelo et Mundo*, lect. 4 (ed. Spiazzi, No. 38); lect. 6 (60-61); lect. 22 (228); lect. 23 (231); lect. 29 (283). *In II De C. et M.*, lect. 1 (297-98); lect. 10 (384); lect. 12 (408); lect. 21 (490). *In III De C. et M.*, lect. 6 (584); lect. 11. *In I De An.*, lect. 8 (ed. Pirotta, 107-8)[31]

The last reference to the commentary on the *De Caelo et Mundo* (Book III, lectio 11) can be immediately eliminated from discussion since it belongs not to St. Thomas but to Petrus de Alvernia.[32]

The general point of all these citations, according to Fabro, is that they show St. Thomas giving a sympathetic interpretation of a point of Platonic doctrine and thereby either saving him from Aristotle's criticism or even reconciling him with Aristotle.

These texts must be considered from three standpoints: (1) the sources, (2) the doctrinal content, and (3) attitude and interpretative method.

1) The sources

The source which St. Thomas used extensively and consistently in his commentary on the *De Caelo et Mundo* was Simplicius. Now *in every case* the sympathetic interpretation of Plato given or suggested in St. Thomas's text *is to be found in the text of Simplicius.*[33]

2) The doctrinal content

Moreover, none of these texts deals with any question of participation, of the theory of ideas, or of Platonic theory of knowledge. For the most part, physical and cosmological theories of quite neutral metaphysical interest are treated;[34] and most of these points are not touched on in early Thomistic works.[35] However, in two cases, a doctrine is reported which is also noted in the *Commentary on the Sentences.*[36] For this doctrinal area, therefore, the texts do not exidence any shift in St. Thomas's attitude but only a material extension of his knowledge of Platonic doctrine and of its possible interpretation.

There is only one metaphysical doctrine that appears in any of these texts. In paragraphs 60-61, 283, 297-98, the theory of the world's dependence *in esse* on a first cause is attributed to Plato. Hence from the standpoint of doctrine these are the only texts from the *Commentary on the De Cuelo et Mundo* which are germane to Fabro's thesis. This point will, however, be treated later.

3) Attitude and interpretative method

In order to consider this point, a brief summary of the technique of each text must be given. In paragraph 38, Plato and Aristotle are reconciled by

a sympathetic interpretation of Plato. In 60-61 St. Thomas exempts Plato from Aristotle's critique by (*a*) determining the exact point attacked by Aristotle and (*b*) interpreting Plato's intention in a different direction. In 231-33 Plato is exempted from Aristotle's critique by the suggestion of a *possible* ("*Potest etiam intelligi* Platonem dedisse intelligere. . .") interpretation for his doctrine; yet, the point is left undecided ("Sed quidquid Plato intellexerit") and Aristotle is said to have argued against Plato's words ("Aristoteles . . . obiieciebat contra id quod verba Platonis exprimunt"). 283 follows the same pattern (but "quidam dicunt" for the "Potest intelligi"). In 297-98 St. Thomas suggests ("sed *forte* Plato non intellexit . . . sed voluit exprimere") a favorable interpretation. In 384 a statement of Plato (which is not clearly approved) is used to confirm an opinion of Aristotle. In 408 St. Thomas reports Simplicius's ("Dicit etiam Simplicius") explanation of an at least apparent contradiction between Plato and Aristotle. In 490 St. Thomas suggests two possible explanations ("et ideo potest dici . . . vel potest dici. . .") which would excuse Plato and leave Aristotle dealing with his words (". . . quia possibile erat aliquos false intelligere verba Platonis, Aristoteles removet falsum intellectum qui ex his verbis haberi posset, sicut frequenter consuevit facere circa verba Platonis"). In 584 St. Thomas reports a defense of Plato made by his followers ("Sectatores autem Platonis dicunt eum hoc non intellexisse. . .") and remarks that, in accordance with this defense, Aristotle is arguing, once again, merely against Plato's words (". . . contra Platonicorum verba, ne ab eis aliquis in errorem inducatur").

Analysis of techniques

In this summary various techniques appear.

1. St. Thomas *suggests* a favorable interpretation of Plato (as in 297-98); this technique even to the verbal signal *forte* already is used in the *Commentary on the Sentences.*

> Vel *forte* intellectum paternum nominat [sc. Plato] intellectum divinum secundum quod in se quodam modo concipit ideam mundi. . . .[37]

2. St. Thomas uses a doctrine of Plato (which may not be wholly acceptable) to confirm a positive doctrine. This procedure also appears in the *Commentary on the Sentences.* The Platonic definition of pleasure is

[37]*In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4 ad 1.

[38]After the exposition of the doctrine, Plato is introduced, in the *Commentary on the Sentences,* by "Unde Plato dixit . . ."; in the *Commentary on the De Caelo et Mundo* by "Unde et Plato dixit . . ."

[39]*In III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 2 ad 3.

[40]Simplicius, *In L. De Caelo,* I (*Com. Graeci,* VII, 352.27-33); III (*ibid.,* VII, 587.37-588.7; 640.27-31).

[41]For example, *In I De An.*, lect. 8 (ed. Pirotta, 107-8); *in III Metaphys.*, lect. 11 (ed. Cathala, 468-71).

[42]*In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 3, a. 1 ad 2; *ibid.,* 45, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3.

[43]*CG,* I, cap. 13.

rejected, but it is used (even in the same verbal style[38]) to confirm a statement about pleasure.

> . . . delectatio causatur ex conjunctione convenientis. Conveniens enim adveniens perficit id cui advenit et quietat inclinationem in illud. Et haec quietatio secundum quod est percepta est delectatio. *Unde Plato dixit* quod delectatio est 'generatio sensibilis' id est incognita, 'in naturam', idest connaturalis.[39]

3. In four texts of *In De C. et M.*—paragraphs 38, 231-33, 490, 584 (and we might add 60-61)—Plato and Aristotle are reconciled, explicitly or implicitly, by a favorable interpretation of Plato, while, in three of them, Aristotle's critique is explained as being against "verba Platonis ne ab eis aliquis in errorem inducatur."

Now it is true that St. Thomas found an explicit formulation of this technique in Simplicius[40] and repeated the statement both in these texts and elsewhere.[41] Yet the technique is already employed in his early works. Thus in the *Commentary on the Sentences,* in two texts,[42] as we have seen, Plato's doctrine on the self-moved first mover is reconciled with Aristotle's unmoved mover by an interpretation of the word "move" as used by Plato. This reconciliation becomes wholly explicit in the certainly early *Contra Gentiles.*

> Sciendum autem quod Plato, qui posuit omne movens moveri, communius accepit nomen motus quam Aristoteles. Aristoteles enim proprie accepit motum, secundum quod est actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi: qualiter non est nisi divisibilium et corporum, ut probatur in VI Physic. Secundum Platonem autem movens seipsum non est corpus: accipiebat enim motum pro qualibet operatione, ita quod intelligere et opinari sit quoddam moveri; quem etiam modum loquendi Aristoteles tangit in III de Anima. Secundum hoc ergo dicebat primum movens seipsum movere quod intelligit se et vult vel amat se. Quod in aliquo non repugnat rationibus Aristotelis: nihil enim differt devenire ad aliquod primum quod moveat se, secundum Platonem; et devenire ad primum quod omnino sit immobile, secundum Aristotelem.[43]

Thus in certainly early works, St. Thomas already uses the equivalent to the distinction "intentiones Platonis" and "verba Platonis." Moreover, texts of this sort are scattered through the works; for example, *In B. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 4 ad 2; *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 1; *Q. D. de An.*, a. 1; *In VII Phy.*, lect. 1 (ed. Leon. 7); *ST*, I, q. 18, a. 3 ad 1.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find this technique combined with Simplicius's principle at a very appropriate point in the text of the *Commentary on the De Anima* which Fabro cites. For in the *De Anima* St.

Thomas found Aristotle criticizing the circular structure of the soul as developed in the *Timaeus*. On the one hand, all of St. Thomas's sources (including Aristotle) had presented Plato as holding a spiritual soul; on the other hand, Aristotle here in the *De Anima* appears to be arguing seriously against a Platonic theory which made the soul a "magnitude." If indeed the soul were a quantitative magnitude, it would not be spiritual; and this would be irreconcilable with all that St. Thomas knew of Plato's theory of soul.[44] If Plato did not hold the quantitative nature of the soul, how could one explain Aristotle's effort to refute this Platonic position?

The solution which St. Thomas uses and to which Fabro refers is highly ingenious.

> Posita opinione Platonis, hic Aristoteles reprobat eam. Ubi notandum est, quod plerumque quando reprobat opiniones Platonis, non reprobat eas quantum ad intentionem Platonis, sed quantum ad sonum verborum ejus. Quod ideo facit, quia Plato habuit malum modum docendi. Omnia enim figurate dicit, et per symbola docet: intendens aliud per verba, quam sonent ipsa verba; sicut quod dixit animam esse circulum. Et ideo ne aliquis propter ipsa verba incidat in errorem, Aristoteles disputat contra eum quantum ad id quod verba ejus sonant.
>
> Ponit autem Aristoteles rationes decem ad destruendum suprapositam opionem: quarum quaedam sunt contra eum, et quaedam contra verba ejus. Non enim Plato voluit, quod secundum veritatem intellectus esset magnitudo quantitativa, seu circulus, et motus circularis; sed metaphorice hoc attribuit intellectui. Nihilominus tamen Aristoteles, ne aliquis ex hoc erret, disputat contra eum secundum quod verba sonant.[45]

Plato attributed shape and circular motion to the soul only metaphorically—thus Plato's doctrine of the spirituality of the soul is safeguarded; Aristotle, however, to protect those who would read Plato's metaphors literally, refutes the verbal position, not the real intention of Plato—thus Aristotle's critique becomes intelligible and his proper understanding of Plato is vindicated.

From the standpoint of technique and attitude this group of texts is, then, in continuity with a series of texts stretching back to the very beginning of St. Thomas's literary activity. What he found in Simplicius was an

[44]On the spirituality of the soul, cf. Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism*, "Analytic Index to the Texts," sub voce "anima." St. Thomas never refers, outside of the *De Anima* commentary, to the doctrine that the soul is a magnitude, and this although he devotes extensive discussions to Plato's theories on the soul.

[45]*In I De An.*, lect. 8 (ed. Pirotta, 107-8).

[46]See Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism*, Part Two, *passim*.

explicit formulation of this technique, a formulation which he accepted and cited at appropriate points. However, he continued to use it, even in the *Commentary on the De Caelo et Mundo,* with reserve and caution. Moreover, in a text cited by Fabro, we find him explicitly stating the exegetical principle of Simplicius, placing alongside it the contrary view of Alexander and concluding with this remark: "Quidquid autem horum sit, non est nobis multum curandum." This expression almost of indifference toward the conciliatory method of Simplicius is in perfect accord with the judicious use he makes of the principle and with the reserve, displayed in the texts themselves, which sometimes brings him merely to *report* the interpretation suggested in Simplicius.

Summary of the analysis

With regard to the technique displayed in these texts, we are then forced to conclude that St. Thomas throughout maintains a judicious and discriminatory attitude toward Platonic doctrines. He is prepared to reject, to accept, to distinguish, or, through various devices, to interpret benevolently the doctrines of Plato and his followers. No wholesale change in his attitude here appears; neither was he in the beginning a complete opponent of Plato, nor was he at any time determined to save and defend Plato against Aristotle. And it is noteworthy that in all these cases of benevolent interpretation and reconciliation, *it is Plato's doctrine which is re-interpreted and brought in line with Aristotle,* not Aristotle's. This fact alone makes the texts move in a direction contrary to Fabro's argument.

One last point: It might be argued in Fabro's defense that the multiplication of sympathetic and conciliatory texts is still some indication of an "increasing benevolence." However, this increase in number must be viewed against the total background of all Platonic texts. The references to Plato in general increase in the later works (there are some forty texts in the *Commentary on the Sentences;* at least one hundred in the *Summa Theologiae);* within this body of texts, those which seriously criticize or condemn Plato also increase both in number and in importance.[46] Since, then, the number of texts can be seen as a function of the total number of texts, the quantitative argument gives no strength to Fabro's position.

Consideration of the remaining texts in Fabro's second stage, must, for economy's sake, be postponed at this point.

III. The Third Stage: the *De Substantiis Separatis*

Fabro brings his argument to a climax with a consideration of the *De Substantiis Separatis.* He goes immediately to the third chapter, in which the agreement of Aristotle and Plato is developed. Now, it would seem

obvious that the third chapter must be read in the light of the previous chapters, since this indeed was the order established by St. Thomas himself. If, then, we turn to the first chapter we find here the most elaborate synthesis of Platonic doctrine to be found in the whole Thomistic corpus. Here St. Thomas exploits all his sources and synthesizes the main doctrines of Plato and of the *Platonici* into a philosophical unity,[47] displaying the logical connection of ideas as well as the premises which command and philosophically specify the entire synthesis. The formal structure is, therefore, what I have elsewhere called the *via Platonica,*[48] a philosophical method with specific philosophical principles. At the end of this extended exposition, St. Thomas says:

> Hujus autem positionis radix invenitur efficaciam non habere.

The basis for the position has no force; the philosophical soul of the synthesis is not viable.

This text is an echo of St. Thomas's very first analytical critique of Platonism in the *Commentary on the Sentences:*

> Horum autem omnium errorum et plurium hujusmodi unum videtur esse principium et fundamentum *quo destructo nihil probabilitatis remanet.*[49]

These two texts stand respectively at the beginning and the end of a series of texts in which St. Thomas analyzes Plato's basic metaphysics and basic epistemology, and rejects their philosophical foundations *(radix, fundamentum)*. I have examined this critique elsewhere and will here assume the results of that study.[50]

This faces us with a problem in St. Thomas. How does it happen that in Chapter Three he uses and approves positions whose philosophical foundations he has destroyed in Chapter One?

I have shown elsewhere that this problem is not limited to the *De Sub-*

[47]See *ibid.*, pp. 243-44, for a listing of the main sources.

[48]*Ibid.*, pp. 322-50; also "Saint Thomas' Methodology in the Treatment of 'Positiones,'" *Gregorianum,* XXXVI (1955), 391-409.

[49]*In II Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, sol.

[50]See note 48, *supra.*

[51]See note 48, *supra.*

[52]Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism,* pp. 403-18.

[53]For a full treatment of this text, see *ibid.*, pp. 302-3, and Henle, "Saint Thomas' Methodology in the Treatment of 'Positiones,'" pp. 402-4.

[54]For an extended examination of this question, see Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism,* pp. 387-96.

[55]See *ibid.*, "Saint Thomas' Polemical Strategy," pp. 423-25.

[56]Fabro does resume the discussion of these texts in two later sections of his work (pp. 83 and 284). He there recognizes some of the qualifications which must be made (and thereby weakens the argument of pages 57-63); but a thorough examination of his treatment would require a much broader textual base and a much more extended discussion than the limits of the present article allow.

stantiis Separatis. I there used a solution presented by St. Thomas himself, the solution based on a distinction between *positiones* and the philosophical method and principles, the *via* and *rationes,* which ground them and *give them specific meaning in a philosophical system.*[51]

This method for handling *positiones* is almost the reverse of that found in the previous group of texts. For here St. Thomas eliminates precisely the *intentiones* and *rationes* of a position while retaining its obvious verbal formulation.

In the light of this analysis of the *total* situation in the texts of St. Thomas, the third chapter of the *De Substantiis Separatis* must be read as a concordance of *positiones* which have, at least as far as Plato is concerned, been freed from their philosophical foundations and, hence, from their specifically Platonic *meaning* (at least as St. Thomas understood it).[52]

Hence, the simple appeal to the apparent meaning of the third chapter of the *De Substantiis Separatis* has no evidential force for Fabro's thesis.

We are now in a position to return to the second stage and resume consideration of the remaining texts.

A. *ST*, I, q. 6, a. 4 ad 12,[53] and *In De Div. Nom., Prologus*

These are very clear cases of the use of the *positio* treatment. Hence the texts must be read in the same way as the third chapter of the *De Substantiis Separatis.*

B. *De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 10 ad 8

This text handles an objection, developed out of Augustinian citations, against the created character of the agent intellect. It summarizes the positions of Socrates, Plato, Augustine, and Aristotle, and gives, briefly, St. Thomas's critical analysis of the *rationes* of Plato and his understanding of the dependence of Augustine on Plato. It is, in fact, a selective summary of the content of *ST*, I, q. 84,[54] with which it is wholly consistent and contemporary. The text must, therefore, be read alongside the *Summa* question. Now, St. Thomas clearly and explicitly recognizes a continuity of ideas from Plato to Augustine in regard to theory of knowledge. His procedure here is to acknowledge the relationship, to refute the *rationes* of Plato, and to end with a benign interpretation of the Augustinian citations.[55] This is exactly the procedure of the *De Spiritualibus Creaturis* text. It is the final benign interpretation which Fabro cites but with no reference to this complex background which alone makes it intelligible.[56] The text runs:

> Non multum autem refert dicere quod ipsa intelligibilia participentur a Deo vel quod lumen faciens intelligibilia.

It does not make much difference which you say. Why not? Because the

Platonic interpretation is equally sound? But St. Thomas has just refuted this interpretation in the very same text as well as in the running anti-Platonic critique of *ST*, I, q. 84. In what sense then? It must be in the sense of his own theory. More than this, however, in *ibid.*, a. 5, corp., he gives the exact sense in which it can be "said" that "ipsa intelligibilia participentur a Deo." This explanation precisely eliminates the Platonic meaning of the formula while letting it stand verbally.

Fabro calls this text "una frase motto inaspetta." After one has become aware of the strategy St. Thomas follows in dealing with the Platonizing expressions of St. Augustine, one, on the contrary, regularly expects phrases of this sort.

C. *In L. De Hebdomadibus*, cap. 2

> Et nihil differt quantum ad hoc si ponamus illas formas immateriales alterius gradus quam sint rationes horum sensibilium ut Aristoteles voluit.

In this text Fabro underlines "Et nihil differt quantum ad hoc," yet puts all his emphasis on "nihil differt." The restriction "quantum ad hoc" refers to the argument that separated forms, though simple in some sense, still participate *esse* and so are not truly simple. Obviously, this argument holds whether Platonic or Aristotelian forms are in question, and this is all that St. Thomas is here saying.[57]

[57]To make this obvious, the entire text should be read: "Est tamen considerandum, quod cum simplex dicatur aliquid ex eo quod caret compositione, nihil prohibet aliquid esse secundum quid simplex, inquantum caret aliqua compositione, quod tamen non est omnino simplex: unde ignis et aqua dicuntur simplicia corpora; inquantum carent compositione quae est ex contrariis, quae invenitur in mixtis; quorum tamen unumquodque est compositum tum ex partibus quantitatis, tum etiam ex forma et materia. Si ergo inveniantur aliquae formae non in materia; unaquaeque earum est quidem simplex quantum ad hoc quod caret materia, et per consequens quantitate, quae est dispositio materiae; quia tamen quaelibet forma est determinativa ipsius esse, nulla earum est ipsum esse, sed est habens esse. Puta, secundum opinionem Platonis, ponamus formam immaterialem subsistere, quae sit idea et ratio hominum materialium, et aliam formam quae sit idea et ratio equorum: manifestum erit quod ipsa forma immaterialis subsistens, cum sit quiddam determinatum ad speciem, non est ipsum esse commune, sed participat illud: et nihil differt quantum ad hoc, si ponamus illas formas immateriales altioris gradus quam sint rationes horum sensibilium, ut Aristoteles voluit: unaquaeque enim illarum, inquantum distinguitur ab alia, quaedam specialis forma est participans ipsum esse; et sic nulla earum erit vere simplex. Id autem erit solum vere simplex, quod non participat esse, non quidem inhaerens, sed subsistens."

[58]The most fully developed statement is *De Sub. Sep.*, cap. 1-2.

[59]"Dicendum quod communis intentio omnium fuit reducere multitudinem in unitatem, et varietatem in uniformitatem, secundum quod possibile esset" (*De Ver.*, q. 5, a. 9, corp.).

[60]*Ibid.*

D. The "dependence on God" in *In I De Caelo et Mundo*, lect. 6 (ed. Spiazzi, 60-61); lect. 29 (283). *In II De Caelo et Mundo*, lect. 1 (297-98); *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 5

We may also resume here the point previously postponed; namely, the attribution to Plato and/or the *Platonici* of a doctrine of creation. It is indeed clear that St. Thomas came finally to a synthesis of Plato-*Platonici* doctrines in which all the levels of being are reduced to a first "cause."[58] St. Thomas recognizes that the effort to reduce multiplicity to unity is the common aim of all philosophers.[59] The differences arise, however, from the procedure by which this unification is achieved in different philosophies.[60] Granting, then, that in the first synthesis St. Thomas sees Platonism as making all things dependent upon a first principle, the question must be asked: By what procedure and through what principles does he think this is done? This brings us back to the formal analysis of the *via Platonica* and the *rationes Platonis* which specify the Platonic reduction to unity. The formal philosophical principles turn out thus to be invalid, in St. Thomas's view, and to entail, in the conclusions, all those metaphysical and epistemological difficulties which St. Thomas formally points out. This, however, leaves the *positio* itself ambiguous and open to incorporation into a different frame of principles.

There is, then, a certain development on this point beyond the data of the commentary on the *Sentences*, a development in St. Thomas's knowledge of the *positiones* within the Platonic tradition, in his selective synthesis of them, and, finally, in his formal critique of the principles which he finds at the root of all of them.

Conclusion

We are thus forced to the final verdict that the texts advanced by Fabro in pages 57 to 62, when properly read within the appropriate Thomistic context, do not support his theses: (1) that there is, in St. Thomas, an attitude of increasing benevolence toward Plato, (2) that St. Thomas more and more assimilated Platonic metaphysics, formally as such, into his own system.

Many problems, indeed, remain; and not all the evidence on the general Thomistic-Platonic problem is yet in. Still, on the basis of present evidence, we can say: (1) that St. Thomas's attitude toward Platonic doctrines was, from the first, one of critical discrimination—he approved, distinguished, rejected, as seemed appropriate to each point of doctrine; (2) that his knowledge of Plato and Platonism grew through his years of literary activity; (3) that he devoted more and more attention to Plato and the *Platonici;* (4) that he developed a synthesis of the metaphysical and epistemological

doctrines drawn from Plato and the *Platonici* (the most developed presentation being [for metaphysics] that of the first chapter of the *De Substantiis Separatis* and [for epistemology] that of *ST*, I, q. 84); (5) that he related these syntheses to a method of philosophizing (the *via Platonica*) and a set of principles (the *rationes Platonis*) which he carefully criticized and rejected; (6) that he used (both for Plato and for St. Augustine) a *via-positio* technique which enabled him to reject the philosophy of a *positio* while yet retaining and approving the *positio* itself.

In addition, this short study has, perhaps, illustrated the difficulties involved in drawing generalizations from isolated Thomistic texts. No doubt, this study itself has not avoided all the pitfalls in the interpreter's path; yet, it may be hoped that comprehensive and co-operative efforts of this sort may bring us to establish a more scientific methodology for the reading of St. Thomas and a more exact understanding of his authentic meaning.

The Nature of Metaphor: Further Considerations

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In *Philosophical Studies* for December, 1955, Mr. Michael Slattery, in an article titled "Metaphor and Metaphysics," sets forth a theory of metaphor and takes exception to the theory which I propounded in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN in May, 1954. I believe that a consideration of Mr. Slattery's theory and a further statement of my own may possibly cast a beam of light in the direction of this mysterious and difficult problem.

In Mr. Slattery's view, metaphor presents no problem to the metaphysician, and therefore the solution is merely to perceive this fact. When I say, "That man is a lion," I do not mean, Mr. Slattery tells me, that the man is a lion. I intend to say that the man is a possessor of lordly courage. If I should object that the word "lion" does not mean "possessor of lordly courage" but signifies a supposit with the nature of the wild beast so named, Mr. Slattery would respond that such is the meaning of the term in literal speech but that its "metaphorical" meaning is "possessor of lordly courage."

My first ground for disagreeing with Mr. Slattery's view is that it seems to me to violate the rights of words. In order to save the metaphorical proposition from the charge of unintelligibility, he follows Humpty Dumpty's practice of making words mean precisely what he chooses. No matter how noble his goal, this appears to me an inadmissible and destructive means.

Mr. Slattery presumes that metaphorical propositions, like literal ones, do give expression to our abstract knowledge of things and are *therefore* of value. If they do not express clear knowledge, then they are false and valueless, or, as Plato thought, poisonous. Mr. Slattery intends to save them from this charge, to show that they do have an intelligible, scientific value in expressing knowledge. He does not start with an examination of metaphor, to see whether perhaps it is unique in human speech, to investigate why science rigorously excludes metaphor from its propositions, to ponder why poets and madmen seek out such strange predications; he does not speculate on the possibility of speech's giving expression, not to abstract thought, but to vision. He starts with the universal principle that metaphors are "informative expressions of thought" aimed at "enabling us to think and converse more easily" about objects and qualities. If that is true, then metaphors must be, as Mr. Slattery thinks that they are, literal statements superficially disguised. But happily for metaphor, if unhappily for science, that is not true.

Mr. Slattery wishes to base his theory on the teaching of St. Thomas. He refers to the standard texts—*De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 11; *Contra Gentiles*, I, cap. 30; *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 13, a. 6. But he fails to prove or even to discuss the important point that the *metaphora* of St. Thomas, which I believe that we would translate "figures of speech," are the same "metaphors" of which he himself wishes to speak. Nor does he make clear that the perfect and imperfect forms of the analogy of proportionality of which he speaks are drawn from the teachings of St. Thomas. His remarks smack of Cajetan's doctrine on metaphor to me; and I believe that I could show, if that were my purpose here, that Cajetan's analogy of improper proportionality—at least as that is understood by some of his modern followers—is not really drawn from the teaching of St. Thomas but is as a matter of fact contradictory to St. Thomas's Thomism. At any rate, those points are among essential premises to any claim that one's teaching is based on that of St. Thomas, and Mr. Slattery is anything but clear about them.

Furthermore, important differences which I seem to detect between St. Thomas's teaching and Mr. Slattery's make me question whether St. Thomas's metaphysics really is the framework for Mr. Slattery's theory, as he claims. For Mr. Slattery, if I interpret his statements correctly, being is a genus. He states that for St. Thomas all things have one basic similarity; they are all beings. As beings, they all have a similarity in common, but they do not have this being in precisely the same manner.

Being, then, is an analogous term, he claims, just as "animal" is. Animal means the same thing for all animals; but when applied to two different kinds of animals, it does not, Mr. Slattery asserts, mean *precisely* the same thing and is thus an analogous term. So the term "being," in Mr. Slattery's words, "cannot mean precisely the same thing when describing a dog and a colour since they do not have precisely the same manner of being." Note that "being" *describes* various beings and means something different in each case because different beings have somewhat different *manners* of being. Thus, like "animal," "being" is for Mr. Slattery a term proportioned to its subject, by which he appears to mean that the same term acquires a somewhat different meaning when it is predicated of each new subject. Such a term is, for Mr. Slattery, analogous.

Mr. Slattery further asserts that in every proportionality there are only three elements, since the predicate is analogically common to both subjects. He gives as an example, "Men exist and stones exist," which can also be stated, "Men and stones exist." Clearly then, Mr. Slattery opines, the term "exist" is one term for the two subjects. A fourth element does not arise, in his opinion, until we consider and "distinguish the difference *within*

the similarity." The act of existence of men and stones—apparently the same act under the general meaning of "exist"—is at different levels; so, though that common act can be said to be indistinguishable under one aspect, in Mr. Slattery's thought, it is not so under another; and thus "for the sake of truth, a distinction must be made between" the two acts of existence.

I am laboring to be fair to Mr. Slattery's thought and at the same time limit my discussion to those points on which it seems to me that I note his striking differences from St. Thomas's teaching and (more important) from the truth of the matter. For St. Thomas, as I understand his teaching on the matter, proportionality is different from proportion precisely in the point that when beings are considered strictly under the formality of proportionality, no relation whatever exists *between* the two distinct beings involved in the analogy (see *De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 11). The analogy of proportionality does not refer in any way to *something* shared by all the analogates. The analogy does not lie, then, in any *term* but in the intrinsic relation which exists *in* (not *between*) the beings. Therefore the term "exist," in Mr. Slattery's example, is not an "analogous" term, as he thinks it is.

To speak of analogous, univocal, and equivocal terms involves the literal meaning of those terms in relation to the things they signify. The term can be said to be absolutely univocal if it always means the same thing in relation to the object signified. Thus any term expressive of any category will retain the limits of that category and will in this respect be univocal. Equivocal terms signify different objects without reference to any similarity between those objects.

Analogous *terms* would thus signify some sameness shared by two different objects. If it is granted that both share the perfection named, then the perfection would have to be *in* each. The required sameness cannot be existential, obviously, since then the "two" objects would not be "two" and the term would clearly name the univocal perfection of one object. If the perfection is existentially different but formally the same, as "black" is in horse-hair and in the ace of spades, the term could be said to be analogous. But this is true of the term in predication *only*. In itself it is univocal, like every term that signifies a formal perfection, such as "courage," "lordly," and so on.

"Exist" does not refer to a formal perfection. There is no community in acts of existence that makes it possible for us to categorize them or to refer to something *in* each by which they could be said to be "somewhat the same." The term "exist" refers to that act which makes an essence to be; and thus we can "conceptualize" and arrive at a meaning for the term based on its necessary relation to essence, not by abstracting the perfection

from a being (as we abstract forms from beings), but by considering the judgment that we make, "That being exists," which states an intrinsic relation in the being between its essence and its act of existence.

Thus the term "exist" has one meaning in itself and many meanings in application. But it is not analogous as are terms referring to limitation or imperfection, which, according to St. Thomas in *De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 11, can be components of an analogy of proportionality. This type of proportionality, since material objects are our proper objects and our "figures of speech" are drawn from our proper knowledge, forms the analogy of *metaphora* in St. Thomas's sense of that word. Such terms as "lion," "stone," and so on, referring to *limited* beings necessarily, have some formal element which remains univocally the same in all predications. This is not true of terms which—like "being," "good," "exist," and so on—have *no* formal element which remains the same but take all their literal meaning from the being which *is*. Predicates like "good," "true," and so on, bring in a relation between the thing and a mind but refer to no formal perfection *in* the being. They consider the being as a being. These are the terms of that analogy of proportionality which St. Thomas considers as the analogy by which we may speak of God and creatures as beings, as good, and so on. As in all proportionality, there is *under this formality* no community whatever *between* the beings involved. But in this type of the analogy, dealing with terms not involving necessary limitation, there is no formal element of any kind that has to be excluded from the analogy.

My contention is that the metaphorical judgment does not deal with analogy and furthermore does not intend to state any relation which exists in or between beings in reality. Its unique and profoundly unscientific purpose is to express a relation which is founded both in reality and in the mind (and imagination). Hence, since metaphor does not express reality as it is, it is not science and is, in its proper purpose, *opposed* to science. For this reason, St. Thomas does not have occasion to treat it as it is in itself, since he deals exclusively with science. His purpose is to show the relation of *metaphora* to science; and thus, insofar as he treats the metaphor of this article, he is *more* occupied with showing what it is not than with revealing what it is.

The metaphorical judgment, unlike literal judgments, does not tell us under what formality the speaker has seized the subject named. It tells us that the speaker is rejecting every formality which is proper to that subject and wants to express to himself and to us the object named *as he sees it*, not alone as it is in itself. He is not concerned with scientific truth but with metaphorical truth (or, in somewhat paradoxical terms, with emotional as well as with scientific truth). Until we see the effect as he sees it, we

have no definite meaning for our metaphorical judgment; *when* we see the effect as he sees it, we know the object as it is *in him*. If his cognitive and emotional faculties are in healthy mental and physical condition, and if he shows himself and us honestly what he is seeing, we will see a strange and (outside metaphor) contradictory being.

This vision to which the metaphorical judgment urges the mind is not scientific knowledge. It derives from an *un*scientific process, a struggle to *avoid* the universal. The metaphorical judgment can, under proper conditions, be useful to the scientist, as St. Thomas points out in *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 1, a. 9, in regard to the *metaphora* of Scripture. Such figures of speech, though "hiding the truth" (as the metaphor of which I treat, considered in relation to science, certainly does), can, in union with definite, objective, and safe literal statements in other parts of revelation, give rise to scientific knowledge. It should be carefully noted, however, that St. Thomas is not discussing in this text or, so far as I know, elsewhere, what the figures of speech are intended to accomplish in themselves but merely what reference they have to the *science* of theology. His discussion of them will help us to see what, in his mind, metaphors are *not;* but it will be worse than misleading if we suppose, as some philosophers have, that he is trying to tell us *all* that metaphors *are*.

Many theologians and philosophers, insofar as I have been able to determine, have been prone to derive an erroneous conclusion from St. Thomas's statement in *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 1, a. 9. They suppose, like Mr. Slattery, that if I can in some way deduce scientific knowledge from *metaphora*, then the *metaphora* must somehow contain the scientific knowledge. Thus one would be forced to admit either that metaphors are disguised literal statements or that some distinction must be made between the metaphorical and literal meanings of a metaphor.

I deny the supposition that scientific knowledge is deduced in any way from the metaphorical judgment. Metaphor has as its sole aim the pointing of the mind at an existing object for the purpose of contemplating the contingent, acting object under a formality supplied by the contemplating intellect. Object and intellect fuse in the white-hot intuition of the intellectualized sense, which touches a characteristic act of the object. The intellect responds with an adequate but alien formality in an effort to express that nonabstractive intuition. Thus metaphor is formed, with its sole aim the pointing of the mind at an existing object for the purpose of contemplation. If the contemplation is achieved, then from *it* a scientific proposition might be deduced, if one wished to do so. If the contemplation is not achieved, then the metaphorical judgment has failed in its sole aim, and no grounds for scientific deduction exist. If science is to use

metaphor at all, then its operation must proceed from the act of contemplation, not from the metaphorical judgment. The individual *terms* of that judgment are indeed independently intelligible; but the metaphorical judgment itself has no definite intelligibility apart from the situation which it expresses—the existing and acting object seen and responded to by a unique, nonabstractive, unclear, satisfying contemplation of the intellectualized sense.

I cannot agree, as I have indicated, that Mr. Slattery reflects St. Thomas's teaching when he regards "animal" as an analogous term in its application to *animals*. As I view the matter, the term enters into anology only when it is applied to beings which are *not* animals. It seems to me that Mr. Slattery is confusing the real and the logical orders, and is supposing that "animal" is a term which includes "being an animal," "analogousness," "all species of animal," and so on, in itself on the basis of the sentient perfection each animal has.

Likewise, I believe that Mr. Slattery supposes that "being" is a term containing all beings in itself, on the basis of the perfection of existence each being has. This is not St. Thomas's teaching. Yet I can see no other possibility for explaining Mr. Slattery's statement that the verb "exist" can be considered in some aspect a common term for stones and men, except on the basis of supposing that he considers stones and men to possess a perfection of being which is in some aspect the same.

Mr. Slattery evidently thinks that the "somewhat the same" aspect of analogy applies to the *terms* as well as to the *beings* involved in proportionality and does not realize that the terms on each side of the analogy of proportionality have meaning only in relation to one another, none in relation to the terms on the other side. Neither "God" nor "exists" on one side of the analogy have, under the formality of the analogy of proper proportionality, any meaning in relation to "men" or "exist" on the other side. The two "exists" have *in this analogy* no community whatever, as the two nouns have no community. Only the fact that the two beings have an intrinsic relation—one a "relation" of identity and the other a real relation between *esse* and essence—makes it possible to say that both are beings. But there is no relation whatever *between* them, on the basis of *this* analogy. We are not speaking here of that analogy which considers necessary and contingent being, infinite and finite being, caused and uncaused being, or of any other analogy except that which considers being as being. And if it were not true that this analogy left beings absolutely distinct and unrelated, we would be speaking of God and creatures as sharing in some community of perfection.

Toward this terrible reef, against which St. Thomas so pointedly warns and which *his* analogy of proportionality avoids, Mr. Slattery, as I chart his course, inevitably steers. I believe that Mr. Slattery's radical differences from St. Thomas's teaching are revealed in his early statement that St. Thomas sees things as similar in that they are beings. But for St. Thomas, as I read him, things are not similar in *being*, considered absolutely, as it is in the analogy of proper proportionality; they are rather dissimilar, though similarity or lack of it seems to me irrelevant in this context. The analogy of proper proportionality is based on a relation intrinsic to each being, not on any relation *between* beings. As we have seen, each being, in being a being (not "caused" or "finite" but simply a being), is autonomous and distinct. It is certainly not similar to other beings on the basis of being a being. Only if being were a genus, something shared in by many, would Mr. Slattery be correct; but reality would then be contradictory. Among other things, as I pointed out above, God would then be similar to other beings on the basis of being.

Mr. Slattery, as I understand his statements, assents to that last proposition. He says:

> For this reason all creatures, in respect of existence, can metaphorically be called divine, since by their existence, no matter at what grade it is, they are similar to God. Conversely, all names which apply to created grades of being can be applied metaphorically to God, since God is in some way like each existing creature: "Every agent produces an effect similar to itself."

To state that names of creatures can be metaphorically applied to God *because* He is like creatures and to make that statement as the *converse* of the statement that creatures are like God on the basis of existence, seems to mean, if human language is to be taken seriously, that God is like creatures on the basis of existence and that there is real relation in God. If Mr. Slattery were thinking of the relation of reason which St. Thomas discusses in *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 13, a. 6, and elsewhere, he would not be able to speak of the *converse* of a real relation.

Further, the principle of causality which Mr. Slattery cites, as a demonstration that God is like creatures, reveals once more that Mr. Slattery conceives of being as a shared perfection. If beings are similar in being, then God is certainly similar to other beings. And, Mr. Slattery indicates, since God is the agent who produces being in all beings and since this common effect emanates from God, then, in Mr. Slattery's view, God is in some way like each being. If being is a common perfection by which things are similar, it follows quite logically that the Cause of this perfection must be like the perfections that He causes.

Such again is not the teaching of St. Thomas. Mr. Slattery might well consider the text that he recommends to his readers: "Deus nullo modo similis creaturis dicendus est, sed creaturae similes possunt dici Deo aliquo modo" (*De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 11 ad 1). Since Mr. Slattery, in his article, seems to think only of extrinsic and reciprocal relations, he may think that when the text says that creatures are like God, it must follow as the night the day that God is like creatures. But if he compares his "in some way like" with St. Thomas's absolute "nullo modo similis," he will at least not attribute his own view of God, of being, of metaphor and metaphysics, to St. Thomas.

"Being" refers to the total existent, not to any perfection which comes to the thing from an agent. "Being" has no reference to a cause, no implication of relation to anything else. "Beings" are neither similar nor different, when taken absolutely as beings. They simply are. They do not, considered absolutely as beings, share anything. As beings, they are neither one nor many. The term "being" does not refer to such matters. It is not a genus. It does not deal with extrinsic relations—real, attributed, or rational. It is not conceptual. It does not refer to a form, as do all nouns based on abstraction. It refers to what is known and expressed only in the *judgment* "The thing is," not to what is known and expressed in a *term*. It deals only with the existent in itself.

Thus Mr. Slattery's first principle, that things are similar in being, appears to me to be wrong; and judgments based on that principle will therefore be, in my judgment, *per se* wrong. It appears to me that just as he categorizes "being" as a common perfection which is applied to individual beings on various levels or grades, so he categorizes all other predicates of beings. Into this confusion he introduces the term "analogous," so that for him the term "animal," because it can be predicated of different species of animal, becomes an "analogous term." For St. Thomas, as I pointed out above, "animal" is a univocal term meaning always "supposit with sentient nature." The fact that it can be applied to different species does not affect its meaning or make it analogous in itself. Mr. Slattery, in accord with what I take to be a misconception of being, ignores the "is" of the judgment, and appears to think that terms carry within themselves not only form but also existence, analogousness or univocity, literal and metaphorical meanings, and perhaps other things.

As I see the matter, the subject-plus-is of the proposition expresses the being, and the predicate noun, if any, expresses the formality under which the intellect is seizing that being. The work of that predicate noun is to express a determined form, and, as I see it, that is all that it can do. Existence, analogousness, "metaphorical" meanings, and other items, rise out

f the judgment, not out of the term. It is of the essence of every term, xcept those that express existence, to express a determined form. When it ases to express that form, it has been destroyed.

To form a metaphor, Mr. Slattery "widens" the predicate noun until it xpresses something quite other than the form which it literally signifies. n "That man is a lion," the noun "lion" is "widened" until it means possessor of lordly courage." As I picture Mr. Slattery's process, he appears to think that buried in the term is a genus. After the tight-fitting ormal limits of the term are spread apart, the species drops out and leaves nly the genus "supposit," with a striking property which somehow got uck in that genus. This appears to me to be erroneous and, if it were aken seriously, dangerously so, since it is a basic attack on the objectivity f human speech. Mr. Slattery admits that we may, if we like, say that he term "lion" has been misused. "And yet it has been misused to a ood purpose," he points out. I do not agree.

For an attack on the real problem of metaphor, a philosopher must first ook at the situation with which metaphor confronts him. In this proposiion, "That man is a lion," he is confronted with a being, "That man is," nd with a formality which does not belong to that being. The mind appears to be revealing that it has seized that being under the formality xpressed in the term "lion." It is a desperate and irrational solution which estroys the term in order to save the truth of the proposition, as Mr. lattery does. Far better to leave the matter unsolved. Yet there is a soluion which respects the terms, which does not ignore the "is" and its mplications, which explains both agent and end, which provides, in brief, definition of metaphor. My explication of this solution in my previous rticle was certainly not clear to Mr. Slattery, perhaps because of our adically different notions of being and of relation, of the distinctions etween being and predication, between reality and categories, between he various kinds of analogy of being and analogous (as opposed to univeal) terms. Agreement on all of these notions as well as others I was orced to presuppose, since I was not writing a complete exposition of netaphysics but a mere explanation of metaphor. However, my treatment nay be less opaque if I take another approach and briefly outline, from a sychological start, what actually happens when the mind produces a netaphor, as I conceive the matter.

Let us suppose that I visit a friend in a large office, and while we converse, the boss emerges and in a loud voice demands more quiet, glares in ntimidating fury about the room, and retires. I have now perceived in his individual man the quality of producing loud noises in order to frighten nd subdue his subordinates. I do not arrive at this perception through

argumentation; I intuit the acting being with my intellectualized senses of sight, hearing, and others less obviously in act. Instead of using this contact with reality for scientific purposes, I remain in its murky yet vivid insight and contemplate the acting being and his effect on the others. I respond emotionally to this individual acting being until his act expands in my sight and appears to be out of proportion to the man's own nature. Hence, with my eye still fixed on that individual acting being, I ask myself, What nature *is* that act proportioned to? Then, from the store of bare natures in my mind, I can try several for size. A dog? That would fit if my emotional reaction were moderate and I could use a common cliché to express my vision. But if I perceive and perhaps feel great fear, and if complete silence results, and if the man's voice was extraordinarily loud, then a dog's nature will perhaps appear inadequate. A lion? Yes, that fits. Since this act is now seen as the act of a lion, and the act inheres in this man, then this man is a lion.

What do I mean by that proposition? Since I reject absolutely all such distinctions as those of Mr. Slattery between "literal" and "metaphorical" meanings of terms, I mean that the man is operating by the nature of a lion; so that by the term "lion" I mean quite literally what the term always means, a supposit operating with the nature of the beast so named. That meaning becomes more evident when I find that as a result of this predication, the boss's office becomes a lair or a den, the subordinates become sheep or prey, and so on. I certainly do not mean that the boss is the subject of "lordly courage." I do mean that he is a lion.

Mr. Slattery, like many other philosophers who have tackled this question, wishes at all costs to avoid the clear contradiction that he perceives (or perhaps better, senses) in the metaphorical judgment. Certainly the metaphorical proposition, taken by itself, does not convey definite intelligibility at all. Not only does it *not* make thought and converse easier (Mr. Slattery's desideratum), but it makes both impossible. All that my hearer can do to understand me is to *look at* the subject. I have not departed from my original intuition of the reality; if my hearer is to join me, he must share the darkness and the ineffability of that contemplation. My whole aim is to express what I am seeing and reacting to, and in no way can my hearer understand me but by seeing what I see and reacting as I react. This is the artistic approach to reality, and it is opposed to the philosophic. Until a philosopher realizes that fact, he will not be in a position to philosophize on metaphor.

If the metaphorical proposition did follow from the philosophical process and aim, then it would be a monstrous failure, since it is not in any sense a clear expression of the universal. More, it would involve a real contra-

diction. There could be no scientific justification for supplying an alien nature to this existing and acting supposit, since no such thing can possibly exist in reality. Nor, since it is a contradiction in any scientific sense, could it exist in the imagination, like a chimera or a satyr, since those are imagined with their own proper natures. On philosophical grounds, the metaphor indeed posits a real contradiction, since a finite act of existence cannot in reality actuate an alien nature. (An infinite act of existence could, as I pointed out in my previous article; Mr. Slattery did not see the point of my discussion of the Incarnation.) This real contradiction would operate on the level of nature, since only a substitution of natures, not of supposit or of accident, is involved. The mind, if it wishes to treat the predicate of the metaphor as a formality under which the being is seized, cannot operate. If, like Mr. Slattery, it feels that it cannot properly treat the predicate in any other way, it is stopped. Then it can deny the proposition as nonsense; or it can proceed by destroying the term and imposing a formal significance which will make sense of the proposition, as Mr. Slattery does; or it can take the unscientific and correct procedure of peering into reality outside itself, into the darkness of material opacity, and in the flash of light which it itself provides in its metaphor, in union with the imagination and the senses, of *seeing* the contingent and individual basis for the predication there. Since that basis *cannot* be conceptualized, converse is impossible; and contemplation, not (unhappily) of being, but of a reflection, a flash, a passing effect of being, is momentarily achieved. It is not much, but it is better than nothing and immeasurably more satisfactory to our *heart* (if not to our *brain*) than is the purest clarity of science.

The problem of metaphor, then, lies in the judgment, not in the term. In "That man is a lion," the supposit involved in the term "lion" is not an individual lion, as it always is in reality; in this judgment, the supposit involved in the term "lion" is a human person. This judgment is evidently false as a scientific statement about reality; but it is perfectly true, granted the expanded and unproportionate quality which the man is exhibiting. Hence it should be clear that while the statement is false on scientific grounds, it is true for the man as he exists in my immediate perception of him and immediate reaction to him. It will be true also to those who perceive and react as I do, and only to those.

The metaphorical judgment has no determined meaning apart from the individual accident of the subject as that accident exists in the maker of the metaphor. The exact meaning of the metaphor can never be determined unless one *sees* the subject as the metaphor-maker sees it. This fact is a scandal to many scientists and has led to solutions like Mr. Slattery's which attempt to fix a determined "metaphorical" meaning which the words can

carry with them. But metaphor does not aim at discursive meaning; it aims at vision. It does not intend to tell us anything but to make us look at something. Good critics, who look at metaphors first and consider them in reality undetermined by pseudo-universal principles, realize this; and sometimes, like John Crowe Ransom in *The World's Body* (New York, 1938, p. 142), they are able to express it (by "miraculism" here Mr. Ransom refers to the phenomenon called metaphor in this article):

> For scientific predication concludes an act of attention but miraculism initiates one. It leaves us looking, marvelling, and revelling in the thick *dinglich* substance that has just received its strange representation.

Metaphor does not aim at definite meaning and therefore does not stop there. Unlike literal predication, whose term is the mind's seizure of reality, the term of metaphor remains outside the mind wholly. It is not the object as adequately *known,* the aim of science; it is the individual being as vividly *contemplated,* the aim of metaphor.

Thus the mind does not want to offer, in metaphor, a rational meaning at which the mind can stop. It delights in offering a proposition which forces the mind to peer into the fascinating and shadowy maze of reality to see *there* what the solution is.

And the answer must lie in the individual quality of the real being as that quality exists in the intellectualized sense of the excited observer. The heart, the will, the emotions, enter in and expand the quality in the observer. Out of his love or fear or hate he sees this quality as larger or smaller than it really is. And unless he sees it this way, the metaphor could not come into being. Only a literal proposition could emerge from clear vision. The metaphor can germinate and live only in the essentially unclear intuition of the intellectualized sense, when the dynamic act of the object finds there a dynamic response from the contemplator.

[1]This is the point I was trying to make in my discussion, in my previous article, of "Grace washes the soul." Mr. Slattery appears to be under the impression that I was making an attack on some "traditional" interpretation of that metaphor. I was speaking of the traditional approach to metaphor itself, not to that metaphor. I know of no tradition of analysis of that metaphor, and I do not believe that there is any. Hence I do not think that I was attacking one. My purpose in discussing it at all was merely to point out that behind "Grace washes" lies the metaphor "Grace is water," since washing is proper to water and not proper to grace. My statement that grace necessarily exists merely means that in my predication of action to grace, I am stating that grace exists. If it did not exist, it would not act; but it is washing; therefore it exists. Mr. Slattery's difficulty about whether it exists in reality or not is irrelevant. Whether it does or not, it certainly exists in my proposition, as the subject of action and as the essential potency actuated by its "is."

When I *see* the quality of frightening noise in the man and I love or fear or hate or admire, my mind seeks metaphor. I may say, "What's he roaring about?" and behind that predication is the metaphor, "The man is a lion." I can predicate that nature of him because it is the nature that seems best proportioned to his quality as that quality exists in me. If I am not moved to expand the quality, then I can never make a metaphor but must speak only of a man; I could make a simile, which would speak of the man as a man, but I could not make a metaphor, which would speak of the man as a lion.[1]

The confusion of the real order with the conceptual order is a constant danger in the analysis of (not in the composition of, or the normal reaction to) metaphor, since the form is that of all judgment and the conceptualizing mind tends to think that the sole function of language and of judgment is to express the *knowledge* of the real. The creative process by which the mind expresses a vision in terms not only of the intuition of the intellectualized sense but also in terms of the spirit's emotional reaction to the reality seen, the metaphorical process, seems not within the ken of such analysts.

Starting with metaphors themselves rather than with presupposed principles does not always ensure success, however. A critic like the gifted Mr. Empson starts with metaphor, but he does not arrive at a definition of metaphor. Unable to grasp that the predicate of the metaphorical judgment exists in an absolutely unique and totally contingent manner in that judgment, he removes it in order to examine it more closely, automatically furnishes it with its own "is" in order to keep it alive, and destroys even the remote possibility of seeing the metaphor as it really is. When the predicate of metaphor becomes the subject of an "is," it is intelligible and can acquire predicates, but it can never be what it was in the metaphorical judgment. Mr. Empson, in his analyses, treats only of simile, since by his inability to see that this judgment of metaphor does not aim to convey definite *meaning*, he joins Mr. Slattery in destroying it. He does not, it is true, destroy the predicate in order to preserve the intelligible value of the proposition, as Mr. Slattery does; but he does "rescue" the predicate from its strange and unintelligible situation into a proper existential world once more and thus by a different means achieves with Mr. Slattery the annihilation of metaphor.

Philosophers and critics must learn, if they are to treat of the nature of metaphor, that the mind does not aim at conveying definite, scientific meaning in its metaphorical product. It aims at expressing vision; and the reason why the mind produces metaphor is proximately that the mind must find a means of expressing the emotional reaction as well as the knowledge of

the spirit, and ultimately that the mind is the faculty of being, not of concept.

When the mind abstracts and expresses its seizure of the real in a literal statement, it necessarily expresses only a partial seizure of the real. The opaque nature of its proper object, material being, resists the natural desire of our intellects to grasp the being, the individual real thing. Further, our spirits in knowing their proper objects, operate in union with our sense faculties; so that when we express our intellectual grasp of the subject of knowledge, we express in the existential judgment a being that the intellect cannot fully grasp, and, in every predicate we add to that judgment, we express a formality under which the intellect seizes that being. The intellect certainly can know singulars, but it cannot reduce them to its own terms so that it can make an intelligible statement about them and still grasp them totally as singular beings. This situation becomes frustrating when under the stress of powerful emotion we feel that we must seize and express the real thing that we see as it really is and not under some formality which expresses only a partial intellectual grasp.

When we are in this situation, we can do one of two things. We can suppress the emotion, keep our knowledge in balance, and express our scientific *meaning* in literal statement, with the intellect resisting the emotional reaction. Or under the force of our emotion, we can see the qualities of the thing as unique and disproportionate to its nature, throw our knowledge out of balance by resisting the intellect's tendency to supply only predicates abstracted from the being, and supply an alien nature to the thing. This does not then express the real being as it is in reality, but it does point with emotional vigor to the real qualities of the thing as we see them.

In my normal abstractive process, I cannot get the individual into my mind; so, by making a judgment which is not literally a judgment, not really expressive of a formality by which I grasp the thing, I point my mind out toward the individual. To speak of the process as a subterfuge of the mind, as I tend to do, is misleading, since it implies that the formation of a literal statement is the *normal* work of the mind and that the formation of metaphor is some sort of trick. This reveals a philosopher's bias, since philosophers have not yet managed to take time out to examine metaphors seriously, in their own habitat, which is antipodal to science. Metaphors appear to be upside down to philosophers, but human minds produce them more readily than they do literal statements. The mind must labor to be clear and scientific, but a truck driver who inadvertently dents a fender will hear a readily-formed torrent of metaphor. Sports writers would be helpless without metaphor, and poets would not exist at all.

It is vitally important to observe that metaphor can operate only while the *vision* lasts. When the mind no longer, under the influence of emotion, *sees* the unique quality or qualities of the object as disproportioned to it, then the metaphor disintegrates into mere contradictory elements, and the vision is finished. The mind and imagination, the emotions, the object, must all be operating together on one another in order to keep the metaphor in existence; and it exists only when they are all operative. The object also operates by exhibiting its unique qualities to us, as Mr. Slattery very rightly stresses in his final paragraph, and it must be actually operating in reality or in our imaginations to keep the metaphor in existence.

Metaphor is as passing and as contingent as finite act and quality. It has none of the eternal element of the literal statement. It deals with the individual, not with the universal. It is pathetic as a means of knowledge.

But it is powerful as a means of vision, seething, as our greatest poet tells us, from those shaping fantasies that apprehend more than cool reason ever comprehends. Ironically spoken by the practical man, Theseus, who condemns these "tricks" of imagination, Shakespeare's words express how shaping fantasy can, under the influence of emotion, fuse the forms of the mind with the things that he sees in an organic unity of metaphor, the dwelling of airy nothings:

> Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
> Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend
> More than cool reason ever comprehends.
> The lunatic, the lover, and the poet
> Are of imagination all compact. . . .
> The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
> Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven,
> And as imagination bodies forth
> The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
> Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
> A local habitation and a name.
> Such tricks hath strong imagination
> That if it would but apprehend some joy,
> It comprehends some bringer of that joy;
> Or in the night, imagining some fear,
> How easy is a bush supposed a bear!
>
> —*Midsummer Night's Dream,* Act 5, scene 1.

How easy, indeed! The philosopher must sit at the feet of the poet to learn the nature of metaphor. If he will do that, he may realize that there are more approaches to reality than are dreamt of in his philosophy. He

will be in a position to discover what the thing is in itself; he will experience it in its unique reality; and he will be then in a position to philosophize about it. But he must humble his pride, or, perhaps, enlarge his horizons beyond the limits of science, and learn as an enraptured hearer, sharing the poet's fine frenzy, what only the poet can teach him. Then the philosopher will be able to realize that this scientific monstrosity, metaphor, brings to human minds a flicker of reflection of the glory of being. It does not deserve either the contempt or the bungling abuse of science, because, though it offers to accidental being only a passing habitation and a contingent name, it nevertheless gives a draught of satisfaction to the faculty of being which thirsts above all things to contemplate beings and Being.

Reply to Father Boyle

M. P. SLATTERY, *College of St. Thomas*

I extend my thanks to Father Boyle for his comments and to the editor for the space he has placed at my disposal.

Concerning the proposition "That man is a lion," Father Boyle says: "I mean quite literally what the term always means, a supposit operating with the nature of the beast so named. . . . I do mean that he is a lion." If this really is the case, then I have no alternative but to refer Father Boyle to a textbook of zoology. Unfortunately even this will be of no avail, since Father Boyle already accepts the fact "that there could be no scientific justification" for making the above assertion and that "on philosophical grounds the metaphor indeed posits a real contradiction." Such an admission seems to make his whole theory untenable.

Father Boyle also insists: "I reject absolutely all such distinctions as those of Mr. Slattery between 'literal' and 'metaphorical' meanings of terms." In this case it is difficult to see why he should think it necessary to mention metaphor at all. Why not exclude it completely from the class of figures of speech?

But we have to discuss an even more radical element in Father Boyle's thought; and for this we must accompany him in his description of the psychological process which results in metaphor. We see the office boss—to use his own illustration—and something about the boss reminds us of a lion. The first image we have in our minds is that of a human being, a man. Then something about this man reminds us of a lion. This reminding consists in, or at least is accompanied by, the production of the mental image of a lion. The latter image perhaps takes the place momentarily of the man's image. And here the crucial point is reached, for here we leave psychology and go into semantics. We begin now to talk about metaphorical and literal *meanings* of terms; and here I part company with Father Boyle. He says that we should next say that the man is *literally* a lion, while admitting at the same time that such an assertion is self-contradictory in reality. In my opinion, what we do is to notice the resemblance between this man, as given in our sense-image of him, and a lion, as given in our memory-image of a lion. In virtue of this resemblance between them we give them the same name, "lion," since the characteristic under discussion is thought of as being leonine rather than human. But we do not mean "lion" in the literal sense, otherwise we would leave the office with alacrity and phone the nearest zoo. We notice, rather, a certain general similarity of the man to the lion and thus widen the term's meaning to catch up, as it were, with

the wider similarity we have discovered. In other words, we use the term "lion" metaphorically. And we use it to describe the *one* human nature that the man has.

I might add that the above-mentioned psychological process is not at all restricted to cases of metaphor. It occurs in *all* cases of seeing similarities between things. Otherwise how would we ever manage to see things as similar to one another? If I see, for example, a chair in my friend's room which is the exact replica of one of my own chairs, the sense-image of his chair will serve to call up a memory-image of my own chair. I would then say that they are exactly alike—just as, in our metaphor, we thought of the man and of lions as being partly alike. In both cases the same general principles of comparison are used; and in neither case does the hypothesis of a two-natured being have to be made.

Though he denies flatly that St. Thomas, as he reads him, says that things are "similar in *being*, considered absolutely," Father Boyle nevertheless admits that,

> if beings are similar in being, then God is certainly similar to other beings. . . . If being is a common perfection by which things are similar, it follows quite logically that the Cause of this perfection must be like the perfections that He causes.

Now, in reply to Father Boyle, if we consult St. Thomas we read that "existence is therefore found common to all things."[1] "*Being* is said of everything that is . . . it is not said of many equivocally, but analogically"[2]; ". . . according to some sort of analogy, as existence is common to all."[3] So, for St. Thomas, "existence" is common to all things, and it is asserted of them analogically (another point which Father Boyle denies). So now, presumably, Father Boyle, who has already charted the course, will accompany me, and together we will "inevitably steer towards this terrible reef." Yet he need not be discouraged. St. Thomas made the journey before us and survived with distinction. The *Summa contra Gentiles*

[1] ". . . ergo esse inveniatur omnibus rebus commune . . ." (*De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 5, resp.; cf. *ibid.*, a. 6, resp.

[2] "*Esse* autem dicitur de omni eo quod est. . . . non enim de multis aequivoce dicitur, sed per analogiam . . ." (*CG*, II, cap. 15).

[3] ". . . secundum aliqualem analogiam; sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus" (*ST*, I, q. 4, a. 3, resp.).

[4] ". . . agens et factum oporteat sibi esse similia . . ." (*CG*, II, cap. 20).

[5] ". . . agens primum et universale, quod Deus est . . ." (*ibid.*, cap. 21).

[6] "Sed essentia Dei est perfecta similitudo omnium, quantum ad omnia quae in rebus inveniuntur, sicut universale principium" (*ST*, I, q. 84, a. 2 ad 3).

[7] ". . . alia autem a se videt non in ipsis, sed in seipso, inquantum essentia sua continet similitudinem aliorum ab ipso" (*ibid.*, q. 14, a. 5, resp.).

[8] Cf. also *ibid.*, q. 4, a. 3 ad 3 as supporting Father Boyle's quotation from *De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 11 ad 1.

tells us that "agent and effect must needs be like each other"[4] and also that God is the first and universal agent.[5] In the *Summa Theologiæ* we read that "the Divine Essence is a perfect likeness of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things, being the universal principle of all"[6] and that God "sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitudes of things other than Himself."[7] So, to employ Father Boyle's vigorous phraseology, "it must follow as the night the day that God is like creatures."

When in interpreting the Pseudo-Dionysius[8]—not always the easiest of tasks—St. Thomas denies that God is similar to creatures, he is referring to the similarity which a copy or effect has to its model or cause. But when he affirms the mutual similarity of any cause to its effect, and of God to creatures, St. Thomas is using the word in a causally neutral sense, as when we say that *X* is similar to *Y* and leave aside the question of which is causally or ontologically prior. In the first case the converse of the proposition is false. In the second, however, it is true. There is the risk, of course, of having this explanation treated as another piece of Humpty Dumptiana. But it seems preferable to saying that St. Thomas openly contradicts himself in a most fundamental part of his metaphysics.

BOOK REVIEWS

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Dialectique de l'agir. **By André Marc, S.J. Paris-Lyon, Emmanuel Vitte [1954]. Pp. 585.**

The Value Judgement. **By W. D. Lamont. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1955. Pp. xv + 335.**

Contemporary ethical literature has become extremely diversified, as these two books clearly show. Both authors intend to make a general approach to ethics, but they have not read the same things and do not see their subject in the same light. Contemporary writing figures prominently in each work; yet, if we except Kant, no modern ethician cited in one book is even mentioned in the other.

Father Marc's work brings to a conclusion a series of studies including his *Psychologie réflexive* and his *Dialectique de l'affirmation.* He is a French Thomist, well read in the literature of Continental existentialism and phenomenology. The present book gives a philosophical formulation of certain classic views in Thomistic moral theory under three general headings: finality, moral obligation, and the moral person. Marc's method consists in making a confrontation of contemporary French ethical positions and the traditional Scholastic views. It is as if A.-D. Sertillanges were to discuss these major topics with René Le Senne. In the course of this dialectic, Marc continually develops and expands his own notions of what modern Thomism means today. His views on the end of human activity, the nature of final beatitude, the certainty of the existence of God, the absolute distinction between good and evil, the intellectual-voluntary character of duty, and the workings of moral conscience are sound and well expressed. The discussion is controlled by a man alert to the facts of human experience, aware of the difficulties inherent in human desire and action, but all the while serenely sure of his metaphysics.

Since the question of moral values is paramount in the second book under review, let us note what Father Marc does with it. Le Senne is quoted (p. 79) as saying that "the word value denotes the interiority of the relation between the Absolute . . . and this or that personal consciousness." Accepting this, Marc adds that, though values are sometimes unreal, yet

when they do become factual, they are more real than those which remain as pure ideals. Moreover, he insists that, when values are realized, they are not thereby destroyed or annihilated but become more actual.

Professor Lamont is inalterably opposed to the above conclusion. (Incidentally, he is not Corliss Lamont the American humanist but a professor at the University of Glasgow.) Looking back over more than fifty years of British moral philosophy, Lamont is impressed (as most readers of this literature will be) by its present condition of stalemate. One stubborn group of British ethicians say that moral values are real and objective; they claim that they can see the difference between the morally good and bad almost as directly as one can see the distinction between yellow and red. Another equally firm school of moral writers in England identifies moral values with subjective approvals or disapprovals of any state of affairs. Neither side will concede the match.

A new approach is attempted by Lamont. He suggests that the act of valuation be studied, using the techniques of present-day economics. In disarming fashion, he admits that he is no expert in economics, but he has studied the subject and sought advice from those who know it. What he intends to offer is a general theory of valuing with some suggestions as to its application to ethics. He does not claim that value judgment and ethical judgment are identical.

The argument of Lamont's book is organized under twenty-two "propositions," much like Scholastic theses. It is difficult to summarize so many conclusions; consequently, I offer a sampling of the first four propositions.

> Valuation is always relative or comparative, never absolute or simply positive. Value is attributed to the non-existent, never to the existent. Value is measured in terms of opportunity cost. Value is measured in terms of anticipated, not actually incurred, cost.

The economic notion of "opportunity cost" is explained as "that content of demand which is renounced when, confronted by the necessity of choosing between alternatives, a demander chooses one and renounces the other." Thus the value of an objective is set by what one will give up in order to attain it.

It will be seen that this economics-inspired theory of valuation leads to conclusions quite opposed to those of Father Marc. Crudely expressed, this opposition amounts to this: for Lamont, heaven is desirable only before you get there; for Marc, heaven is imperfectly desirable before you get there, perfectly so after you get there. Many profitable insights are to be found in Lamont's book. He does try to find a mean between crude objectivism and uncontrolled subjectivism. Yet his psychology of cognitive,

conative, and effective activities looks strangely outmoded. One noteworthy feature of the work is a reinstatement of teleology in ethical discussion. Lamont even searches for some absolute ground for moral judgement—and comes up with something very much like Kant's autonomy of the person. It would be interesting to see what Father Marc could do, dialectically, with this sort of British ethics.

JOHN J. FITZGERALD, *University of Notre Dame*

The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas: Basic Treatises. **Trans. Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, G. Donald Hollenhorst; with a preface by Jacques Maritain. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1955. Pp. xxxiv + 638. $10.00.**

In the preface to this perceptive translation of the *Logical Art* of John Poinsot (1589-1644), the seventeenth-century Dominican called John of St. Thomas, Jacques Maritain has written:

> The *Logical Art* of John of St. Thomas is in several respects the masterpiece of Aristotelian logic; yet, it includes issues that Aristotle hardly touched upon. In the context of John of St. Thomas, issues not treated by Aristotle never look un-Aristotelian; quite naturally the system of logic founded by Aristotle takes over truths contributed by the Stoics and other philosophers, by grammarians and by Theologians. At a time when the state of logical studies obviously calls for an ample process of integration, the work of John of St. Thomas demonstrates, in the most encouraging fashion, the integrative power of Aristotelian logic (p. vii).

Perhaps no contemporary is closer to the inspiration and thought of this seventeenth-century thinker than Maritain who, in *The Degrees of Knowledge,* has used his capital distinction between the objective and formal concept to correct and assimilate the authentic insight of Descartes, and again, in *The Philosophy of Nature,* has used his formulation of the doctrine of subalternation as an essential factor in the assimilation of the originalities of modern scientific types into the classical Aristotelian-Thomist theory of science.

In the same spirit and with some of the same insight-in-depth into the thought of John of St. Thomas on the philosophy of logic, Professor Simon fixes, in terms of the traditional Scholastic distinction between formal and material logic, the contemporary relevance of these logical treatises:

> No part or function of logic will ever decide whether a particular proposition, relative to the real world, is true or not. But logic may be able to say what general conditions an argumentation must satisfy in order to be not only consistent, i.e., formally perfect, but also demonstrative. *Material logic* is a possibility if and only if some second intentions are so constituted that their laws be the rules of scientific demonstrations (p. xi).

Thus, from the outset, the authors of this translation have suggested the philosophical and historical setting indispensable to the understanding of the order and import of the translated treatises: the object and nature of logic, on the universal, antepredicamental inquiries—on unity of meaning, on the categories, on demonstration and science.

The vexed issue of those second intentions, which, in the thought of John of St. Thomas, constitute the proper subject matter of "posterioristic analysis or material logic" as distinguished from "prioristic analysis or formal logic," is decisively elaborated in the context of a firmly resolved concept of philosophical science, unconfronted by, and so uncomplicated with, the unresolved logical and methodological problematics of modern mathematical-physical science. This would seem to be the sense in which one must take Professor Simon's remark: "Both with regard to language and to *Problematik*, John of St. Thomas remains a scholastic. In spite of his chronology, Galileo and Descartes are unknown to him. His uneventful life was, for the most part, spent closed to the great scientific novelties of the Renaissance" (p. xix).

Prescinding from the historical solidity of this remark, it does convey the basic strength and relative weakness of these masterly logical treatises. Their strength consists in a philosophy of logic deriving from a historically matured and substantially complete philosophical science which—and this is their inevitable weakness—embodied the unrecognized or imperfectly recognized problematic and methodology of the nonphilosophical physical sciences. Since the clear discernment and formulation of the epistemological and logical constants of a specific science usually come late in its historical development, one might expect those peaks and dips exhibited in the historical development of logical studies to which Father Bochenski likes to refer. One might further expect such peaks in logical studies to follow the peaks in the development of the sciences which nurture them. Thus, the excellence and perennial relevance of the works of John of St. Thomas would seem to be premised on the assimilation of the Aristotelian philosophy in its fullest development to date; a confining and compelling task which would, in fact, seem to exclude any serious preoccupation with the scientific

originalities of the Renaissance.

Viewed in these perspectives, the translation of Professors Simon, Glanville, and Hollenhorst stands forth, alike in its doctrinal density as in its refreshingly literate rendition for the most part into contemporary English idiom, as an indispensable basic contribution to contemporary philosophic literature at both the philosophical and historical levels. One could hope that these intrinsic merits will incline them and others, of equal competence, to advance still further this important task of rendering into readable idiom the remaining master works of the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition.

VERNON J. BOURKE, *Saint Louis University*

Imprudence in St. Thomas Aquinas. **By Charles J. O'Neil. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1955. Pp. 165. $2.00.**

The Truth That Frees. **By Gerard Smith, S.J. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 79. $2.00.**

These are the "Aquinas Lectures" of the past two years. Fittingly enough, in this period in which Marquette University has celebrated its seventy-fifth anniversary, both talks were given by members of its own faculty. This excellent lecture series continues to make an important contribution to St. Thomas in America.

Professor O'Neil returns to a theme on which he has done much scholarly work, the nature of prudence. Here, his approach is from the contrary, the vice of imprudence. He first shows why imprudence is not adequately treated in the *Nicomachean Ethics:* it has no place in Aristotle's moral science. Nothing better demonstrates the advances made by Aquinas as a philosopher than the way in which he saw the reality of the vice of imprudence. People do acquire defective habits of reasoning about moral matters, and this lecture explains why that is so. Besides its primary interest to moralists, this study has a direct value for political philosophers. It offers a thoughtful criticism of Jaffa's book on the relation between Aristotelian and Thomistic political philosophy. The possibility of political imprudence is the key to an understanding of the two positions. It would seem an opportune time, now, for a full-scale reappraisal of the political philosophy of Aquinas. Professor O'Neil could do it.

Father Smith has fitted his lecture into the general theme of the anniversary programs at Marquette, which was "The Pursuit of Truth to Make Men Free." He directs his attention to the fundamental problem of the relation of freedom to truth. His lecture has an almost deceptive simplicity.

Ten words are rarely used where one will do. In an age of repetition and redundancy, this technique requires a bit of adjustment in the mental processes of the reader. We are told how *good knowledge* plus *good use of knowledge* combine to make men free. But freedom is usually taken as an absolute, as an intuited value, in contemporary discussions. It will take some repetition to get most people to think otherwise. Father Smith's argument and its artless examples are impossible to summarize. (So, it is startling to find an explanation which depends on our understanding the inability of babies to spit straight. Indeed, as a father in the irreligious sense, with wet memories of feeding babies in high chairs, I should be inclined to deny the validity of the example.) The whole lecture has to be read carefully and meditated, for Father Smith says that the key to the good life lies in abandoning ourselves to that highest knowledge which is the love of God. It seems like a very simple proposition. If I may end with a Smithic comment, it is not.

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AN, PAUL MARSHALL. The Writings and Lectures of Rudolf Steiner. New York: Whittier Books. Pp. 140. $4.75.

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TT, WILLARD E. Santayana and the Sense of Beauty. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 252. $4.50.

USTINE, ST.] The De Dono Perseverantiae of Saint Augustine. Tr. with introd. and commentary by Sister Mary Alphonsine Lesousky, O.S.U. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America, 1956. Pp. xxii + 310. Paper, $3.00.

Since the content of this work is almost entirely theological, both the introduction (pp. 1-101) and the commentary (pp. 218-98) stress theological considerations. The text is that of the Benedictine edition; the translation is a careful literal one. There is a full bibliography and a detailed index.

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, ALFRED JULES, and OTHERS. The Revolution in Philosophy. Introd. by Gilbert Ryle. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956. Pp. 130. $2.50.

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BAILLE, JOHN. The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. viii + 151. $3.00.

According to the author, almost all non-Catholic theologians ha abandoned the distinction between "natural" and "revealed" theolog with the result that either professed philosophers no longer talk about God at all, leaving this to the "theologians" who philosophi about God, or their philosophy is entirely a theology. The author goes on to say that all these theologians have abandoned the idea that God has communicated "propositions" to man, or insist that if this were possible it would have nothing to do with revelation. Revelation, as they understand it, is the revealing of God by hims to man in human experience. Faith, consequently, cannot be an act knowledge; it is indistinguishable from religion.

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This book was published in 1947 and revised in 1951, from which edition the present translation was made. It was recognized as on of the best contemporary introductions to continental thought; it contains only a few non-European thinkers.

After a chapter on the origin of contemporary philosophy, the s ceeding chapters take up in turn the philosophies of matter, of id of life, of essence, of existence, and of being. There are two ap pendices, one on mathematical logic, the other on international or ganizations.

BOEKRAAD, A. J. The Personal Conquest of Truth, According to J. H. Newman. New York: Gregory Lounz, 1956. Pp. 327. Paper, $5.00.

Reviewed in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXXIII (March 1956), 209-10.

BORN, MAX. Experiment and Theory in Physics. New York: Dover Pubns. 1956. Pp. 44. Paper, 60¢

This is an expanded version of a lecture given in 1943 and pub- lished that same year. Born argues from the history of science to the nature of science, particularly to its inductive, experimental and hypothetical characteristics. Yet philosophical presuppositio are involved in his interpretation. This is a classic presentatio of one point of view of the philosophy of science.

BOULDING, KENNETH. The Image. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1956. Pp. 175. $3.75.

This is a very interesting effort to provide a framework of und standing for all the levels of knowledge about man and the univers Impressed by the peculiarly synthetic and inclusive character of i formation theory and systems theory, the author has attempted to g both above and below the reaches of these theories. He looks at t organizational concept of the "image" to provide this organizatio Like all attempts of its kind, it supposes adequacy of knowledge i the fields to be organized (is this humanly possible?) and a bril- liant intuition of relationships. Because the author has intuitiv flashes, the book is stimulating and provocative; there are more blank spots.

BRAMELD, THEODORE. Toward a Reconstructed Philosophy of Education. York: Dryden Press, 1956. Pp. xiv + 417. $4.50.

One group of the followers of John Dewey calls itself "reconstruc-
ionism"; though its views remain progressivist and instrumentalist,
here are several special characteristics: a more dynamic interest in
utting into effect what are conceived to be ideal patterns; greater
mphasis on society, especially in terms of social ownership and a
heory of social consensus that is both ground and goal.

The author tells us that this book is a complete revision of his
atterns of Educational Philosophy (1950). The present work is di-
ided into two main parts, the philosophical and the educational be-
iefs of the system.

D, C. D. Human Personality and the Possibility of Its Survival.
The Agnes E. and the Constantine E. A. Foerster Lecture on the Im-
ortality of the Soul." Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1955.
p. 27. Paper, 50¢

R, MARTIN.] The Writings of Martin Buber. Ed. with an introd. by
ill Herberg. New York: Meridian Books, 1956. Pp. 351. Paper,
1.35.

Buber can be described as a religious existentialist. Though in
ome way he maintains that God cannot be known, he nevertheless be-
ieves in a personal, infinite God who can be "met." The notion of
ersonal encounter and of the "dialog" are central to his analysis of
an and man's relation to God. The present work consists of selec-
ions grouped under the headings of human existence, social life,
iblical faith, Jewish destiny, and teaching and learning.

The editor has a lengthy introduction (pp. 11-39), which gives a
rief account of Buber's life and writings, and an excellent, sym-
athetic (but not uncritical) summary of his main views. The editor
nd the publishers are to be congratulated for fully annotating both
he introduction and the selections.

HAM, JOHN C. Lester Frank Ward in American Thought. "Annals of
merican Sociology." Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956. Pp.
1. Paper, $1.00.

This study of Ward attempts to evaluate his importance in American
hought. The author, making a fully documented study of Ward's con-
emporaries and of contemporary sociologists, concludes that Ward was
ot extremely significant in sociology; that he had some standing as
social philosopher and some small influence as a social reformer;
hat he was sometimes praised by those who were seeking a historical
radition for their own views.

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roblems. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1956. Pp. 93. Paper,
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AP, RUDOLF. Meaning and Necessity. 2d ed. Chicago: Univ. of Chi-
ago Press, 1956. Pp. x + 258. $5.00.

This new edition contains five additional chapters in the form of a
upplement on empiricism, semantics, and ontology; on meaning postu-
ates; on belief sentences; on meaning and synonymy in natural lan-
uages; and on some concepts of pragmatics. All of these have pre-
iously been published as articles, partly in response to reviews and
tudies, partly to enlarge some of the ideas of the original book.

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CHURCH, ALONZO. Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Vol. I. Rev. e Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 385. $7.50.

CLARKE, MARTIN LOWTHER. The Roman Mind. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Pr 1956. Pp. 175. $3.75.

COCHRANE, ARTHUR C. The Existentialists and God. Philadelphia: West minster Press, 1956. Pp. 174. $3.00.

COHEN, MORRIS. A Preface to Logic. New York, Meridian Books; Septem 1956.

COLLINGWOOD, R. G. The Idea of History. New York: Oxford Univ. Pres 1956. Paper, $1.75.

CONANT, JAMES BRYANT. The Citadel of Learning. New Haven: Yale Univ Press. Pp. 86. $2.00.

COOPER, LANE. The Poetics of Aristotle. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press 1956. Pp. 167. $1.75.

COPLESTON, FREDERICK, S.J. Contemporary Philosophy. Studies of Logi Positivism and Existentialism. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 19 Pp. ix + 230. $4.00.

The articles and addresses reprinted here have previously been lished, except for the last four chapters on existentialism. The thor is well acquainted with his subject, and his penetrating pres ations are marked by sympathy, judicious criticism, and an easy, formal style. All philosophers, no matter what their beliefs, ca profit from the author's reflections.

COURNOT, ANTOINE AUGUSTIN. An Essay on the Foundations of Our Knowle Tr. with an introd. by Merritt H. Moore. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956. Pp. 650. $9.00.

CROXALL, T. H. Kierkegaard Commentary. New York: Harper & Bros., 19 $5.00.

————. Kierkegaard Studies. New York: Roy Pubs., 1956. $4.00.

D'ALVIELLA, COUNT GOBLET. The Migration of Symbols. Introd. by Geo Birdwood. New York: University Books, 1956. Pp. 277. $5.00.

This study of symbols, their various adaptations, and their tr from place to place and culture to culture is of some value for a theory of metaphor and symbolic understanding. The author seems think that symbols somehow do not lose their original meaning--a theory that is frequently found among people engaged in the study religions. The book was first published in French in 1892 and tr lated into English in 1894.

D'ARCY, MARTIN, S.J. Communism and Christianity. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1956. Pp. 192. Paper, 65¢

This is "an examination of the Christian and Communist philoso in their views of human life and happiness," as the sub-title put The term "philosophy" is taken in a broad, nontechnical sense; mo technically, the work could be classified as Christian apologetic The author makes use of his broad knowledge of culture and histor examine the claims of Communism; his reasoning is both clear and ful, and is expressed with considerable skill. The presentation the Christian philosophy of life is more complicated, in that the thor simultaneously takes account of, and criticizes, many versio Christianity and some criticisms directed against it by others th

mmunists.

———. The Mind and Heart of Love. New York: Meridian Books, 1956. p. 381. Paper, $1.35.

RRARI, ROY J., and BARRY, SISTER M. INVIOLATA, C.D.P. A Complete Index of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas. Washington, D.C.: atholic Univ. of America Press, 1956. Pp. ix + 386. Paper, $20.00.

This large folio volume is intended to be a complete index of the erms of philosophical and theological importance in the Summa Theologiae. A consistent method of reference should make the index easy o use, and the large format made it possible to use nine point type.

OUGEMONT, DENIS. The Devil's Share. An Essay on the Diabolic in odern Society. Tr. by Haakon Chevalier. New York: Meridian Books, 956. Pp. viii + 221. Paper, $1.25.

This is an ethical analysis of individual man and of society, from n existentialist and personalist standpoint, employing some phenomeological techniques. Like many of his contemporaries, De Rougemont akes use of revelation and religious tradition but not in a theological way.

This translation was first published in 1944.

ARTES, RENÉ. Discourse on Method. Tr. from the French with an introd. by Laurence J. Lafleur. 2d rev. ed. New York: Liberal Arts ress, 1956. Pp. 72. Paper, 50¢

LF, MAURICE. An Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy. Tr. by P. offey. New York: Dover Pubns., 1956. Pp. xvi + 327. $3.50; paper, 1.75.

De Wulf's Introduction à la philosophie néo-scolastique was written n 1903 and translated into English in 1907, under the title Schlastiism Old and New. This translation contains an appendix (pp. 263-317) the translator, "Philosophy and the Sciences at Louvain." De Wulf irst gives a brief consideration to medieval Scholasticism and then akes up the movement known at that time as "neo-Scholasticism."

The present edition is an excellent reprint.

ANSKY, THEODOSIUS. The Biological Basis of Human Freedom. New York: olumbia Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 144. $2.95.

ERER, RAY H. Postulates and Implications. New York: Philosophical ib., 1955. Pp. 509. $7.50.

ERTY, KENNETH. Logic: An Introduction to Aristotelian Formal Logic. eekskill, N.Y.: Graymoor Press, 1956. Pp. 157. $2.50.

RLE, D., O.P. Scientific Humanism and Christian Thought. Tr. by eginald Trevett. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1956. Pp. viii + 19. $3.75.

This group of five essays is principally concerned with the impact f science--both theoretical and practical--on thought and life. The uthor deals with the changes that have been wrought in culture by the cientific revolution and the further changes that ought to be made if wish to avoid the depreciation of the common man and the waste of eisure in idleness. He also considers the relation of scientific nought to religious faith, knowledge, and practice, and the difference between science and philosophy.

N, LOYD D. Ethics, Policy, and Social Ends. Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown ., 1956. Pp. 256. $1.85.

TEIN, WILLIAM. Great Political Thinkers. 2d ed. New York: Rinehart & Co., 1956. Pp. 960. $7.50.

, IRWIN. Philosopher's Holiday. New York: Viking Press, 1956. Pp. 0. Paper, 95¢

TEIN, ALBERT. The Meaning of Relativity. 5th ed. Tr. from the rman. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 166. $3.75.

Essays in Conceptual Analysis. Ed. by Antony Garrard Newton Flew. York: St. Martin's Press, 1956. Pp. 276. $4.25.

[EUCLID.] The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements. Tr. with introd and commentary by Sir Thomas L. Heath. 2d ed. New York: Dover P 1956. Vol. I, pp. x + 432; Vol. II, pp. 436; Vol. III, pp. 546. volume, $4.00; paper, $1.95.

This is a reprint of the revised edition of 1925 and maintains high standards of this publishing house. The translation and not have often been commended. The long introduction (pp. 1-152) is ful for its description and characterization of the nature of geo

EWING, UPTON CLARY. Thresholds of Existence. New York: Philosophic Lib., 1956. Pp. 299. $3.75.

Existentialism from Dostoevesky to Sartre. Ed. with an introd. by W Kaufmann. New York: Meridian Books; November, 1956.

FAY, CHARLES RYLE. Adam Smith and the Scotland of His Day. New Yor Cambridge Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 180. $4.75.

FEIGL, HERBERT, and SCRIVEN, MICHAEL (eds.). Minnesota Studies in t Philosophy of Science. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 19 $5.00.

FERM, VERGILIUS. Encyclopedia of Morals. New York: Philosophical L 1956. $10.00.

FEUERBACH, LUDWIG. Essence of Christianity. Tr. and ed. by E. Grah Waring. New York: Ungar Pub. Co., 1956. $1.75; paper, 65¢

FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB. The Vocation of Man. Tr. by William Smith vised, with an introd. by Roderick M. Chisholm. New York: Libera Arts Press, 1956. Pp. xx + 154. Paper, 75¢

The present editor has revised and modernized the old (1848, 1 translation of Smith and brought the translation into harmony wit edition of Medicus. The introduction is very helpful; it explain Fichte's problem and shows how he went about solving it.

FLEW, ANTONY. Essays in Conceptual Analysis. New York: St. Martin' Press, 1956. $5.00.

FRANK, ERICH. Knowledge, Will and Belief. Chicago: Henry Regnery C August 1956. $3.50.

FRANKFURTER, FELIX. Of Law and Men. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co 1956. $6.75.

FREEMAN, EUGENE, and APPEL, DAVID. The Wisdom and Ideas of Plato. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Pubns., 1956. Pp. 160. Paper, 35¢

FROMM, ERIKA, and HARTMAN, LENORE DUMAS. Intelligence. New York: H House, 1955. Pp. 60. Paper, 85¢

GARDEIL, H. D., O.P. Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas A III. Psychology. Tr. by John A. Otto. Saint Louis: B. Herder B Co., 1956. Pp. xiii + 303. $4.00.

This series, in four volumes, first appeared in French in 1953 this is the first volume to be published in English. The author tends to acquaint the reader with the thought of St. Thomas in a tematic way. The order of presentation is that of Aristotle's De ma, but of course much use is made of St. Thomas's other writings times the author goes into problems of interpretation that are di sed by commentators on St. Thomas, but usually does not go into temporary problems. Some selected texts from St. Thomas are give translation, pp. 237-94.

GILSON, ETIENNE. Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. New Random House, 1956. $7.50.

GLOVER, EDWARD. Freud or Jung? New York: Meridian Books; October

————. On the Early Development of Mind. New York: Internatio Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 494. $7.50.

RUNNER, JOSEF. Individuation. Tr. from the German by Stanley odman. New York: Pantheon Books, 1956. Pp. 216. $3.50.

WOOD, DAVID C. Pragmatic Theory of Truth. New York: Philosophical ., 1956. $3.75.

ER, ROY RICHARD, and HUGHES, HELEN MacGILL (eds.). Toward a Unified eory of Human Behavior. New York: Basic Books, 1956. Pp. 390. .50.

, MANFORD GEORGE. John Dewey's Thought and Its Implications for ristian Education. New York: King's Crown Press, 1956. Pp. xv + . $4.00.

The author first gives a summary of Dewey's philosophy and then kes up in greater detail his idea of intelligence and of the nature man. Then he tries to find in Dewey some meaning for "religion" d a place for instrumentation in religious experience. His conclu- on is that the "scientific method" can be used in the teaching and tual practice of religion. Though the author strives to find a sis in Dewey for his conclusions, the reader receives the impression at Dewey himself attached very little value to religion (as distinct om religious experience), made no effort to move his experimentalism to ritual and creed. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the new mean- g of "religion" which the author is constrained to produce is con- nant with his original intention.

A. R. The Scientific Revolution, 1500-1800. The Formation of the dern Scientific Attitude. Boston: Beacon Press; October, 1956. per, $1.75.

HIRE, STUART (ed.). The Age of Reason. New York: New American Lib., 56. Pp. 191. Paper, 50¢

NG, ARTHUR LEON (ed.). Religion, Morality and Law. Dallas: South- n Methodist Univ. Press. Pp. 120. $3.00.

S, ROBERT T., and JARRETT, JAMES L. Language and Informal Logic. w York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1956. Pp. 280. $3.50.

, FRIEDRICH AUGUST VAN. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: Univ. of icago Press, 1956. Pp. 271. Paper, $1.00.

, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH. The Philosophy of History. Tr. by J. oree; prefaces by Charles Hegel and J. Sibree; introd. by C. J. iedrich. New York: Dover Pubns., 1956. Pp. xvi + 457. Paper, .75.

Though this translation is based on what modern scholarship will obably show to be a faulty text and is itself written in a somewhat d-fashioned style, it is still the only available translation. The w introduction, though very brief, is helpful in putting the writ- gs of Hegel, and the content of this volume in particular, into oad perspective.

The edition is excellently reproduced.

MAYLON H. Thinking Things Through. An Introduction to Logic. New rk: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1956. Pp. xviii + 455. $5.50.

The "substance of Parts I and II" of this book was first published der the title of Reflective Thinking. The present volume has been ed for several semesters in an experimental version.

The author divides the book into three parts: first, "semantics," e logic of meaning (the nature of language, names, definitions, and on); second, "syntatics," the logic of valid reasoning (based on an alysis of statements, gradually introducing the use of symbols and veloping various tables); third, "empirics," the logic of factual quiry, an analysis of various techniques of discovery. The book is early written, with helpful examples.

NG, A. Intuitionism. New York: Humanities Press, 1956. Pp. 138. 75.

HILGARD, ERNEST ROPILQUET. Theories of Learning. 2d ed. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956. Pp. 572. $5.50.

HILL, THOMAS E. Ethics in Theory and Practice. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1956. Pp. 433. $4.50.

History of the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 338. $4.50.

HOOK, SIDNEY (ed.). Modern American Philosophy. New York: Criterion Books, 1956. $6.00.

HOURANI, GEORGE F. Ethical Value. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Pre 1956. $4.50.

HOUTS, MARSHALL. From Evidence to Proof: A Searching Analysis of Me to Establish Fact. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1956.

HOWELL, WILLIAM SAMUEL. Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. Pp. 418. $6.00.

HYLE, F. Man and Materialism. New York, Harper & Bros. $2.75.

HUME, DAVID. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Introd. by sel Kirk. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956. Pp. 194. Paper, 95

HUPPÉ, BERNARD FELIX, and KAMINSKY, JACK. Logic and Language. New Alfred A. Knopf. Pp. 227. $2.50; text ed., $1.75.

HUTCHISON, JOHN ALEXANDER. Faith, Reason, and Existence. New York: ford Univ. Press. Pp. 314. $4.50.

HUTTEN, ERNEST H. The Language of Modern Physics. New York: Macmil Co., 1956. Pp. 278. $3.75.

JAMES, WILLIAM. The Will to Believe and Other Essays on Popular Phi ophy and Human Immortality. New York: Dover Pubns., 1956. Pp. x + 332; ix + 70. $3.75; paper, $1.65.

These two publications are appropriately combined in one volum since they deal with related issues, at least in part. Both are more popular in form and presuppose relatively little philosophic training. Together they give at least one dimension of James's thought. The reprint is excellent.

JOAD, C. E. M. Guide to Philosophy. New York: Dover Pubns., 1956. 592. $2.95; paper, $1.95.

This well-known introduction to philosophy was first published 1936 and is presented in a very economical yet excellent reprint. is composed of three parts: the first on theory of knowledge, the ond on "critical metaphysics," and the third on "constructive met sics"; in this last, some of the great philosophical systems are marily presented. This book could possibly be used as a text for introductory course in philosophy, but it would need careful supp mentation and some corrections.

JUNG, C. G. Symbols of Transformation. New York: Pantheon Books, $5.00.

KANT, IMMANUEL. Critique of Practical Reason. Tr. with an introd. Lewis White Beck. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956. Pp. xxiv Paper, 90¢

The translation given in this edition is a corrected version one previously published by the author (1949), which has been de ly praised. The introduction gives the background of the work f the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals and the C of Pure Reason, and then outlines the course of the argument. T is also a brief sketch of the life and works of Kant and a short ography on his moral doctrine. The edition should be very useful students.

KARALIS, NICHOLAS J. Absolute Truth and Reality. New York: Philos cal Lib., 1956. $3.75.

KAUFMAN, WALTER. Nietzsche. Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist

ew York: Meridian Books, 1956. Pp. 412. Paper, $1.45.

This book was first published in 1950. The present edition is nly very slightly changed from the first; the author tells us that me small changes have been made and that all the quotations are now ccording to his own published version.

Y, WILLIAM A. Educational Psychology. Rev. ed. Milwaukee: Bruce ub. Co. Pp. 574. $4.25.

KEGAARD, SOREN. Attack upon "Christendom." Boston: Beacon Press; ctober, 1956. Paper, $1.45.

EAVY, JAMES LEO. A Study of Three Contemporary Theories of Lyric oetry. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1956. Pp. 182. aper, $2.00.

, RUSSELL. Beyond the Dreams of Avarice. Chicago: Henry Regnery o., 1956. Pp. x + 339. $4.50.

This volume contains twenty-four essays, most of which have been rinted before or given as addresses. The general topic is criticism f social conditions and social thought in the United States and Great ritain; and the particular topics range from the need for first prin- iples in political thinking to state housing, from the analysis of onservative and liberal political trends to literary criticism. The uthor again shows himself extremely capable in presenting and defend- ng a deeply thoughtful conservatism.

P, ORRIN E. Ritual and Cult. A Sociological Interpretation. "An- als of American Sociology." Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956. p. vi + 40. Paper, $1.00.

In this study, the terms "ritual" and "cult" are used in very broad enses to include all symbolically meaningful actions and objects that re in public use. The author contends that ritual and cult are not irectly rational but can be rationally analyzed in terms of the gen- ration of consensus in a group and emphasizing the values of that roup.

N, ZUCE. Essentials in Problem Solving. 2d ed. New York: Arco Pub. o., 1956. Pp. 119. $3.00.

This is not a book in the theory but in the art of solving problems. he author expresses his idea in terms of "approaches," generalized nd abstract ways of solving problems. In other words, specific meth- ds are applicable only to specific cases. To widen the scope of ap- lication of a method, it is necessary to generalize it and then again ake it specific to the new case (which the author calls "channeling"). his book could be of great use to anyone who has to solve new or aried problems.

RECHT, STERLING P. Our Philosophical Traditions. New York: Appleton- entury-Crofts, 1956. Pp. 525. $5.50.

ENCE, NATHANIEL. Whitehead's Philosophical Development. Berkeley: niv. of California Press, 1956. Pp. 391. $5.00.

NIZ, GOTTFRIED WILHELM VON. Philosophical Papers and Letters. Tr. rom the German and ed. by Leroy E. Loemker. Chicago: Univ. of Chi- ago Press, 1956. Pp. 1246. 2 vols. Each, $6.50; set, $12.00.

DEMAN, EDUARD C.] The Democratic Man. Selected Writings of Eduard . Lindeman. Ed. by Robert Gessner. Foreword by Max Otto. Boston: eacon Press, 1956. Pp. ix + 390. $5.00.

The selections have been grouped under seven headings: the democrat- c way of life, groups are people, classrooms without walls, social ork in action, social action at work, creation and recreation, and emocracy as morality. The editor has written a biographical sketch pp. 17-38). Lindeman had many interests, and social philosophy was rominent among them. In philosophy, he was largely influenced by

James and Dewey, with perhaps a stronger trend toward realism.

LIPPMANN, WALTER. Essays in the Public Philosophy. New York: New A can Lib., 1956. Pp. 144. Paper, 35¢

————. Good Society. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1956. $1.15.

MacCLINTOCK, STUART. Perversity and Error. Studies on the "Averroi John of Jandun. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956. Pp viii + 204. Paper, $4.00.

This volume is not a comprehensive account of John's philosoph concentrates on several problems: sensation and the active sense, active intellect, and the relation of faith and reason. There ar also appendices dealing with the problems of authenticity and wit manuscript sources. The author to some extent wishes to "rehabil John, and this he does partly by showing that his positions were unique but were rather in a fairly active current of interpretati Textual references are full and adequate, and there is an excelle use of secondary sources. On the other hand, interpretations are always fully justified by documentary evidence.

MACEK, JOSEF. An Essay on the Impact of Marxism. Pittsburgh: Univ. Pittsburgh Press, 1955. Pp. 157. $5.00.

MANNHEIM, KARL. Essays on the Sociology of Culture. Ed. by Ernest heim and Paul Kecskemeti. Tr. from the German. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 262. $6.00.

MANTINBAND, JAMES H. Dictionary of Latin Literature. New York: Phi sophical Lib., 1956. Pp. v + 303. $7.50.

This relatively brief dictionary is based on the standard, muc longer, and more detailed source books. It is a convenient refer tool to identify authors and titles.

MARCEL, GABRIEL. Royce's Metaphysics. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; ember 1956. $4.50.

MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS; EPICTETUS. Meditations; Enchiridion. In by Russell Kirk. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956. Pp. 200. Pa 95¢

MARIAS, JULIÁN. Reason and Life. Tr. from the Spanish by Kenneth S Reid and Edward Sarmiento. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1956. P 426. $5.00.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. Man and the State. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Pr 1956. Pp. 225. Paper, $1.25.

MARTIN, CECIL P. Psychology, Evolution and Sex: A Study of the Mech of Evolution. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1956. $4.75.

MARTIN, GOTTFRIED. Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science. Tr. f the German by P. G. Lucas. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1956. Pp. $4.50.

MAYER, FREDERICK, and BROWER, FRANK E. Education for Maturity. For by William H. Kilpatrick. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956 Pp. vi + 155. $3.25.

This is a general discussion of education. The authors propos that education should be broader and more inclusive, and especial that art and religious values should be put into education. The of education are not only information but also creativity and "a liberal mind." Some stimulating ideas are proposed, but the book rather vague and general.

————. Patterns of a New Philosophy. Foreword by J. A. Laywery Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956. Pp. vi + 112. $3.25.

The authors think that modern times call for a new philosophy. them, philosophy seems to be a reflective and critical spirit, ma concerned with ethical issues, directed to the future and to cond action. They are "skeptics regarding metaphysics" (p. vi) but ve

ch concerned with education and with "values." Though they do not cept any previous philosophy and have no firm stand of their own, ey believe that students of philosophy should have a good acquaint- ce with all philosophies.

L, ROBERT E., S.S.J. The Reality of Substance. Washington: Catholic iv. of America Press, 1956. Pp. xiv + 202. Paper, $2.25.

This dissertation considers first the contemporary rejection of sub- ance and then refutes the various arguments by an analysis of the tion of knowledge. In the second part, there is a proof of the ex- tence of substance and considerations of the knowability and nature substance. There are a very brief bibliography and an index. The ctrine of St. Thomas (for which many texts are quoted) is analyzed cording to the tradition of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas; contem- rary authors are usually quoted in translation or from secondary urces.

Y, J. L. (ed.). Psychology of Personality. New York: Logos Press, 56. Pp. 399. $6.75.

DEN, CHARLES J., O.S.A. Medical Ethics. 4th ed. Philadelphia: A. Davis Co., 1956. Pp. xix + 491. $4.25.

The fourth, revised edition contains a new chapter on the duties of ch individual to the preservation of his own life, and several chap- rs have been placed in a new order. In appropriate places, new terial has been added where changes in medical knowledge have been gnificant; there are also considerations on present activities of ntraceptionists and a review of civil law on artificial insemination. e reading references formerly provided at the end of each chapter ve been dropped; some references have been put into the text itself. This well-known text continues its careful attention to detail and kes abundant use of recent papal pronouncements.

GEORGE HERBERT. The Social Psychology of George Herbert Mead. Ed. Anselm Strauss. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956. Pp. 312. per, $1.50.

C, JOOST A. M. Rape of the Mind. New York: World Pub. Co., 1956. .00.

, A. DA SILVA. Man. His Life, His Education, His Happiness. Tr. M. B. Fierz. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1956. Pp. 729. $6.00.

The author, a Brazilian physician, writes of the life of man from rth to old age, the nature of man, intellect and emotions, sex, mar- age, society, education, religion, economics, world organization. all things, he holds that we must begin with the biological bases life and action. In many ways a realist, at other times he shows azing ignorance; he attacks morality and religion, yet gives reasons r monogamous marriage that would do credit to many a moralist. The ok is indigestible; neither translator nor publisher saw fit to pro- de it even with a table of contents.

LSON, CARL (ed.). Christianity and the Existentialists. New York: as. Scribner's Sons, 1956. Pp. 219. $3.75.

R, OSCAR W. The Kantian Thing-in-itself or The Creative Mind. New rk: Philosophical Lib., 1956. Pp. xix + 142. $3.75.

The author attempts to interpret the "thing-in-itself" as a logical ject, the most general object on which all logically depends. This turn is connected with the notion of valuation. The author does t hesitate to conclude to the primacy of will over both science and eality." Incidentally he refers to many figures in the history of ilosophy, giving interpretations which cause a historian to blink th surprise.

AKAS, CLARK E. (ed.). The Self. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956.

Pp. 302. $4.50.

MUNZER, EGBERT. Solovyev. Prophet of Russian-Western Unity. New Y
Philosophical Lib., 1956. Pp. vi + 154. $4.75.

This study of the thought of Solovyev begins with a short acco
of his life and of the influences upon his thought. This thought
then presented under four heads: the notion of Sophia and Divine-
Humanity; theocracy, church, and state; ethics, aesthetics, and m
cism; and eschatology. The author sympathetically presents the i
tive thought of the Russian philosopher-theologian, to whom philo
theology, and prophecy were all identical. Admitting here and th
that this thought did not attain full clarity or did not rid itse
gnostic and cabalistic elements, the author seems to think that t
personal, emotionally-charged religious speculation of Solovyev i
better than "abstract" Western philosophy.

There are no references, and no index.

MYERS, FRANCIS M. The Warfare of Democratic Ideals. Yellow Springs
Ohio: Antioch Press, 1956. Pp. 261. $3.50.

Mystery and Mysticism. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1956. Pp. 137
$4.75.

This is a collection of six essays, "Mysticism and Mystery," b
Plé, O.P.; "Mysterion," by Louis Bouyer, Cong. Orat.; "St. Paul's
Mysticism," by L. Cerfaux; "The Christian Myth," by Ian Hislop, O
"Studies on the Phenomena of Mystical Experience," by A. Léonard,
and "Mysticism: An Essay on the History of a Word," by Louis Bouy

Recent philosophers, particularly among the existentialists an
the field of the philosophy of religion, have spoken much of myst
and mysticism. In many cases they have given their own entirely
meanings to the terms--a legitimate enough procedure in itself; b
they have also used these new meanings to frame arguments about t
historical uses of the term. In other cases, readers have made t
relation. Hence, the book can be of very great use in clearing a
many misconceptions.

NAGEL, ERNEST. In Defense of Logic without Metaphysics. Glencoe, I
Free Press, 1956. $5.00.

NAHM, MILTON C. The Artist as Creator. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Pr
1956. Pp. 364. $5.50.

NATANSON, MAURICE. The Social Dynamics of George H. Mead. Introd.
Horace M. Kallen. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956. Pp. v
102. $2.50.

This study is inspired by the thought that Mead may be widely
interpreted. The author studies Mead's chief works and finds thr
themes: the nature and origin of the self, the nature of the "act
and the notion of temporality. He decides that there are interna
conflicts in Mead's thinking, caused by the latter's failure to m
some distinctions on the self and its relation to the world, his
ure to have a clear notion of his own standpoint, and his failure
give up incompatible relics of behaviorism and psychologism. The
thor contends that phenomenology, particularly that of Husserl, i
very similar in intent and method to Mead, and that the latter wo
have profited both in clarity and in depth from a knowledge of th
movement.

The study is carefully annotated; there are a bibliography of
and a selected bibliography of secondary sources.

NEWMAN, JEREMIAH. Co-responsibility In Industry. Preface by Michae
Fogarty. Westminster: Newman Press, 1956. Pp. 210. $4.00.

NEWMAN, JOHN HENRY, CARDINAL. Apologia Pro Vita Sua. Ed. by A. Dwi
Culler. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1956. Pp. 411. Paper,

ZSCHE, FRIEDRICH WILHELM. Birth of Tragedy: Genealogy of Morals. Tr. y Francis Golffing. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1956. 95¢

Mediaeval Thinkers. "Studies and Texts," 1. Ed. by J. Reginald 'Donnell, C.S.B. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 955. Pp. xi + 382. Paper.

The following texts are contained in this volume: Commentary on oethius's De Hebdomadibus by Clarenbaldus of Arras, edited with an ntroduction (pp. 1-4) by Nicholas M. Haring, S.A.C. (4-21); the Comentaries on the Two Boethian Opuscula Sacra on the Holy Trinity by ilbert, Bishop of Poitiers, edited with an introduction (pp. 23-31) y Nicholas M. Haring, S.A.C. (pp. 32-98); the Sententia Super Secundm Metaphysicae by Adam of Buckfield, edited with an introduction pp. 99-100) by Armand Maurer, C.S.B. (pp. 101-44); the Quaestiones in etaphysicam by Peter of Auvergne, edited with an introduction (pp. 45-47) by Arthur Monahan (pp. 148-181); a selection (the Universal nd supposition) from the Logica attributed to Richard of Campsall, dited with an introduction (pp. 183-84) by Edward A. Synan (pp. 185-32); the second question of the prologue (on intuitive and abstracive knowledge) to the Commentary on the Sentences by Walter Catton, dited with an introduction (pp. 233-35) by Jeremiah O'Callaghan, S.J. pp. 135-269); the First Quodlibet of Jean Quidort, edited with an inroduction (pp. 271-72) by Ambrose J. Heiman, C.PP.S. (pp. 272-91); a election (Lib. III, tract. 2, cap. i, ii, iii; tract. 3, cap. i, ii) rom the Summa De Bono by Ulrich of Strasbourg, edited with an introuction (pp. 273-94) by Francis Collingwood (pp. 294-307); selections questions 12-16 of the First Quodlibet and selections from the Quaeiones Disputatae) dealing with the soul and knowledge by Thomas of utton, edited with an introduction (pp. 309-11) by Joseph J. Przezdiecki (pp. 312-78). There is an index of proper names cited.

IS, LOUIS WILLIAM. Polarity. A Philosophy of Tensions among Values. hicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956. Pp. x + 242. $4.50.

By the polar method, the author understands a procedure that exlores each of two opposites that stand in relation of complementarity o each other. He believes that in this method one can accept the ontraries of experience and the differences of philosophers without enying any part of reality or any "truth" discovered by any philosopher. His basic points of view seem to be related to those of Whitehead, Hocking, Perry, and philosophers of religion like Brightman and emple.

The various chapters try to exemplify the method of polarity in roblems of logic, epistemology, psychology, ethics, social philosophy, nd metaphysics. Though the author's references range from Plato to orris Cohen and Dewey, metaphysical realism never really gets a hearng, and the problematic employed by the author seems to imply that hilosophical truth is of the same order as scientific theory.

NNELL, THOMAS J. Moral Aspects of Medicine. Westminster: Newman ress, 1956. $3.50.

, JAMES. The Growth and Structure of Motives. Glencoe: Free Press, 956. Pp. 277. $5.00.

RUSSELL. An Approach to the Psychology of Religion. Boston: Chrisopher Pub. House, 1956. Pp. 183. $3.00.

This is intended to be an introductory textbook. The author does ot intend to destroy religion or explain it away, and to this extent he book is successful. Its weaknesses are serious in the area of istorical knowledge, theological and philosophical background, and ven at times of information about contemporary religious practices. he bibliographies of suggested readings for the chapters are scanty

and most often out of date.

Opinions of the Committees on Professional Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and of the New York County Lawyers Association. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 872. $10

OPLER, MARVIN K. Culture, Psychiatry and Human Values. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1956. Pp. 260. $6.00.

ORGAN, TROY WILSON (ed.). The Examined Life. Boston: Houghton Miffl Co., 1956. Pp. 416. $5.00.

Our Moral and Spiritual Resources for International Cooperation. Was ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956. Pp. 36. 30¢

PARKES, A. S. Extrasensory Perception. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1956. Pp. 240. $6.00.

PATON, H. J. Immortality. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1956 Pp. 19. Paper, 50¢

PEPPER, STEPHEN C. The Work of Art. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Pres 1956. Pp. 183. $3.00.

PEREIRA, I. RICE. The Nature of Space. New York: Author, 121 W. 15 Pp. 62. Paper, $3.50.

PERRY, RALPH BARTON. The Humanity of Man. Ed. by Evelyn Ann Masi. York: George Braziller, 1956. Pp. 189. $3.75.

Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern World, The. Four lectures, ed. by Charles W. Hendel. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956. Pp. 128. $2.50.

[PLATO.] Great Dialogues of Plato. Tr. from the Greek by W. H. D. R ed. by Eric H. Warmington and Philip G. Rouse. New York: New Amer Lib., 1956. Pp. 525. Paper, 50¢

PLATO. Euthyphro, Apology and Crito, and the Death Scene from Phaedo Tr. from the Greek by F. J. Church. Revised with an introd. by Ro D. Cumming. 2d rev. ed. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956. Pap 50¢

————. Phaedrus. Tr. with an introd. by W. C. Helmbold and W. G Rabinowitz. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956. Pp. xvii + 75.

This is a new translation of all the improvements of the text t have been suggested in recent years. The introduction concerns it largely with the problem of the unity of the work, which the trans tors find in its structure and style (especially the tone of irony rather than its subject matter. However, they point out that for Plato dialectic and love are not as unrelated as they would be in other philosophies. The introduction will be helpful for all stud of Plato, and the translation is smooth and easily intelligible.

————. Phaedrus, Ion, Gorgias, and Symposium, with passages fro Republic and Laws. Tr. from the Greek and ed. by Lane Cooper. I Cornell Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 494. $3.75.

————. Philebus and Epinomis. Tr. with an introd. by A. E. Tayl Ed. by Raymond Klibansky with Guido Calogero and A. C. Loyd. New Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1956. Pp. vi + 272. $5.25.

The edition here published for the first time was found in manu script form by Raymond Klibansky and edited. Taylor wrote a long troduction (pp. 9-99), in which he attempts a detailed exposition Plato's moral theory and its relations to his other teachings. T text of the Philebus is given on pages 101-201; that of the Epino pages 221-53. The last section of the book contains the notes of editors on text, translation, and interpretation.

POULET, GEORGES. Studies in Human Time. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins P 1956. Pp. 384. $5.00.

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Vol "The Role of Philosophy in the Catholic Liberal College." Washin

ffice of the Secretary of the Association, 1956. Pp. 247. Paper, .50.

In addition to the presidential address, the association address, d the papers on the main topic of the meeting (summarized in the Nov- ber issue of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN in a report on the meeting), the esent volume contains the papers read at the round table meetings. opics taken up were: "David Hume and John Scotus Eriugena," Anthony metz; "Scholastic and Aristotelian Logic," I. M. Bochenski, O.P.; Knowledge of God in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Nature," Peter Reilly; "The Prime Mover and the Order of Learning," Ralph McInerny; The Metaphysical Analysis of the Beautiful and the Ugly," Robert E. Call, S.S.J., (with a commentary by James P. Reilly, Jr.); "Maritain Education for Freedom," Leo R. Ward, C.S.C.; "The Threat to Academ- Freedom," Journet Kahn; "Some Historical Origins of Rationalism in tholic Philosophy Manuals," John E. Gurr, S.J.; "Natural Wisdom and me Recent Philosophy Manuals," Kenneth L. Schmitz; "'Knowledge' and ree Man' in Spinoza's Ethics," Sister Mary Ann Ida Gannon, B.V.M.; The Judgment and Existence," Marc F. Griesbach.

AKRISHNAN, S., and MOORE, C. A. (eds.). Source Book of Indian Philos- phy. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956. $5.00.

EN, JOHN D., and RYAN, FRANCIS A. A Catholic Philosophy of Education. ev. ed. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1956. Pp. xiii + 601. $4.75.

This revision includes several new topics and completely revised ibliographies. The over-all structure of the book, however, remains he same.

ENBACH, HANS. Rise of Scientific Philosophy. Berkeley: Univ. of alifornia Press, 1956. $1.45.

———. The Direction of Time. Ed. by Maria Reichenbach. Berkeley: niv. of California Press. Pp. 291. $5.50.

lution in Philosophy, The. Introd. by Gilbert Ryle. New York: St. artin's Press, 1956. Pp. 126. $2.50.

This book consists of a series of short papers, most of which were riginally given as lectures on the third programme of the British roadcasting Company. The purpose is to explain to an audience with- ut technical training the direction and character of philosophical ctivity in Great Britain, as carried on by those philosophers who ractice analysis. The authors try to show both the special charac- eristics of the contemporary effort, and its relation to earlier ef- orts. In the course of the lectures, it becomes clear that the move- ent from logical positivism to analysis was a real change whose ulti- ate character cannot yet be predicted.

MOND, WILLIAM KENNETH. Socrates and the Western World. New York: itadel Press, 1956. Pp. 214. $3.00.

ENBERG, PETER N. Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Political hought. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 212. $3.75.

AN, DAVID. The Oral Tradition, The Written Word, and the Screen mage. Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1956. Pp. 48. 50¢

SON, ABRAHAM. Complete Theories. New York: Humanities Press, 1956. p. 136. $3.75.

S, OSWALDO. Símbolo y Deseo. Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1956. p. 196. Paper.

In this work, the author wishes to make known and explain the foun- tions of a method of diagnosis and classification (called "Córdoba- gem" after its authors), which centers on the "desiderative symbol" d the "desiderative expression." In his second chapter, the author nsiders the precise nature of clinical psychology and holds that it not an application of any other branch of psychology but a distinct

science in its own right. He argues that it is a practical knowle "clinical" in method (not merely in what is discovered), directed the description and analysis of the individual in his existential ation.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND A. W. An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry. In by Morris Kline. New York: Dover Pubns., 1956. Pp. xvi + 201. $ paper, $1.50.

First published in 1897, this study of the foundations of geome and of their philosophical implications was very important in the tory of thought. As is well known, in this work Russell decided t the principles of projective geometry were the necessary propertie a modified Kantian "form of externality." Professor Kline, in his troduction, points out that Russell's historical analyses and phil sophical criticisms are permanently valuable, even though contempo theories in mathematics have gone beyond the position here present

SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL. Being and Nothingness. Tr. with an introd. by Ha E. Barnes. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1956. Pp. lxix + 638. $10.00.

This translation fills a long-felt need. The translator has gi a long introduction (pp. i-xliv) in which she outlines the main po tions of Sartre and shows how they all constitute a unified system thought. In some cases, she tries to relate Sartre's ideas to tho of other philosophers and even to nonphilosophical ideas and activ ties (such as mysticism, which is explained in a rather peculiar s of way).

SAUL, LEON JOSEPH. The Hostile Mind. New York: Random House, 1956. 221. $3.50.

SCHNEIDER, HERBERT WALLACE. Three Dimensions of Public Morality. Bl ington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 166. $3.00.

SEARLES, HERBERT L. Logic and Scientific Methods. 2d ed. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1956. Pp. xiii + 378. $4.25.

The first edition of this work was published in 1948. In this vised edition, a new chapter on definition has been added, and sev other chapters have been expanded. At other points, corrections a improvements in the language have been made.

SKUTCH, ALEXANDER FRANK. The Quest of the Divine. Boston: Meador Pu Co., 1956. Pp. 440. $3.50.

SMITH, CHARLES. Sensism. The Philosophy of the West. New York: Tru Seeker Co., 1956. 2 vols. Pp. lvi + 1612. $10.00.

The author refutes Plato, Descartes, and all "associationist" thinkers by means of semantics and physicalism (matter and motion the only realities).

SMITH, GERARD, S.J. The Truth That Frees. "The Aquinas Lecture," 19 Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956. Pp. 79. $2.00.

The theme of this lecture is the way in which various kinds of knowledge free men. The author shows that there is an ascending s ies of knowledges, from practical to speculative, in speculative f particular to universal, from faith to vision, and each one frees more and more.

SMITH, T. V. Philosophers Speak for Themselves: from Aristotle to P tinus. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956. $1.50.

———. Philosophers Speak for Themselves: from Thales to Plato. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956. $1.50.

———. The Ethics of Compromise. Boston: Starr King Press, 195 Pp. 117. $2.50.

The author claims that since no one unambiguously possesses an certain truth, it is immoral to insist that any general statement

ly one meaning or is literally and uniquely true. He enhances this peculative relativism by assimilating it to democracy and to toler-nce. As in previous writings, he makes adroit use of quotations, im-lying that all "non-relativists" can justly be put into groups that ink exactly alike and are collectively responsible for everything ritten by any of their members. The book is therefore more special leading than an honest presentation of an argument.

, VINCENT. Elements of Logic. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1956.

R, HERMAN AUGUSTUS. Essays on Science. Foreword by C. Stacy French. tanford: Stanford Univ. Press. Pp. 229. $5.00.

NBERGHEN, FERDINAND VAN. Aristotle in the West. Tr. from the French Leonard Johnston. New York: Gregory Lounz, 1956. Pp. 244. $3.00.

VAN, A. M. The Three-Dimensional Man. New York: Kenedy, 1956. Pp. + 297. $4.00.

These are the literary reflections of a businessman and publicist, o is also a humanist and a Christian.

I, ALFRED. Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics; Papers from 1923 to 38. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 471. $9.60.

R, A. E. Aristotle. New York: Dover Pubns., 1956. Pp. 118. $2.75; per, $1.00.

This is an excellent reprint of the revised edition published in 919. As everyone knows, Taylor is a Platonist and considers Aristotle a kind of modified, and to that same extent, mutilated Plato. In ddition, he assimilates Aristotelian terms and distinctions to some oncepts of modern philosophy. Nevertheless, the book is stimulating n many ways.

———. Plato: The Man and His Work. New York: Meridian Books; Oct-ber 1956.

NT, F. R. Philosophical Theology. 2 vols. Re-issue. New York: mbridge Univ. Press, 1956. $8.50.

Golden Chain. Tr. from the Latin by a religious of C.S.M.V. New rk: Morehouse-Gorham, 1956. Pp. 90. Paper, $1.25.

S AQUINAS, ST. On the Truth of the Catholic Faith. Bk. 3; pts. 1 2. Ed. by Vernon J. Bourke. Garden City: Hanover House, 1956. ch, $2.50; Doubleday & Co., 1956. Paper, each, 85¢

———. The Blessed Sacrament and the Mass. Tr. from the Latin with tes by Rev. F. O'Neill. Westminster: Newman Press, 1956. Pp. 190. 2.75.

———. The Three Greatest Prayers. Tr. from the Latin by Laurence apcote with introd. by Thomas Gilby. Westminster: Newman Press, 956. Pp. 96. $2.00.

———. Treatise on Law (Summa Theologiae I-II, qq. 90-97, with I, . 16-17, 84-88). Introd. by Stanley Parry. Chicago: Henry Regnery ., 1956. Pp. 254. Paper, 95¢

NDIKE, LYNN. A History of Magic and Experimental Science. Vols. VII d VIII. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 656 and 776. ch, $10.00.

N, ERIC WALTER FREDERIC. Living and Knowing. New York: Harper & os., 1956. Pp. 285. $5.00.

SON, J. O. Philosophical Analysis. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 956. Pp. 218. $2.90.

dation of Scientific Theories. Ed. by Philipp Frank. Boston: Beacon ess: November 1956. $4.00.

CK, PETER ROBERT EDWIN. Conservatism. Princeton: Van Nostrand ess, 1956. Pp. 191. Paper, $1.25.

ISES, RICHARD. Positivism. Tr. by Jerry Bernstein and Roger G. wton. New York: George Braziller, 1956. Pp. 415. $3.95.

WALSH, ANN MARIE. Self-Concepts of Bright Boys with Learning Difficu ties. New York: Bureau of Pubns., Teachers College. Pp. 92. $2

WHEELER, MOTHER MARY CECELIA. Philosophy and the Summa Theologica o Saint Thomas Aquinas. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Pres 1956. Pp. 118. Paper, $1.25.

WHITE, MORTON GABRIEL. Toward Reunion in Philosophy. Cambridge: Ha Univ. Press. Pp. 323. $5.75.

WHITE, VICTOR. God the Unknown. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956. $

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH. Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead. Ed. Lucien Price. New York: New American Lib., 1956. 50¢

———. Modes of Thought. Reissue. New York: Macmillan Co., 19 $3.75.

WINSPEAR, ALBAN DEWES. The Genesis of Plato's Thought. 2d ed. New S. A. Russell-Harbor Press, 1956. Pp. 397. $5.00.

WOLFSON, HARRY AUSTRYN. The Philosophy of the Church Fathers. Vol. "Faith, Trinity, Incarnation." Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. P 1956. Pp. xxviii + 635. $10.00.

This is the first volume of a study on the principles and the m od by which the Fathers of the Church (taking the term in rather wide sense) tried to "explain" the mysteries of the Christian Fai The author contends that the general pattern of this attempt was already developed by Philo. In general, the author thinks that thi study is pretheological, and that its conclusions neither prove n disprove the fact of revelation, the nature of inspiration, and s In general, also, the method followed is textual and analytic; th thor calls it "hypothetico-deductive," in that he begins the stud each problem with a proposed explanation and tries to see whether is verified by illustrative texts.

This first volume deals with the problem of faith and reason, Trinity, and the Incarnation.

WOODGER, J. H. Physics, Psychology and Medicine: A Methodological E New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1956. $1.75.

WUELLNER, BERNARD, S.J. Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy. Milwa Bruce Pub. Co., 1956. Pp. xvi + 138. $4.25.

This dictionary was prepared mainly for undergraduates, and it should be of real benefit to them. Every library should have a c available. Sometimes those who are trying to get acquainted with Scholasticism on their own may also find this book helpful; on th other hand, the author cautions against using this as a source-bo learn what Scholastic philosophers think.

ZIMMER, HEINRICH. Philosophies of India. New York: Meridian Books; September 1956.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

Supplement to THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN
XXXIV (May, 1957)

the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that philosophical principles and problems.

urrent" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a difference in price, format, and the like.

e procedure is as follows:

Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.

Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.

Books received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.

A. Evolution of Scientific Thought from Newton to Einstein. 2nd rev. New York: Dover Pubns.; Sept., 1956. $2.00.

ALFRED. Now. New York: Hillier Press, 1956. Pp. 256. $5.50.

HENRY D. (ed.). The Age of Ideology. Ed. with introd. and commentary. New York: New American Lib., 1956. Pp. 288. Paper, 50¢
As usual in the series of which the present volume is a part, the k under consideration consists of a series of selections from Kant, chte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Comte, Mill, Spencer, Marx, Mach, Niesche, and Kierkegaard, with a general introduction to the volume particular introductions to each thinker. In this volume, the roductions and summaries constitute almost half the book.
The introductions are always stimulating, but it must be noted t the editor does not take a historical attitude. He tells us in general introduction that the term "ideology" was chosen deliberly to indicate his conviction that all the thinkers in question d the editor?) conceive the philosophical enterprise as not conned with truth but with goals (pp. 14, 19, 25).

DER, H. G. (ed.). Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov., 1956. $4.75.

ARY TAMME, SISTER, O.P. A Critique of John Dewey's Theory of Fine in the Light of the Principles of Thomism. Washington: Catholic v. of America, 1956. Pp. xi + 131. Paper, $1.50.
This doctoral dissertation is a study of the basis in logic of ey's theory of art, of the theory of art itself, and a critique, h internal and in the light of Thomistic thought. The first parts

are well documented and seem sound. In contrasting Dewey's theor of beauty and fine art with the "Thomistic," the author does not sufficiently aware of the incomplete character of Thomistic writi on the subject.

ARBERRY, A. J. Reason and Revelation in Islam. New York: Macmillan Mar., 1957. $3.00.

ARMSTRONG, ADAM ELLIOTT. In the Last Analysis. Foreword by Vergili Ferm. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1956. Pp. 115. $3.00.

ARNETT, WILLARD. Santayana and the Sense of Beauty. Preface by Irw Edman. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press; Apr., 1957. $1.25.

ARNOLD, E. V. Roman Stoicism. New York, Humanities Press. $6.00.

AVERROES. Averroes' Commentary on Plato's Republic. Ed. with an in trod., tr. from the Hebrew and notes by E. I. J. Rosenthal. New Cambridge Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 344. $14.50.

_____. Commentarium Medium in Aristotelis De Generatione et Corr one Libros. Ed. by Francis Howard Fobes and Samuel Kurland. Cam bridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1956. Pp. xliv + 21

According to the editors, the text tradition of this Commenta is very involved, many manuscripts having whole passages out of o Even the Junta edition, whose pagination is given in the margin, some complicated spots. In the case of this Commentary, the edit have been able to check not only against the Aristotelian text (t Bekker numbers are given in the margin), but also against Arabic Hebrew manuscripts. The present text, therefore, has a very high probability of being very close to the original Latin translation

Like the preceding volumes of this series, this is a beautiful fashioned volume, a delight not only to the scholar but also to t bibliophile. There are a valuable glossary of Greek, Arabic, and Hebrew equivalents of the principal Latin terms of the translatio and a Greek index to this glossary, which together provide a very useful tool for comparisons.

AYER, A. J. The Problem of Knowledge. New York: St. Martin's Press 1956. Pp. x + 258. $4.50.

First published in Great Britain, this study of knowledge aims discuss the main problems in that area. In the first chapter, th author shows what he considers to be a philosophical treatment of knowledge, in contrast to other possible ways of treatment. In t second, he takes up the general topic of skepticism and certainty the general criteria of knowledge, the question about indubitable statements. In the third chapter, he considers perception, sense data, realism, and phenomenalism. In the fourth, the problem of ry, knowledge of the past and of the future, the nature of the ca process, are the topics of discussion. In the last chapter, the lem is about selves; the nature of personality, personal identity its criteria, the knowledge of other minds.

BABBITTE, EDWIN, O.F.M. Cosmology for All. Chicago: Henry Regnery Feb., 1957. $1.25.

BACHHUBER, ANDREW H., S.J. Introduction to Logic. New York: Applet Century-Crofts; May, 1957. $4.00.

BAHM, ARCHIE J. Philosophy--An Introduction. New York: John Wiley Sons, 1953. Pp. 441. $4.50.

BATES, MARSTON, and HUMPHREY, PHILIP S. The Darwin Reader. New Yor Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1957. $6.75.

BEACH, WALDO. Christian Ethics. New York: Ronald Press, 1957. Pp.

BECK, ROBERT N. The Meaning of Americanism. New York: Philosophica Lib., 1956. Pp. 192. $4.75.

BERES, DAVID. Ego Deviation and the Concept of Schizophrenia. New

ewish Child Care Association, 1956. Pp. 72. Paper, $1.00.

MANN, GUSTAV. Philosophy of Science. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin ress, 1957. Pp. xiii + 181. $4.75.

The author, a member of the Vienna Circle, here studies science rom the viewpoint of logical positivism. He begins with deduction nd definition, and proposes an ideal language as the solution to ny problems. (That the solution often looks like an elimination of problem should not surprise anyone who has more than a superficial miliarity with the techniques of logical positivism.) In the sec- nd chapter, the theme of "process" is studied, through an illustra- ion of the Newtonian laws of the attraction of bodies. In the third hapter, the notion of configuration is illustrated through Gestalt sychology and the mechanist-vitalist controversy. Some of the au- hor's formulations are so tightly reasoned and expressed that they ay well become classic.

SON, HENRI LOUIS. The Creative Mind. An Introduction to Metaphy- ics. Tr. from the French by Mabelle L. Andison. New York: Philo- ophical Lib., 1956. Pp. 252. Paper, $1.65.

LEY, GEORGE. A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowl- dge. Ed. with introd. by Colin M. Turbayne. New York: Liberal rts Press, 1957. Pp. xxiv + 104. Paper, 75¢

The text of this edition follows that of the first (1710) edition, xcept that the changes of the second (1734) edition have been added brackets and the corresponding first edition passages put in foot- otes.

The introduction gives a short biography, an outline of the doc- rine of the work, and a brief, clear account of its influence upon ter philosophers. There is also a selective bibliography. This is n excellent edition for students and scholars alike.

OCCI, PETER A. Free Will, Responsibility, and Grace. Nashville: bingdon-Cokesbury Press; May, 1957. $2.00.

, G. W. SCOTT. Measurements of Mind and Matter. New York: Philo- ophical Lib.; Oct., 1956. $4.50.

NEY, RAYMOND B. Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation. New York: arper & Bros.; Feb., 1957. $1.45.

GEORGE. Dominant Themes of Modern Philosophy. New York: Ronald ress, 1957. Pp. x + 660. $6.75.

The author tells the prospective reader that this book will deal ith recurrent problems and with those that have established new tra- itions. The method followed has been called "the history of ideas," "intellectual history." Philosophies are not presented as systems even when they were such) but as variations of a set of problems- nd-solutions. The author maintains that he is "not quarreling with he ideas which are presented here, but trying to understand them and o set them down in such a fashion that the reader will sympathize ith them" (p. vi). In the author's practice, this aim is combined ith wholesale value-judgments about these ideas.

The book begins with the Renaissance revolt against authority, tudies the pre-Kantians and Kant in some detail, and then moves more apidly into existentialism. Logical positivism and its successors re not treated. There are relatively few references; most of the w footnotes refer to secondary sources.

NSKI, I. M., O.P.; CHURCH, ALONZO; and GOODMAN, NELSON. The Prob- m of Universals. A Symposium. Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame ress, 1957. Pp. 54. Paper, 95¢

This discussion of the problem of universals is conducted from the int of view of logic, even though Father Bochenski states that his

view is relative to an "ontological frame of reference." Mr. Chur holds for the existence of (abstract) propositions and classes; Mr Goodman holds only for individuals (defined, however, logically); Father Bochenski tries to mediate with a theory of logical identit The papers are good reflections of the present state of one part o logical theory.

BREVOLD, LOUIS I. The Intellectual Milieu of John Dryden: Studies in Some Aspects of Seventeenth-Century Thought. Reissue. East Lansi Univ. of Michigan Press; Sept., 1956. Pp. 185. Paper, $1.25.

BRIERE, O. Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy, 1898-1950. Tr. from t French by Laurence G. Thompson. Preface by E. R. Hughes. New Yor Macmillan Co., 1956. Pp. 159. $4.75.

BRIFFAULT, ROBERT, and MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW. Marriage: Past and Pre ent. Boston: Porter Sargent Pub., 1956. Pp. 96. $2.50; paper, $1.50.

BROWN, BRENDAN F. (ed.). Natural Law Reader. New York: Oceana Pubns Apr., 1957. $3.50; paper, $1.00.

BROWN, LENNA WILLIAMSON. From Zero to Infinity. Lawrence, Kans.: Al Press, 1956. Pp. 193. $4.00.

BRUNER, JEROME S.; GOODNOW, JACQUELINE J.; AUSTIN, GEORGE A. A Study Thinking. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1956. Pp. 330. $5.50.

BRUNNER, AUGUST, S.J. A New Creation. Towards a Theology of the Chr tian Life. Tr. Ruth Mary Bethell. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1956. Pp. 143. $4.75.

This is a work of theology but of theology in its broadest sens in which it includes the full instrumental use of philosophy and p chology. The title is also slightly misleading, in that what is studied is "Christian perfection" especially as found historically the religious life. Thus, the three phases analyzed are: possessi and poverty, marriage and chastity, and freedom and obedience.

The resources of philosophy that are most fully utilized are th of phenomenology and, to a lesser extent, those of existentialism its themes of communication and liberty. Any Christian philosophe who is interested in the perfection of man will profit a great dea by reading this penetrating, reflective study. It is unfortunate that the book is almost entirely unannotated.

BUBER, MARTIN. Eclipse of God. New York: Harper & Bros.; Feb., 1957 $1.15.

BURNETT, WHIT (ed.). This Is My Philosophy. New York: Harper & Bros 1933-1957. Pp. 397. $4.95.

CARMICHAEL, LEONARD. The Making of the Modern Mind. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956. Pp. 96. $2.00.

CASSIRER, ERNST. Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics. T from the German by O. Theodor Benfey. Preface by Henry Margenau. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 251. $5.00.

CHERRY, COLIN. On Human Communication. A Review, a Survey, and a Cr icism. New York: John Wiley & Sons; Dec., 1956. Pp. 356. $7.00.

CICERO, MARCUS TULLIUS. M. Tulli Ciceronis De Natura Deorum. Ed. by Arthur Stanley Pease. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 545. $15.00.

CLARK, GORDON H. Thales to Dewey. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.; Mar 1957.

CLARKE, M. L. The Roman Mind: Studies in the History of Thought fro Cicero to Marcus Aurelius. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Mar., 1956. Pp. 168. $3.75.

COHEN, MORRIS RAPHAEL. A Preface to Logic. New York: Meridian Book 1956. Pp. 224. Paper, $1.25.

NGWOOD, ROBIN GEORGE. The Idea of History. Ed. by T. M. Knox. w York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 365. Paper, $1.75.

LLY, F. G. Science versus Philosophy. New York: Philosophical b.; May, 1957. $3.75.

RASWAMY, ANANDA K. The Transformation of Nature in Art. New York: ver Pubns., 1957. Pp. v + 245. Paper, $1.75.

This philosophy of art has many excellent and thought-provoking sights: the essential unity of man is made the basis for the universal tendency of men to express their ideas and feelings in works art, and the nature of art-work as symbol is clearly defined. At e same time, the author's basic monism—in spite of explicit protests to the contrary--shows in this work more clearly than in many his other productions. The choice of Meister Eckhart to serve as e spokesman for medieval theories of art is a consequence of the thor's view of monism as the real meaning of philosophy, art, and eligion.

Nevertheless, the book is valuable; the present edition is a joy use as well as adapted to small resources of library and student.

R, LANE. The Poetics of Aristotle: Its Meaning and Influence. Reissue. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press; Mar., 1956. $1.75.

S, GEORGE SYLVESTER. The Challenge of Soviet Education. New York: cGraw-Hill, 1957. Pp. 341. $6.00.

CT, ANTOINE AUGUSTIN. An Essay on the Foundations of our Knowledge. . with introd. by Merritt H. Moore. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 956. Pp. lxx + 615. $9.00.

Though Cournot has often been acknowledged as an important thinker, is rare that any attention has been paid to the details of his ought. The present edition may be hoped to provide both stimulus d material for such detailed study. The translation is good. ere is a long and helpful introduction with a selective bibliogra-y. The translator has added some explanatory and bibliographical otnotes and also a detailed index, which very considerably increases the value of the edition.

, BENEDETTO. Aesthetic. New York: Noonday Press; Oct., 1956. .95.

N, GEORGE W. A Primer on Communism. Ed. Howard Oiseth. New York: P. Dutton & Co.,; Feb., 1957. $2.50.

LL, T. H. Kierkegaard Commentary. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956. . 282. $5.00.

___. Kierkegaard Studies. New York: Roy Pubs., 1956. Pp. 227. .00.

T, FRANZ. The Mysteries of Mithra. Tr. Thomas J. McCormack. New rk: Dover Pubns., 1957. Pp. xi + 239; with folding map. Paper, .85.

___. Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism. Tr. with introd. by ant Showerman. New York: Dover Pubns., 1957. Pp. xxiv + 298. per, $1.75.

The author of these two works was one of the outstanding classical holars at the end of the nineteenth century. In the Mysteries of thra he presents the conclusion of a detailed study of texts and numents relating to this religion. It is a more detailed book than e companion volume. Oriental Religions is of broader scope and has o purposes, to show the gradual infiltration into Roman thought and actice of Oriental beliefs and liturgy, and to illustrate the spread this syncretic religion through the lands governed by Rome.

These two works should be in the library of every school that shes to provide its students with a knowledge of Roman religion.

The present editions are excellently printed, with specially desig cover illustrations, and are presented at a reasonable price.

CURRY, WALTER CLYDE. Milton's Ontology, Cosmogony, and Physics. Lex ington: Univ. of Kentucky Press; Apr., 1957. $5.00.

DANTE ALIGHIERI. On World Government or De Monarchia. Tr. Herbert W Schneider; introd. by Dino Bigongiari. 2nd ed. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. xvi + 80. Paper, 60¢

The first edition of this work, published in 1949, was reviewed THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXVII (1950), 246-47. The first edition of- fered an abridged text (it ran to 61 pages); this edition is compl The introduction is unchanged.

DAVID, HENRY P., and VON BRACKEN, HELMUT (eds.). Perspectives in Per sonality Theory. New York: Basic Books, 1957. Pp. 447. $6.50.

DEMPSEY, PETER JAMES RORY. Freud, Psychoanalysis, Catholicism. Chic Henry Regnery Co., 1956. Pp. 219. $3.00.

[DESCARTES, RENÉ.] Descartes' Major Philosophical Works and Early Co respondence. Tr. with introd. by Laurence J. Lafleur. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957.

DI SANTILLANA, GIORGIO (ed.). The Age of Adventure. Ed. with introd and commentary. New York: New American Lib., 1956. Pp. 288. Pap 50¢

This is another in the "Mentor Philosophers" series and contain selections from Nicholas of Cusa, Overbury, Da Vinci, More, Machia velli, Michelangelo, Erasmus, Luther, Dürer, Copernicus, Montaigne Paracelsus, Kepler, Boehme, Galileo, Hakluyt, and Giordano Bruno. The editor contributes a general introduction to the book, and par ticular introductions and evaluations for each thinker.

The introductions and summaries are brilliant but definitely slanted. The editor has scholarship, but his sympathies are subtl and strongly directed toward the naturalistic, anti-religious trai of his subjects.

DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS GRIGORIEVICH. The Biological Basis of Human Freedom. New York, Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 145. $2.95.

DRAKE, HENRY L. People's Plato. New York: Philosophical Lib.; May, 1957. $7.50.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN. Freedom of the Will. Ed. by Paul Ramsey. New Ha Yale Univ. Press; May, 1957. $6.50.

EVERETT, MILLARD S. Ideals of Life. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 19 Pp. 736. $5.00.

EWING, A. C. The Idealist Tradition. Glencoe: Free Press; Mar., 195 $5.50.

FAIRWEATHER, EUGENE RATHBONE (ed.). A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm Ockham. Tr. by the editor. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 195 Pp. 457. $5.00.

FEIGL, HERBERT, and SCRIVEN, MICHAEL (eds.). The Foundations of Scie and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1956. Pp. 360. $5.00.

FESTUGIERE, A. J. Epicurus and His Gods. Tr. from the French by C. Chilton. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 113. $2.25.

FEUERBACH, LUDWIG. The Essence of Christianity. New York: Harper & Bros.; Feb., 1957. $1.45.

_____. Essence of Christianity. Tr. and ed. E. Graham Waring. York: Ungar Pub. Co.; Mar., 1957. $1.75; paper, 65¢ [Corrected entry]

FINNEY, PATRICK. Moral Problems in Hospital Practice. Revised and larged by Patrick O'Brien. Foreword by James Francis Cardinal Mc Intyre. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1956. Pp. 342. $4.75.

, WARNER. The Examined Life. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press; pr., 1957. $1.75.

D, PETER (ed.). New Problems in Medical Ethics. Third series. Tr. v Malachy G. Carroll. Westminster: Newman Press, 1957. Pp. 303. 4.50.

C, FRANCIS H. Philosophical Greek: An Introduction. Chicago, Univ. f Chicago Press. $5.00.

M, ERICH. The Forgotten Language. New York: Grove Press; Feb., 957. $1.75.

IGCU-LAGRANGE, RÉGINALD, O.P. Beatitude. Tr. from the Latin by atrick Cummins. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1956. Pp. 403. $6.00.

HORN, WALTER. Individual Freedom and Governmental Restraints. aton Rouge, Louisiana State Univ. Press. Pp. 260. $3.75.

ON, ETIENNE HENRY. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. r. from the French by L. K. Shook; with a catalogue of St. Thomas's orks by I. T. Eschmann. New York: Random House, 1956. Pp. 512. 7.50.

NE, THEODORE MEYER. Liberalism: Its Theory and Practice. Austin: niv. of Texas Press; May, 1957. Pp. 248. $4.50.

____. Our Cultural Heritage. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956. Pp. 69. $3.50.

NWOOD, DAVID C. Pragmatic Theory of Truth. New York: Philosophical ib.; Nov., 1956. $3.75.

____. Truth and Meaning. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Apr., 1957. 3.75.

RAHI, PEPITA. The Contemplative Activity. New York: Abelard-chuman, 1956. Pp. 139. $3.00.

, EVERETT W. Modern Science and Human Values. Princeton: Van ostrand, 1957. Pp. 480. $6.00.

IS, DALE (ed.). The Concept of Development. Minneapolis: Univ. of innesota Press; Mar., 1957. $4.75.

OD, ROY. Foundations of Inductive Logic. New York: Harcourt, Brace Co.; Mar., 1957. $7.00.

INS, CHARLES HOMER. The Rise of Universities. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. ress, 1957. Pp. 118. Paper, $1.25.

Y, EDWIN F., S.J. Medical Ethics. Chicago, Loyola Univ. Press. p. 462. $6.00.

EBRAND, JOEL H. Science in the Making. New York: Columbia Univ. ress; Feb., 1957. Pp. 144. $3.00.

ING, WILLIAM ERNEST. The Coming World Civilization. New York: arper & Bros., 1956. Pp. xiv + 210. $3.75.

Though this book partakes somewhat of political philosophy, it is uch more, as is evident from a glance at the topics covered. The irst "study" concerns the modern role of the state and its inability o be all things to all men; the second considers subjectivity to be he characteristic of modernity and contends that it is surpassed by ntersubjectivity and participation; the third analyzes the structure f history in terms of the functions and strands of civilization; the ourth and fifth take up Christianity and world religion; the sixth orecasts the tasks to come--the overthrow of superstition, the ad-ance in aesthetic living, the progress of philosophy from the general o the particular.

, SIDNEY (ed.). American Philosophers at Work. New York: Criterion ooks, 1956. Pp. 512. $7.50.

NITZ, IRVING L. The Idea of War and Peace in Contemporary Philoso-hy. Introductory essay by Roy Wood Sellars. New York: Paine-Whitman ib., 1957. Pp. 224. $4.50.

This is a study of the opinions of a selected series of modern thinkers on war, peace, the nature of the state, law, the common g The thinkers are placed into two groups: (a) political idealism, e amined in Whitehead, Maritain, Santayana, Tolstoy and Gandhi, and Bertrand Russell; and (b) political realism—Lenin, Emery Reves, E stein, Kirtley F. Mather, James and Dewey, and Perry. The studies are carried on with an obvious attempt at objective presentation— vious, partly because it is not so very successful. Among other things, the author thinks that a philosophy of the state should in clude an explanation of why people act the way they do. His own position has this redeeming feature: he believes positions can be found in terms of which a common ideal can be stated and common pr posals of action can be accepted.

HOURANI, GEORGE F. Ethical Value. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Pres 1956. Pp. 233. $4.50.

HUGH OF ST. VICTOR. Soliloquy on the Earnest Money of the Soul. Tr. Kevin Herbert. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 41. Paper, $1.50.

HUME, DAVID. An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Ed. wi introd. by Charles W. Hendel. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. lxiii + 158. Paper, 75¢

The text of the Inquiry is taken from the first edition of all Hume's works (1826) but has been compared with the two best recent editions. A selective bibliography is added.

The editor gives a rather lengthy introduction. After a short ography, and a brief account of Hume's speculative philosophy, an tempt is made to show the purpose of the present work, to enumerat the various "principles" that are discovered, and to show the basi foundation of the principles in Hume's notion of "human nature." editor adds that the "sentiments" are considerably more important Hume in practical matters than any form of knowledge, though he do grant reason a larger place in practice than he allows theoretical

HURST, WILLARD. Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth- Century United States. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1956. 146. $2.50.

HUTTEN, ERNEST H. The Language of Modern Physics. New York: Macmill Co.; Jan., 1956. Pp. 278. $3.75.

JASPERS, KARL. Man in the Modern Age. Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Mar., 1957. 95¢

JOACHIM, HAROLD H. Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind. York: Macmillan Co.; Mar., 1957. $2.50.

JOHNSTON, HERBERT. Business Ethics. New York: Pitman Pub. Corp., 19 Pp. xiv + 354.

This textbook is intended for use in a business program. As th author points out, a large proportion of students are not able to ply the principles of ethical theory to concrete matters or to fol the applications in one field of action and then make applications another, distinct field. Hence there is a need of specialized boo in applied ethics.

The method followed is to present a concrete case, then to go b to principles, and finally to solve the case in the light of the r evant principles. Further cases and questions are then given.

The general topics covered are: (1) the need for prudential rea soning and judgment; (2) the existence of various kinds of rights; (3) justice in general; (4) co-operation; (5) speech and lying, es pecially in business; (6) the purpose of economic life; (7) the pr vate enterprise system; (8) labor and capital; (9) employment and

ges; (10) labor unions; (11) government in economic life. Many of ese treatments are very well handled, and the author gives an ex- llent philosophical understanding especially of the last five pics.

N, HORACE MEYER. Cultural Pluralism and the American Idea. Phila- lphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1956. Pp. 208. $5.00.

IS, NICHOLAS J. Absolute Truth and Reality. New York: Philosophi- l Lib.; Dec., 1956. $3.75.

ANN, FELIX. Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York, Humani- es Press. $5.00.

ANN, FRITZ. Thomas Mann: The World as Will and Representation. ston: Beacon Press; July, 1957. $6.00.

ANN, WALTER ARNOLD (ed.). Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. . by the editor and others. New York, Meridian Books. Pp. 319. per, $1.45.

N, HANS. What Is Justice? Berkeley: Univ. of California Press; r., 1957. $7.50.

EGAARD, SOREN AABYE. Kierkegaard's Attack upon "Christendom," 54-1855. Tr. with introd. by Walter Lowrie. Boston: Beacon Press, 56. Pp. 321. Paper, $1.45.

. The Prayers of Kierkegaard. Ed. with a new interpretation of s life and thought by Perry D. LeFevre. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago ess, 1956. Pp. 253. $3.50.

CK, WILLIAM. Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of History. New York: lumbia Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 128. $3.00.

ISRAEL. The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer. w York, Humanities Press. $5.00.

SKY, SAMUEL JOSEPH. The Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis. New York, cmillan Co. Pp. 325. $6.00.

R, RICHARD. Speculation and Revelation in the History of Philoso- y. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956. Pp. 251. $5.75.

H, JOSEPH WOOD. The Measure of Man. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 54. Pp. 261. Paper, 95¢

JOHN. The Structure of a Moral Code. Foreword by Clyde Kluckhohn. mbridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Jan., 1957. Pp. 489. $8.00.

R, SUSANNE K. Creation and Expression. New York: Chas. Scribner's ns; Apr., 1957. $3.50.

TT, PETER (ed.). Philosophy, Politics and Society. New York: cmillan Co., 1956. Pp. 199. $3.00.

NCE, NATHANIEL. Whitehead's Philosophical Development: A Critical story of the Background of Process and Reality. Foreword by Stephen Pepper. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press; Aug., 1956. Pp. 0. $5.00.

NC, HUGUES. An Introduction to Deductive Logic. New York: John ley & Sons, 1955. Pp. 244. $4.75.

Y, RAY (ed.). The Language of Value. New York: Columbia Univ. ess, 1957. Pp. viii + 428. $6.50.

This second symposium on "value" carries the editor's purpose rther: to clarify some of the fundamental problems concerning the ture and status of value. After a short introduction by the editor, e first part is a series of essays on various aspects of the prob- ms by Willis Moore, Edward Schouten Robinson, Charles Morris, ephen C. Pepper, E. Maynard Adams, Iam McGreal, A. Campbell Garnett, rbert Fingarette, Richard B. Brandt, Harold N. Lee, Robert S. Hart- nn, and Ray Lepley. In the second part, comments are offered upon e or more of these papers by Adams, Morris, McGreal, Laurence J. fleur, Herbert Feigl, Fingarette, Lee, Garnett, Charles L. Steven-

son, Robinson, Brandt, Moore, Hartmann, and Lepley.

In all the flurry of analysis published in the past decade, som very general distinctions seem to become accepted (such as the dis tinction between intrinsic and instrumental values), but so many n and original distinctions are being generated by each paper that t over-all improvement is obscured.

LEVI, ALBERT WILLIAM. Varieties of Experience: An Introduction to Ph losophy. New York: Ronald Press; Feb., 1957. $5.75.

LEVY, GERTRUDE RACHEL. Plato in Sicily. Hollywood-by-the-Sea, Fla.: Transatlantic Arts, 1956. Pp. 161. $3.75.

LEWIS, CLARENCE IRVING. Mind and the World Order. New York: Dover Pubns., 1956. Pp. xiv + 446. Paper, $1.95.

This work, first published in 1929, was one of the first to pre sent clearly the theory of knowledge of the new pragmatism. Accor ing to this theory, there are two orders of truth: of fact, in whi apart from the immediately given, there can be only empirical gene ization; and of logic, which is analytic but is not of real things The author conducts a sharp analysis upon the Kantian notion of th apriori. He differs strongly from the older empiricism which held all knowledge to be empirical generalization. But he wants also t avoid metaphysical realism, which he attempts to do by the assumpt of the "given," which has the same role as "sense-data" or "appear ances" have in other nonrealistic systems.

The reprint is excellently printed in a convenient and attracti form.

LEWIS, HYWELL DAVID (ed.). Contemporary British Philosophy. New Yor Macmillan Co., 1956. Pp. 515. $6.00.

LOCKE, JOHN. An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Chicago: Henr Regnery Co., 1956. Pp. 372. Paper, $1.35.

LOCKE, WILLIAM N., and BOOTH, A. DONALD (eds.). Machine Translation Languages. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1955. Pp. 243. $6.00.

LONERGAN, BERNARD. Insight. New York: Philosophical Lib.; May, 1957 $10.00.

MacIVER, R. M. (ed.). Integrity and Compromise: Problems of Public a Private Conscience. New York: Harper & Bros.; Jan., 1957. $2.50.

MAIMONIDES, MOSES. Guide for the Perplexed. Tr. M. Friedländer. Ne York: Dover Pubns., 1956. Pp. lix + 414. Paper, $1.85.

This is a reprint of the second, revised edition, first publish in 1904. The lengthy introduction gives a short life of Maimonide bibliographical information on the Guide, and a summary of its doc trines. There are special indices to Scripture passages quoted, t Koran, Maimonides's other writings, as well as a general index. I is a very useful edition and excellently produced.

MAISELS, M. Thought and Truth. Tr. from the Hebrew by Abraham Regel New York: Bookman Associates, 1956. Pp. 359. $5.00.

MANDELBAUM, MAURICE; GRAMLICH, FRANCIS W.; and ANDERSON, ALAN ROSS (e Philosophic Problems. An Introductory Book of Readings. New York Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. xiii + 762. $6.25.

The topics illustrated by a variety of selections are those of method, knowledge and the external world, life, mind, and freedom, ethics, values and the social order, religion, and world views. T average length of the selections is about nine pages.

The selections may be of some use, but, as in all books of this type, a teacher needs to page through the book himself. Claims of adequacy will meet with quite different evaluations. Aristotelian ism, for example, is represented in ethics (in a selection from W. Ross) but not in the section on knowledge. Metaphysics is not rep

sented at all, but there is a section of selections about metaphysics, called "world-views."

THEY-ZORN, OTTO. Dionysus. Amherst, Amherst College Press. Pp. 210. $3.00.

EL, GABRIEL. Royce's Metaphysics. Tr. Virginia and Gordon Ringer. Preface by William Ernest Hocking. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956. Pp. xix + 180. $4.50.

First published in 1918-1919 in the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, this study of Royce was written when Marcel was at the beginning of his career, yet, according to Professor Hocking, it is still one of the best analyses. Marcel was attracted by Royce's personalism, his stress on the connection between knowledge and volition, and his philosophy of loyalty. This much he admits in his foreword to the present translation. Perhaps also he was somewhat attracted by Royce's criticism of realism; some of the themes of Marcel's own thought are very similar to these views of Royce. The book is therefore valuable both as an analysis of Royce and a key to some of Marcel's own positions.

TAIN, JACQUES. Existence and the Existent. Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Feb., 1957. 75¢

ROU, H. I. A History of Education in Antiquity. Tr. from the French by George Lamb. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1956. Pp. 484. $7.50.

ILIUS OF PADUA. The Defender of Peace. Vol. 2. Tr. from the Latin with introd. by Alan Gewirth. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 541. $8.50.

IN, CECIL P. Psychology, Evolution and Sex. Springfield, Ill.; Charles C Thomas. Pp. 176. $4.75.

IN, WILLIAM OLIVER. The Order and Integration of Knowledge. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1957. Pp. viii + 355. $6.50.

This study of the kinds of knowledge and their inter-relation is directed both to philosophers and to educators. In principle Aristotelian, the author is well acquainted with current movements and takes account of the contemporary situation. His basic schema is the levels of abstraction, but he handles them in a new way. His most original contribution is the notion of integrative knowledges which depend directly upon other knowledges.

ALL, E. L. Christian Theology and Natural Science: Some Questions on Their Relations. New York: Ronald Press; Jan., 1957. $4.50.

HEWS, W. R. The Religious Philosophy of Dean Mansel. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 23. Paper, 60¢

ON, R.; MERTON, R. K.; GELLHORN, W. Freedom to Read. New York: R. . Bowker Co., 1957. $2.50.

, JOHN STUART. On Liberty. Ed. by Currin V. Shields. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956. Pp. xxviii + 141. Paper, 65¢

This excellent reprint has the usual good format and production of the works published previously in the "Library of Liberal Arts." The introduction gives a brief but understanding account of Mill's life and works; then it presents the background and theme of the present work; finally, it indicates certain lines of criticism which a discerning reader should keep in mind. For all its brevity, it is really an excellent introduction.

AGU, ASHLEY. The Biosocial Nature of Man. New York: Grove Press, 956. Pp. 123. $2.50; paper, $1.00.

IS, CHARLES. Varieties of Human Value. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago ress, 1956. Pp. 223. $5.00.

YN, ADRIAN C. Structure, Function, and Purpose. New York: Liberal rts Press, 1957.

MOUNIER, EMMANUAL. Character of Man. New York: Harper & Bros.; Jan., 1956. $6.00.

MUELLER, IRIS WESSEL. John Stuart Mill and French Thought. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press; Mar., 1956. Pp. 275. $4.00.

MUNITZ, MILTON K. The Moral Philosophy of Santayana. New York, Humanities Press. $3.50.

MURRAY, GILBERT. The Literature of Ancient Greece. 3d ed. Chicago: Phoenix Press; Aug., 1956. Pp. 420. $1.75.

MYERS, HENRY ALONZO. Tragedy: A View of Life. Ithaca, Cornell Univ. Press. Pp. 224. $3.50.

NAGEL, ERNEST. Logic without Metaphysics; Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Glencoe: Free Press; Jan., 1956. $6.00.

NELSON, LEONARD. System of Ethics. Tr. from the German by Norbert Guterman. Foreword by H. J. Paton. Introd. by Julius Kraft. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 308. $5.00.

NIESS, ROBERT J. Julien Benda. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Nov., 1956. Pp. 350. $6.50.

NOON, WILLIAM. Joyce and Aquinas. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; Mar., 1957. $3.75.

NOONAN, JOHN PATRICK, S.J. General Metaphysics. Chicago: Loyola Univ Press, 1957. Pp. 282. $2.90.

O'DONNELL, THOMAS J. Morals in Medicine. Westminster: Newman Press, 1956. Pp. 298. $3.75.

OPPENHEIMER, ROBERT. The Constitution of Matter. Eugene, Ore.: State System of Higher Educ., 1956. Pp. 44. Paper, $1.00.

OSBORN, E. F. Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Apr., 1957. $4.75.

PARKER, DeWITT H. The Philosophy of Value. Preface by William K. Frankena. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, Feb., 1957. Pp. 272. $5.00.

PARKIN, CHARLES. The Moral Basis of Burke's Political Thought. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. viii + 145. $2.50.

The author maintains that, though it is a commonplace that Burke's political theory rested on a moral doctrine, no one has ever worked this doctrine out systematically. Burke himself had not done so, and several recent writers have seen in his moral statements only a collection of unrelated and inconsistent maxims, governed by the principle of expediency.

The present study tries to build up a systematic view. The author first shows that Burke held a form of contract theory, one more ancient than that of the French Revolution. He presents Burke's view on the natural relation between society and government. He shows that Burke's attacks on "abstract natural rights" and on "abstract idealism" in politics are coherent and of one piece. He then takes up Burke's positive view of the moral order and its basis in the recognition of God as the source of all law and right.

The most illuminating contribution is the insight that the attack on "abstract natural rights," "abstract idealism," and "abstract reason" are all of a piece. A rationalist extremism parades as metaphysically grounded, as pure and noble, but under the cover of generalities it permits full expression of passion in private life and tyranny in politics. Reason in ethics is not the pretended pure reason of the philosophe, but experientially grounded reason guided by right appetite and moderated by prudence that envisages all the complexities of reality.

PATTERSON, CHARLES H. Moral Standards. An Introduction to Ethics. ed. New York: Ronald Press, 1957. Pp. ix + 535. $5.50.

This second edition is completely revised; in particular, it includes new matter in a rather full discussion of contemporary naturalism and in new applications to social and political problems. The book has three parts. In the first, the author analyzes the basic notion of ethics and compares the notion of a moral standard to the complete subjectivity of relativism. In the second part, he considers the various ways in which moral standards are discovered and stated (intuitionalism, formalism, hedonism, naturalism, self-realization, and Christian ethics). In the third part, some basic problems are examined: freedom, responsibility, goodness and its relation to motives and rewards, and the function of ethics in business, the professions, and politics.

For the author's purposes (the teaching of an introductory course in a state-supported school), the text seems quite well done. The student should be able to clarify his own ideas and to reach some reasoned basis for them. Incidentally, it might be pointed out that the author's view of Christianity could be qualified as "liberal."

CE. CHARLES SANTIAGO SANDERS. Chance, Love, and Logic. New York: George Braziller, 1956. Pp. 351. $5.00.

osophers Speak for Themselves. From Thales to Plato. Tr. from the reek. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956. Pp. 406. Paper, 1.50.

ET, JEAN. Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence. ew York: Basic Books; Feb., 1957. $6.75.

ET, JEAN, and INHELDER, BÄRBEL. The Child's Conception of Space. r. from the French by F. J. Langdon and J. L. Lunzer. New York: umanities Press, 1956. Pp. 502. $8.00.

DELLA MIRANDOLA, GIOVANNI. Oration on the Dignity of Man. Tr. rom the Italian by A. Robert Caponigri. Introd. by Russell Kirk. hicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956. Pp. 52. Paper, 75¢

FR, JOSEF. The Silence of St. Thomas. Tr. J. Murray, S.J., and . O'Connor. New York: Pantheon Books; Mar., 1957. Pp. 128. $2.75.

O. Protagoras. B. Jowett's trans. revised by Martin Ostwald. Ed. ith an introd. by Gregory Vlastos. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 956. Pp. lviii + 69. Paper, 75¢

In its revision, the translation has become both more readable and ore accurate. The lengthy introduction highlights the method of easoning employed by Plato. Professor Vlastos has a kind of linuistic interpretation of the Forms which differs from most traditional theories. In addition, he holds that there are flaws in the articular reasoning of Plato in this dialogue, and that the view of rotagoras has much to recommend it. These views are maintained with onsiderable skill.

____. Protagoras and Meno. Tr. from the Greek with an introd. by . K. C. Guthrie. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1956. Pp. 157. Paper, 5¢

INUS. The Enneads. Tr. by Stephen MacKenna. New York: Pantheon ooks, 1957. $12.50.

IN, RICHARD H., and STROLL, AVRUM. Philosophy Made Simple. Garden ity: Garden City Books, 1956. Pp. 191. Paper, $1.00.

IAN-MINDLIN, E. (ed.). Psychoanalysis as Science. Reissue. New ork: Basic Books; Oct., 1956. $4.25.

AKRISHNAN, SARVEPALLI, and MOORE, CHARLES A. (eds.). Source Book in ndian Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Mar., 1957. 5.00.

SIR HERBERT EDWARD. The Nature of Literature. New York: Horizon ress, 1956. Pp. 381. $5.00.

REICHENBACH, HANS. From Copernicus to Einstein. Tr. Ralph B. Winn. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1947. Pp. 93. Paper, 95¢

_____. The Rise of Scientific Philosophy. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1956. Pp. 344. Paper, $1.50.

ROTHSTEIN, JEROME. Communication, Organization, and Science. Indian Hills, Colo.: Falcon's Wing Press; Apr., 1957. $4.00.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND. Logic and Knowledge. Essays, 1901-1950. Ed. by Robert C. Marsh. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. xi + 382. $4.50.

The editor has selected papers which are often referred to but which are for one or another reason unavailable for most students. In one case, the editor has translated a French article, which has been revised by Lord Russell himself. There are extremely brief introductions to each selection, locating them with reference to the rest of the writing and trying to show the particular stage of development. It will be a very useful collection.

RUSSELL, HUXLEY, NIEBUHR, MARITAIN, JUNG, and OTHERS. This Is My Philosophy. New York: Harper & Bros.; Jan., 1957. $4.95.

SAMBURSKY, S. The Physical World of the Greeks. Tr. from the Hebrew Merton Dagut. New York: Macmillan Co., 1956. Pp. 265. $4.00.

SANTAYANA, GEORGE. Interpretations of Poetry and Religion. New York Harper & Bros.; Feb., 1957. $1.45.

_____. The Idler and his Works. Ed. by Daniel Cory. New York: George Braziller, 1957. Pp. 218. $4.00.

SCHAFFNER, BERTRAM HENRY (ed.). Group Processes. New York: Josiah M Jr., Foundation, 1956. Pp. 255. $3.50.

SCHLEGEL, DOROTHY B. Shaftesbury and the French Deists. Chapel Hill Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1956. Pp. 143. $4.75.

SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR. The World as Will and Representation. Tr. E. J. Payne. Indian Hills, Colo.: Falcon's Wing Press; June, 1957. $17.50.

SEARLES, HERBERT L. Logic and Scientific Methods. New York: Ronald Press, 1957. Pp. 378.

SELSAM, HOWARD. Revolution in Philosophy. New York: International Pubs.; Nov., 1956. $3.50.

SHAY, THEODORE L. The Legacy of the Lokamanza. New York: Oxford Uni Press, 1956. Pp. 215. $2.10.

SINNOTT, EDMUND WARE. Life and Mind. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1956. Pp. 29. Paper, 50¢

_____. Matter, Mind and Man. New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp 242. $3.50.

_____. The Biology of the Spirit. New York: Viking Press, 1955. Pp. 189. Paper, 95¢

SMETHURST, ARTHUR F. Modern Science and Christian Beliefs. Nashvill Abingdon Press, 1957. Pp. xx + 300. $4.00.

The author of this book has a doctor's degree in science and ha maintained his connection with scientific societies; he also holds honors degree in theology and is chancellor and canon of Salisbury Cathedral. The present work is in three parts. In the first, ge questions are taken up: the presuppositions of modern science, the Christian antecedents of science, the virtues of a scientist, and use and limitations of science. In the second part, some problems the special sciences are treated, from physics, the life sciences, and characterology. In the third part, miracles and creeds are di cussed. There are four appendices: on logical positivism, dialec cal materialism, existentialism, and the problem of communication.

The author maintains that the presuppositions of natural scien

can be justified only by theology (an idea similar to that proposed by several theologian-philosophers at the Free University of Amsterdam) and that science does not touch the individual and existential side of man (ideas akin to those of Martin Buber). On the other hand, the author maintains that creeds (and to some extent even Scripture) are not to be taken literally and that dogma must always be reformable. The appendices (except the fourth) are too short to be of much value.

TH, T. V. (ed.). Philosophers Speak for Themselves. From Aristotle to Plotinus. Tr. from the Greek and the Latin. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956. Paper, $1.50.

TH, T. V., and GRENE, MARJORIE. Berkeley, Hume and Kant. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. $1.75.

_____. Descartes to Locke. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. $1.75.

TH, WILSON. Professors and Public Ethics. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 251. $4.00.

CHIES, J. R. Analysis of Perception. Preface by Sir Russell Brain. New York: Humanities Press, 1956. Pp. 153. $4.00.

ER, EDMUND DAVISON. The Inevitable Choice. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1957. Pp. 192. $2.50.

NOZA, BARUCH. The Road to Inner Freedom. Ed. with an introd. by Dagobert D. Runes. New York, Philosophical Lib. $3.00.

VENS, RAYMOND, and OTHERS (eds.). A Scientific Sampler. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956. Pp. 431. $6.00.

LIVAN, DANIEL J. Introduction to Philosophy. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co.; Mar., 1957. $3.75.

LOR, RICHARD W., and OTHERS. Life, Language, Law: Essays in Honor of Arthur F. Bentley. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press; Jan., 1956. $5.00.

LOR, STANLEY. Conceptions of Institutions and the Theory of Knowledge. Foreword by Philip M. Hauser. New York: Bookman Associates, 1956. Pp. 175. $4.00.

HOOR, MARTEN. Certainties and Uncertainties in Education. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 56. Paper, $1.00.

These two lectures were given at the College of Education. The author shows that the extremely complex nature of the educational process prevents the easy discovery of scientific laws governing educational practice and that philosophic principles are too remote to provide detailed direction. He then urges a moderation and open-mindedness in the face of current controversies, which will be more likely to ensure success and also will lessen the tension between the various groups engaged in education and in teacher training.

ANT, FREDERICK ROBERT. Philosophical Theology. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1956. 2 vols. Vol. 1, 438 p.; vol. 2, 290 p. Vol. 1, $8.50; vol. 2, $5.50.

MAS AQUINAS, ST. Exposition of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. Tr. Pierre Conway, O.P.; rev. William H. Kane, O.P. Quebec: M. Doyon, 1956. Pp. xvi + 449. Paper, mimeographed, $6.00.

The translator has given a very brief introduction to the work and to his own translation. The text is that of the Leonine edition; the Aristotelian text commented on is not given, but the analytic outlines at the head of each "lecture" are given in full. There is a detailed index.

The translation does not aim at elegance but at accuracy. This, together with the omission of the Aristotelian text commented on, makes for very difficult reading at times. Nevertheless, it is a most valuable work and should be in every library.

_____. On the Truth of the Catholic Faith: Summa contra Gentiles. Book 4, Salvation. Garden City: Hanover House; Feb., 1957. $3.00; paper, 95¢

_____. Summa Theologiae, Tertia Pars. "Cura et Studio Instituti Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis," Vol. IV. Ottawa: Commissio Pia 1953. Pp. lxvii + 2413-3089 + 16.

First published between 1941 and 1946, the "Ottawa" edition of t Summa has come to be regarded as one of the most useful and convenient editions. The second edition contains the same text and notes but revised and corrected. The paper is a bit heavier, the binding and covers more solid. At $24.00 (Canadian) for the set of five vo umes, it remains at a very reasonable price level.

THORNDIKE, LYNN. History of Magic and Experimental Science. Vols. 7 and 8. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Apr., 1957. $10.00 each.

THORPE, W. H. Learning and Instinct in Animals. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press. $10.00.

TODD, JOHN MURRY (ed.). The Springs of Morality. New York: Macmillan Co., 1956. Pp. 334. $6.00.

Tulane Studies in Philosophy. New Orleans: Tulane Univ. Press, 1956. Pp. 93. Paper, $2.00.

Like the preceding volumes in this series, this volume contains number of unrelated essays. The titles and authors are: "Category and Paradox," by Edward G. Ballard; "Contingency, Causality and Com mon Sense," by Richard L. Barber; "On the Universal and the Individ al," by James K. Feibleman; "On Responsibility," by Carl H. Hamburg "Knowledge and Truth in Historical Inquiry," by Harold N. Lee; "Hom geneity and Invariance," by Paul G. Morrison; "Classifications of Supposition in Medieval Logic," by Louise Nisbet Roberts; and "Pro- legomena to a Modern Philosophical Theism," by Robert C. Whittemore

VAN LAER, PIERRE HENRI, and KOREN, HENRY J. Philosophy of Science. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press. Pp. 181. $3.75; paper, $3.00.

VON HILDEBRAND, DIETRICH, and JOURDAIN, ALICE. Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality. New York: David McKay Co.; Mar., 1957. $3.50.

WARRENDER, HOWARD. Political Philosophy of Hobbes. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Apr., 1957. $6.75.

WHITE, LYNN TOWNSEND, JR. (ed.). Frontiers of Knowledge in the Study Man. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956. Pp. 342. $4.50.

WHITE, MORTON. Toward Reunion in Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard Univ Press; Apr., 1956. Pp. 308. $5.75.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH. Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead. Record by Lucien Price. New American Lib., 1956. Pp. 320. Paper, 50¢

_____. The Concept of Nature. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Feb., 1957. $1.35.

[WHORF, BENJAMIN LEE.] Language, Thought, and Reality. Selected Writ ings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Ed. with introd. by John B. Carroll. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1956. Pp. 278. $7.00.

WILSON, CURTIS. William Heytesbury: Medieval Logic and the Rise of Mathematical Physics. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press; Sept., 19 Pp. 231. $4.00.

WINDELBAND, W. History of Ancient Philosophy. New York: Dover Pubns. Oct., 1956. $3.50; paper, $1.75.

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Ed. G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe; tr. G. E. M. Ans combe. New York: Macmillan Co., 1956. Pp. xix + xix^e + 204 + 196^e $5.75.

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